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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate householder self-evacuation during an Australian 
bushfire. Bushfires in the Perth Hills in January 2014 and a year later in the Adelaide Hills 
burnt large areas of semi-residential and rural land, damaged and destroyed homes and 
infrastructure and resulted in the self-evacuation of thousands of residents.  The investigation 
of self-evacuation during these bushfires involved exploring the range of factors influencing 
householders’ decisions to evacuate or remain and defend their property, identifying factors 
predicting evacuation and characterising self-evacuators. This investigation, also established 
whether the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) was an appropriate theoretical 
framework for the analysis of decision-making in Australian bushfire and how it could be 
improved to better meet these needs. 
 
A Critical Realist philosophy guided the research strategy because it provides a rationale for 
the development and testing of theories and hypotheses about structures, generative 
mechanisms and context that accommodates the descriptive nature of the Protective Action 
Decision Model which is used as the theoretical and analytical framework of this thesis. It 
provides the rationale for a retroductive analysis of householder self-evacuation decision-
making in developing understandings of mechanisms and structures in the real domain.   
Critical realism takes account of the open and dynamic nature of the ‘actual’ domain in which 
context and conditions effect householders’ self-evacuation decisions during bushfire.  
Finally, the Critical Realist philosophy, through its effective separation of ontology and 
epistemology, facilitates the simultaneous use of quantitative and qualitative methods and 
therefore the mixed methods approach to this research.  
 
A mixed methods research strategy was used involving data collection and analysis of 
quantitative telephone surveys of 457 bushfire-affected participants and face-to-face 
interviews of 109 participants in 59 households.  This strategy utilised the researcher’s skills 
in the design and analysis of quantitative survey research and semi-structured face-to-face 
interviewing. It facilitated theory testing, discovery of phenomena and theory generation. The 
mixed methods strategy enabled triangulation of results, greater completeness of data, 
broadened insights into structures and processes, and supported detailed explanation, vivid 
illustration and general enhancement of findings.  
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Survey data were analysed quantitatively using SPSS 22, 23 and 24 generating descriptive 
statistics, inferential statistics including cross-tabulation of variables, Chi-square, expected 
count and standardised residual statistics. Binary logistic regression was used to identify factors 
that predicted householder evacuation. A K-means cluster procedure and discriminant function 
analysis were used to establish the characteristics of self-evacuators.  
 
Qualitative data collected through face-to-face interviews were all transcribed and analysed 
thematically using the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) 
NVivo Versions 11. 
 
The study found that many of the factors incorporated in the PADM, including environmental 
and social cues and warnings and householders’ perceptions of the threat, of hazard 
adjustments and of other stakeholders, influenced self-evacuation decision-making. Three of 
these factors were shown to predict evacuating or not evacuating.  Hazard adjustment 
perceptions were most important in predicting evacuation, especially the effectiveness of 
evacuating or not evacuating in protecting personal safety or property. Knowledge and skills 
and the costs involved in evacuating or remaining also predicted evacuating or not evacuating 
but were of lesser importance. The receipt of warnings from emergency authorities was a 
highly important actor in predicting self-evacuation as was the perception of likely impact of 
the bushfire on property although to a lesser degree.  The extent to which householders 
undertook long-run hazard adjustments i.e. actions to prepare for or mitigate the impact of 
bushfire, although not predicting evacuation, shaped their perceptions of the effectiveness of 
both evacuating and remaining in protecting personal safety and property.  The study also 
developed a clearer picture of the characteristics of self-evacuators. It identified seven 
archetypes that characterised householders’ self-evacuation attitudes and behaviour including 
Threat, and Responsibility Deniers, Dependent, and Considered Evacuators, Community 
Guided and Experienced Independents. 
 
The self-evacuation decision-making behaviour of householders confronted by a bushfire 
threat is complex and varied, but perceptions of the effectiveness of protective actions, the 
receipt of official warnings and, to a lesser extent, perception of threat to property are central 
to taking protective action. The extent of householders, personal and property preparation and 
equipping for firefighting was pivotal to their hazard adjustment perceptions and 
consequently to their protective action decision-making. While the PADM provided an 
extremely effective theoretical framework for this thesis it requires some adjustment to 
 3 
 
incorporate the influence of long-run hazard adjustments on protective action decision-
making in an Australian bushfire.  
 4 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Bushfire Self-Evacuation 
 
The impact of bushfire (or wildfire in North America) on human populations in Australia is a 
significant and growing problem exacerbated by the effects of climate change (Bradstock, 
Cohn, Gill, Bedward, & Lucas, 2009; IPCC Fifth Assessment Report Working Group II, 2014; 
Liu, Stanfurf, & Goodrick, 2010) that has increased the frequency and severity of bushfires 
(Clarke, Lucas, & Smith, 2013; Head, Adams, McGregor, & Toole, 2014; Sharples et al., 
2016). Expanding urbanisation of populations into bushfire prone areas especially on the urban/ 
rural interface (WUI) (Buxton, Haynes, Mercer, & Butt, 2011) has also exacerbated the 
bushfire problem. Australian householders confronted by an imminent bushfire threat must 
make crucial decisions to evacuate or to remain and defend their property (Tibbits, Handmer, 
Haynes, Lowe, & Whittaker, 2008) but the factors influencing these decisions are not well 
understood (McLennan, Elliott, & Omodei, 2012). This thesis explores the factors that 
influenced residents’ decisions to self-evacuate in the face of bushfires in three suburbs of the 
Perth Hills in January 2014 and in townships and rural areas in the Adelaide Hills in January 
2015.  
 
The Perth and Adelaide Hills bushfires were of different size and duration and involved 
different dominant vegetation types and topographies but the similarities in the threat to and 
uncertainties for the resident populations provided an opportunity to investigate householders’ 
self-evacuation decision-making. The circumstances of the bushfires enabled a detailed study 
of the diverse and related factors that played a part in determining householders’ self-
evacuation response. These factors included: how they became aware of the bushfire; their 
perceptions of the threat it posed; how they thought their neighbours and the emergency 
services were responding to it; the warnings that they received both from official sources and 
from their family and friends; and ultimately, how they decided to respond to it, by evacuating 
or remaining at their property. It also offered the opportunity to establish, from these factors, 
which had the greatest influence on the householders’ protective action, and specifically, which 
factors predicted a householders’ decision to self-evacuate. Finally, it was also possible to 
characterise different self-evacuator archetypes.  Unique combinations of factors played 
differential roles in householders’ self-evacuation decisions, involved diverse considerations, 
were reached for very different reasons and were arrived at along distinctive decision-making 
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routes. Different types of self-evacuators are characterised by the roles that factors influencing 
self-evacuation played in their decision-making.     
 
Bushfire is an unplanned fire that burns in natural surroundings including forest, woodlands, 
shrub, scrub, and grass. Bush means any part of the urban-rural interface or rural country side 
and does not refer to particular vegetation types (Luke & McArthur, 1986). The nature and 
behaviour of a bushfire, including its scale and intensity and the speed at which it spreads, 
depend on a complexity of factors that influence the way fuel, oxygen and heat interact, such 
as fuel load and moisture content, wind speed, ambient temperature, relative humidity, and the 
slope and orientation of the terrain (Geoscience Australia., 2014). This complex combination 
of factors can produce unpredictable, highly changeable and dynamic outcomes that are 
difficult for householders to understand and predict (Burrows, 1999; Neale, Weir, & McGee, 
2016; Tolhurst & McCarthy, 2016). 
Major bushfires are typically of large-scale, can devastate hundreds of thousands of hectares 
and in some cases, burn for days or weeks. There have been six bushfires recorded in Australia 
since 1851 involving a burnt area of more than 1 million hectares, and twelve fires in the last 
twenty years covering areas of more than 100,000 hectares (Australian Emergency 
Management Knowledge Hub, 2014). Between 1901 and 2011, 260 major bushfires occurred 
in Australia resulting in 825 fatalities (Bianchi et al., 2014). The worst and most recent “Black 
Saturday” bushfires of February 7, 2009 killed 173 people and destroyed 2039 homes (Teague, 
McLeod, & Pascoe, 2010). 
Notwithstanding the experience of the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires, and the subsequent 
recommendations of the Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission (VBRC) (Teague et al., 2010), 
community bushfire safety policy in Australia continues to be founded on a number of enduring 
propositions, which are themselves based on research evidence. First, well prepared houses can 
be successfully defended against bushfire and provide refuge as the fire front passes (Bianchi 
& Leonard, 2008; Handmer & Tibbits, 2005; Whittaker, Haynes, Handmer, & McLennan, 
2013)  except in catastrophic fire weather conditions (Australasian Fire and Emergency 
Services Authorities Council, 2012). People who are mentally, physically and emotionally 
capable and have the required skills, equipment and resources are capable of bushfire defence 
(Handmer & Tibbits, 2005). Second, timely evacuation, well in advance of the bushfire threat 
is the safest option (Country Fire Authority, 2012; Tibbits et al., 2008), and late evacuation is 
an inherently dangerous response to a bushfire (Handmer & Tibbits, 2005; Haynes, Handmer, 
McAneney, Tibbits, & Coates, 2010; Tibbits & Whittaker, 2007; Whittaker et al., 2013). Third, 
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householders must rely on their own resources in responding to bushfire because the resources 
available to the emergency services to assist in property defence or evacuation are relatively 
limited, especially in major fires (Whittaker et al., 2013).  
In a post-Black Saturday context, Australian bushfire safety policy focuses on both greater 
predictability of bushfire risk and enhanced capability for responding in ways that will increase 
safety and survival. Community bushfire-safety policy strongly advocates householders decide 
to evacuate well before a bushfire becomes a threat, or to stay and actively defend their 
property. Emergency authorities promote leaving well in advance of a bushfire threat as the 
safest option. Fire Danger Ratings (FDRs) are issued forecasting levels of bushfire danger at 
least 24 hours in advance. For Code Red (Catastrophic) and Extreme forecast fire danger days, 
people are advised in advance to remove themselves from the risk area even if a bushfire is not 
in progress in that area (Country Fire Authority, 2014). Total fire Bans (TFB) are declared by 
the authorities on days when fires are likely to spread rapidly and could be difficult to control. 
During a Total Fire Ban fires in the open or activities in the open that may cause fire are 
prohibited. The policy also promotes the preparation of houses and property by both those who 
intend to stay and defend and those who intend to evacuate. Property and fire-fighting 
equipment preparation increases the likelihood of active self-defence and property protection, 
allows firefighters to more effectively defend evacuated properties and supports the efforts of 
neighbours who remain and defend (Country Fire Authority., 2012). Bushfire safety policy also 
promotes the development of a comprehensive bushfire plan, which encourages householders 
to decide in advance of the fire season, whether they remain and defend against, or evacuate 
from, an imminent bushfire threat. In highlighting the extreme danger of late evacuation it 
strongly advocates careful monitoring of the bushfire including being alert to official bushfire 
warnings (Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council, 2012). 
Evidence suggests however that many householders in bushfire prone areas do not take 
protective actions or behave in the manner promoted by bushfire safety policy. Most do not 
remove themselves from areas of potential disaster risk on days of Code Red and Extreme 
bushfire danger (Reid & Beilin, 2013; Whittaker & Handmer, 2010). Many householders in 
bushfire prone areas perceive bushfire preparation as undertaking “easy to do” actions (Gilbert, 
2014; Rhodes, 2011) including gardening and general property maintenance. Many 
householders do not undertake systematic planning of property defence or of their evacuation. 
Few bushfire plans are written, take account of possible unexpected contingencies or have been 
practiced by the household (Gilbert, 2014; Rhodes, 2011). Many householders intend to ‘wait 
and see’ how a bushfire develops before deciding whether they will remain or evacuate 
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(Dunlop, McNeil, Skinner, & Morrison, 2012; Gilbert, 2014; Whittaker & Handmer, 2010) 
notwithstanding the strong emphasis of bushfire safety policy on making a clear-cut decision 
to leave early, well in advance of any bushfire. Householders who wait and see tend to 
undertake fewer preparations of their property and for their evacuation compared to those who 
make a definite decision in advance to stay and defend or to evacuate (Dunlop et al., 2012). 
Some of those who plan to stay and defend have only a partial commitment to that course of 
action and retain late evacuation as an option (Tibbits & Whittaker, 2007). Uncertainty about 
when to leave and the inability to recognise when leaving is no longer safe was a major problem 
for the previous ‘Prepare, Stay and Defend or Leave Early’ policy (Tibbits & Whittaker, 2007; 
Whittaker et al., 2013) and continues to be a problem for the current policy. There is 
considerable evidence about householders’ intentions and actions during an Australian bushfire 
based on research arising out of past disasters and Inquiries but limited research on the factors 
that drive protective action decisions and how householders come to those decisions 
(McLennan et al., 2012; McLennan, Elliott, Omodei, & Whittaker, 2013). The reasons for the 
considerable differences in householders’ protective behaviour during bushfire, and the 
archetypal groups that they reflect, are not well understood (nous Group., 2013), although 
research insights in this area would provide the basis for significant improvements to public 
policy.  
Research is therefore needed, to improve understanding of the basis of householders’ protective 
actions in an Australian bushfire through a comprehensive examination of the factors that 
influence hazard related decision-making. Social psychological theories have recently had 
some limited use in Australian (Beatson & McLennan, 2011; McLennan, Cowlishaw, Paton, 
Beatson, & Elliot, 2014; McLennan, Paton, & Beatson, 2015) and international (McCaffrey, 
Toman, Stidham, & Shindler, 2013, 2014) bushfire research to establish underlying causes of 
problems, means of behavioural change and reasons for the ineffectiveness of some approaches 
(Trifeletti, Gielen, Sleet, & Hopkins, 2005). Australian researchers primarily use expectancy-
valence based models (Vroom, 1964), Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) and 
Rogers’ (1983) Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) that posit that behaviour can be predicted 
from an individual’s tendencies toward different outcomes, the means by which they take 
actions to achieve those outcomes and their expectations of the relationship between their 
efforts and successful performance to achieve outcomes. Preference of some researchers for 
these models is based on the growing evidence of their effective use in ‘wildfire research, 
compared with other theoretical frameworks’ (McLennan, Paton, & Beatson, 2015).  
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This thesis uses the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) (Lindell, 2013, 2014; Lindell 
& Hwang, 2008; Lindell & Perry, 2004, 2012; Lindell et al., 2015) as a theoretical framework.  
The PADM is a judgement and decision-making (JDM) stage model at the descriptive end of 
the normative-descriptive  continuum (Lindell, 2014). It has been applied to describe and 
analyse the decision-making and behaviour of populations subject to threat from earthquake,  
hurricane , tornado and nuclear accident (Chaney, Weaver, Youngblood, & Pitts, 2013; Cohen 
& Weinsch, 2015; Huang, Lindell, Prater, Wu, & Siebeneck, 2010; Kuligowski, 2013; Lindell 
et al., 2015; Terpstra & Lindell, 2009). The PADM is unlike other accepted behaviour models 
in that it takes account of situational conditions including social context, environmental cues 
and social information as factors that affect the process of decision-making and protective 
action adoption and is consequently preferred as a theoretical and analytical framework for this 
thesis (Lindell & Perry, 2012). 
 
1.2. Research Context and Objectives  
 
Australian bushfire self-evacuation research is set in a unique context in which householders 
must decide for themselves whether they evacuate or remain. The research on evacuation from 
natural hazards overwhelmingly originates in North America and addresses a range of hazards 
other than bushfire, including most commonly hurricane, tornado and earthquake that are, 
unlike bushfire, not defendable. Although flood, like bushfire is defendable, significant flood 
defence by individuals is limited largely to sandbagging. North American emergency 
authorities have mandatory powers to order compliance to evacuation orders of at-risk 
communities whereas Australian authorities, while having the powers (Eburn, 2014), do not 
generally compulsorily evacuate residents from bushfire. Evacuation research in Australia is 
therefore in fact about self-evacuation.  
 
Research on the factors that motivate protective decisions and how they are reached in 
bushfires is limited (McLennan et al., 2012; McLennan et al., 2013). Research on self-
evacuation, as one of the two key protective responses to bushfire is also limited despite 
significant research undertaken following the Black Saturday bushfires (McLennan et al., 2012; 
McLennan et al., 2013). The PADM provides a theoretical framework to examine factors 
influencing self-evacuation decision-making during bushfire.  
The objective of this research is therefore to identify factors that influence householders’ self-
evacuation during bushfire. Specifically, the research questions are:  
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i. What are the factors that influence householders’ decisions to self-evacuate? 
ii. What factors predict self-evacuation? 
iii. What are the characteristics of self-evacuators? 
iv. What improvements can be made to the PADM to enable better analysis of 
householder self-evacuation decision-making? 
 
1.3. Research Methods  
 
To establish the extent and importance of factors that influence an Australian householders’ 
decision to self-evacuate from a bushfire, a philosophical framework based on constructivist 
ontology and a critical realist epistemology (Bhaskar, 2008) underpinned a mixed methods 
research strategy (Rossman & Rallis, 2012; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010; Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009) for the collection and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data. The 
mixed methods strategy incorporated quantitative telephone surveys (n=457), containing some 
qualitative elements and a qualitative semi-structured interview of households recruited 
through the telephone survey (n=59) involving survey respondents and adult household 
members (n=109) who had evacuated from the bushfire. A breadth of quantitative data was 
required to capture all the elements of, and their influence on, self-evacuation decision-making. 
A large quantitative sample was also necessary to enable the use of robust statistical models to 
identify factors predicting self-evacuation and characterise self-evacuators. Qualitative data 
were vital in three ways. First, they enabled triangulation with quantitative results for a more 
complete view of the overall findings. Second, they provided insights into how decision-
making factors coalesced to produce the complexity of actions taken by individual 
householders confronted by a bushfire threat. Third, they supported detailed explanation, vivid 
illustration and general enhancement of quantitative findings.  
 
Quantitative data were collected in the Perth and Adelaide Hills approximately two months 
after the bushfires were extinguished and qualitative face-to-face interviews were conducted a 
further two months after the completion of the quantitative stages. All data in Perth were 
collected between March and August 2014 while Adelaide data were gathered between 
February and June 2015. 
 
Quantitative data were analysed using frequency analyses, cross tabulations, binary logistics 
regressions, cluster analyses and discriminant function analyses. Qualitative data were 
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thematically analysed using NVivo 10 and 11 to clarify and synthesize insights and 
interpretations and to build householders’ stories into an analysis. A triangulation design 
(Creswell and Plano Clark 2007) using both the quantitative and qualitative results enriched 
the analysis. 
 
The research sought and received prior written approval from the College Human Ethics 
Advisory Network (CHEAN) of RMIT University (Appendix D).   
 
1.4. Research Outcomes  
 
This research will provide detailed insight into three important aspects of householders’ 
decisions to self-evacuate. First it will establish, as comprehensively as possible, the range of 
factors that influence self-evacuation decision making in bushfire. This includes a detailed 
examination of the protective action decision-making process, involving initial awareness of 
the bushfire threat, assessment of whether it is likely to require a response, search for and choice 
of an appropriate protective response, and implementation of that choice. The PADM, as a 
descriptive model designed specifically for the analysis of hazard decision-making, 
incorporates a broad range of factors and interrelationships within its framework and provides 
a valuable guide for identifying and defining factors influencing bushfire self-evacuation.  
 
Second, this study will isolate from this broad range of factors influencing self-evacuation, 
those that are fundamental to understanding decision-making because they predict whether a 
householder will choose evacuation as their preferred protective action. Knowing these 
fundamentally important factors may assist policy makers to focus their efforts on the things 
that make a difference to householder decision-making and to develop effective programs and 
activities to enhance self-evacuation decision-making.   
 
It is not enough to simply understand the factors, even the fundamental factors, that influence 
self-evacuation from a bushfire. It is also necessary, thirdly, to have some understanding of the 
characteristics of self-evacuators so that the factors specific to them that are most influential, 
the routes taken to come to a decision to leave, and the way this might be achieved, can be 
better understood. These insights can provide important guides to the emergency services in 
designing community education programs and managing self-evacuation of residents 
threatened in a bushfire event. 
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This study provides a unique opportunity for assessing the strengths and shortcomings of the 
PADM as a theoretical and analytical framework for understanding decision-making and 
behaviour and its relevance in the Australian bushfire context. Suggestions for modification, 
extension and improvement of the model will be aimed at increasing its usefulness in the 
analysis of decision-making in Australian bushfire. 
 
1.5. Structure of the Thesis  
 
The thesis comprises eight chapters.  Chapter 2 reviews English-language social science 
academic literature on protective action decision-making, focusing on evacuation. It reviews 
decision theory, highlighting the flaws and biases in individuals’ decision-making and 
concluding that descriptive decision theories explicitly incorporate individuals’ beliefs and 
values into decision-making. Expectancy-valence theory based decision-making models 
including the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) and protection motivation theory (PMT) are 
discussed and the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) is advanced as providing the 
most appropriate theoretical framework for addressing the research questions. The key 
elements of the PADM are discussed, detailing how the coalescing of environmental and social 
cues, warnings and information and householder’s core psychological perceptions generate a 
decision-making process whose outcome is a protective response.  The research questions are 
founded on the proposition arising out of the literature, that bushfire self-evacuation decision-
making requires further elaboration using a framework incorporating the social and 
environmental context of the decision makers. 
  
Chapter 3 elaborates the research methodology, involving a mixed method approach that 
enables the triangulation of quantitative telephone survey data with qualitative data from face-
to-face interviews, creating rich insights into householders’ attitudes and behaviour. It outlines 
the quantitative and qualitative sampling approach, the development and testing of the 
telephone survey and the face-to-face interview field format, and provides a detailed 
explanation of the quantitative measures. The administration of data collection and techniques 
used in data analysis are summarized.  It also details how ethical issues were addressed and 
participants’ confidentiality and privacy protected. Finally, the delimitations of the scope of 
the research and limitations of data are identified.  
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Chapters 4 and 5 present separately, the results of the Perth Hills and Adelaide Hills bushfires, 
integrating quantitative and qualitative data using the elements of the PADM as an analytical 
framework. They report on how environmental and social cues and warnings provide insights 
to householders about the nature and progress of the bushfire and the potential threat it presents. 
Householders’ psychological perceptions of the threat, their bushfire preparations and their 
views of their neighbours and other stakeholders involved in the fires are a basis for their beliefs 
and values that guide decision-making. The process of protective action decision-making that 
is generated by the combination of cues, warnings and information about the fire and 
psychological perceptions and the protective action response (evacuating or remaining) is 
described.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses the findings of the research based on the aggregation of the Perth and 
Adelaide hills data. It first describes the role and interaction of the broad range of factors 
involved in self- evacuation decision-making. A model predicting householder self-evacuation 
applying binary logistics regression is developed in the second section. The factors that predict 
evacuation are identified and significant relationships between these predictor factors and 
bushfire threat, experience, and intrusiveness are elicited. In the third section, cluster analysis 
and discriminant function analysis identify and confirm seven archetypes that characterise self-
evacuators. The characteristics of self-evacuation archetypes provide a structure for 
interpreting householders’ behaviour during a bushfire and offer insights into why and how 
they undertake protective actions. 
 
Chapter 7 describes, explains, and interprets the implications and significance of the findings 
of the study focusing on whether they confirm the current knowledge around protective 
response to natural hazards and establish new understandings of the key factors influencing 
decision-making in self-evacuation. The model of factors predicting evacuation and the 
elaboration of seven different self-evacuation archetypes are central to this discussion.   
. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarising its key findings, explicitly answering the 
research questions, discussing its contribution to the knowledge, suggesting consequences for 
public policy and exploring its implications for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Deciding to Evacuate from a Natural Hazard 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Following Wisner (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004), disasters occur when people are 
caught between economic, social, cultural, ethnic and other processes that generate 
vulnerability and a natural hazard event leading to death, destruction, damage or disruption. A 
disaster occurs when a significant number of vulnerable people experience a hazard and suffer 
severe damage and/or disruption of their livelihood system in such a way that recovery is 
unlikely without aid (Wisner et al., 2004, p. 45). A natural disaster invokes a range of protective 
responses, including doing nothing, defending against the hazard, or evacuating. The focus of 
this thesis is the nature and role of factors that influence the decision to evacuate as a protective 
response to an Australian bushfire.   
 
This chapter summarises the history of decision theory and presents the fundamentals and key 
factors in decision-making. Normative models of decision-making that assume rational choice 
by perfectly knowledgeable individuals are presented with a focus on demonstrating them as 
incapable of reflecting the complex reality of decision-making during natural hazard (Perry, 
Lindell, & Greene, 1981, p. 27). Instead, models used specifically to analyse decision-making 
within a hazard context are examined to highlight their strengths when applied to natural hazard 
contexts. Specifically, the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM: (Lindell & Perry, 2012) 
is presented as most appropriate for the analysis of protective action decision-making within a 
hazard context because of its integration of both expectancy-valence theory and situational 
factors, including the social and environmental context. The elements of the PADM are 
explored in detail to identify and elaborate the factors that influence adoption of protective 
responses to all hazards including evacuation from a bushfire. The chapter than compares 
literature on evacuation from wildfire in North America, forest fire in Europe and bushfire in 
Australia. This chapter is concluded by outlining the key questions for the investigation of 
householders’ self-evacuation decision-making in an Australian bushfire.    
 
2.2. Fundamentals of Decision Theory 
 
Human behaviour involves individuals making choices between alternatives; this is the process 
of decision-making. An individual’s beliefs and values guide their decision-making. An 
understanding of the beliefs and values that motivate choices and actions is required to explain 
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and predict behaviour. Choice models attempt to explain rational choices between alternative 
actions where the consequences of those actions are not known with certainty. Decision theory, 
a subset of choice theory relevant to individuals, guides this discussion because, although 
household decision-making may involve a group of people rather than a single individual, these 
groups, typically family groups, act as single decision-makers (Petersen, 2009; Steele, 2014).  
 
Making a rational choice between alternatives subject to uncertainty has occupied 
philosophers, statisticians, and scholars for many hundreds of years since Christian Huygens 
in 1657. La Logique ou l’art de Penser by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole with 
contributions from Pascal in 1662 established the principle of maximising expected value (EV= 
pixi, where p represents… and x represents…) (Petersen, 2009). Daniel Bernouli introduced the 
notion of ‘moral value’ reflecting the decision maker’s view of good and evil; in the twentieth 
century, the concept became known as subjective utility. However, there is a fundamental flaw 
in assuming a single societal utility function shared by all decision-makers. Frank Ramsey 
addressed this flaw in his posthumously published paper (1931), in which he posited a set of 
eight axioms that a rational decision-maker uses to choose between uncertain prospects, and 
by implicitly ascribing numerical probabilities and values to outcomes, act consistently with 
the principle of maximising expected value. Within this notion, probability was an expression 
of a decision maker’s degree of belief regarding the occurrence of an event. Acceptance of the 
proposition of meaningful subjective probabilities implied that the attitudes and behaviour of 
a decision-maker could be used to assess situations where objective frequency data were not 
available. While unaware of Ramsey’s paper, von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) Theory 
of Games and Economic Behaviour introduced their concept of utility by reinterpreting 
Bernoulli’s notion of moral value. In their second edition (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1947), this time drawing on Ramsey’s work, they proposed a set of axioms applied by a rational 
decision-maker when choosing between outcomes to maximize expected utility. Leonard 
Savage (1954) further developed the axiomatic analysis of the principle of maximising 
expected utility by establishing systematic procedures for linking probability calculus to 
objectively observable behaviour. Peterson and Beach (1967) empirically examined subjective 
assessments by decision-makers in a range of situations. They concluded that their inferences, 
including means, variances, and correlations “are influenced by appropriate variables and in 
appropriate directions, but there are systematic discrepancies between normative and intuitive 
inferences” (pp. 42 - 43) in other words, man is an intuitive statistician and may act irrationally. 
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979) questioned the expected utility principle as an accurate 
description of how people make choices and emphasised the irrational behaviour of individuals 
who perceive a certain gain as worth more than an equally large expected gain. The certainty 
effect is based on people’s preference for certain gains and an equivalent aversion against 
certain losses. The authors also addressed people’s inability to distinguish properly between 
small probabilities and therefore violate the independence axiom. They proposed Prospect 
Theory, which modified the expected utility principle by introducing two weighting functions; 
one for value and one for probability. Decision-makers evaluate outcomes in terms of gains or 
losses referencing an S shaped function that reflects their unequal valuing of gains and losses. 
The probability weighting function is non-linear because people tend to overestimate small 
probabilities, and underestimate moderate and large probabilities. Diverse decision frames can 
be created, which generate different choices and sometimes result in preference reversals. 
Consistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s critique, Duncan Luce developed (1959, 2005) a 
probabilistic theory of utility after noting that people sometimes choose one alternative over 
another with a certain probability. Preference does not oscillate back and forth, but the 
decision-maker’s preference is probabilistic. The completeness axiom requires that a decision 
maker consistently either prefers A to B or B to A, for all A and B. Probabilistic choice behaviour 
identified and explained by Luce was therefore a violation of the completeness axiom. 
Violations of the transitivity axiom (A>B, B>C so A>C), which is a fundamental principle of 
rational choice, emerged from research that indicated the percentage of people with cyclic 
preference orderings (B ≻ A, C ≻ B but A ≻ C) is not negligible (Loomes & Taylor, 1992). 
 
The aim of decision theory was to formulate hypotheses about rational decision making that 
were accurate and precise. A decision is ‘an irrevocable choice of an action that has value-
relevant consequences’(Edwards & Fasolo, 2001, p. 582). A decision involves a set of 
alternatives that produce outcomes that have various utilities. Uncontrollable and uncertain 
events mean that alternatives faced by the decision-maker have more than one potential 
outcome. A decision is right if its outcome is at least as good as that of every other possible 
outcome. A decision is rational if the decision-maker chooses to do what he has most reason to 
do at the time of the decision. This instrumental rationality presupposes that the decision-maker 
has some aim that is itself external to decision theory and cannot be irrational. From this 
perspective, to be instrumentally rational is to do whatever one has most reason to expect will 
fulfil one’s aim.  
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Two primary components may be used to construct individual decision models; they are 
prospects and preferences. Prospects are themselves comprised of acts, states, and outcomes. 
Acts are things that decision-maker can do of their own volition (alternatives). States of the 
world (uncontrollable and uncertain events) confront the decision-maker with the need to 
decide between alternatives. Preferences indicate the decision-maker’s likes and dislikes for 
certain outcomes (Steele, 2014). Adapting an example from Lindell (2014, p. 404), evacuation 
decision information is presented in a matrix where the rows define the alternatives with 
various utilities, the columns define the states of the world with unknown probabilities and 
individual cells of the matrix define all possible outcomes of the decision. For example, a 
decision-maker may decide to evacuate from, or stay and defend against, a threatening bushfire 
(depending on his/her preferences). The bushfire may either hit or miss the property depending 
on a range of states of the world that are not known with certainty and may be continually 
changing. In cell A and B, the decision to evacuate means that no lives are lost; although in 
both cases there is an economic cost of evacuating and property damage specific to Cell B. In 
cell C, there is no economic cost of evacuating, no property damage or lives lost because the 
fire misses. In Cell D, property damage is experienced and lives are lost, although there is no 
economic cost of evacuating. 
 
Decisions are informed by a decision-maker’s judgement, which collectively comprise the 
identification of alternatives, the states of the world and their probabilities, and the decision-
makers’ preferences for certain outcomes. A judgement is an inference stemming from ‘one or 
more partially reliable cues, that provides incomplete and possibly conflicting information 
about an unobservable state’ of the world (Lindell, 2014, p. 405). There are two types of 
decision model: the first, normative models, explore normative questions about what rational 
decision-makers ought to do to act rationally; the second, descriptive models, consider what 
decision-makers actually do when presented with a set of alternatives. Descriptive decision 
theories seek to explain and predict how people make decisions; this is done by applying a 
conceptual understanding of how beliefs and desires (which reflect the subjective utility of acts 
and the subjective probability of states of the world) trigger decision makers’ choices, and their 
related actions and behaviour. 
 
Both normative and descriptive decision theories share Hume’s view that decisions are 
triggered by the decision-makers’ beliefs and desires. However, normative models, along 
Bayesian lines, do not provide a basis for understanding individuals’ actions based on values 
and beliefs because these models assume a highly idealised, rational person who “knows 
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Table 2.1 
Decision matrix. 
Protective Response Bushfire behaviour 
 Miss (p-1) Hit (p) 
Evacuate A. Cost of evacuating 
No property damage 
            No lives lost 
B. Cost of evacuating 
Property damage 
No lives lost 
Remain C. No cost of evacuating 
No property damage 
No lives lost  
D. No cost of evacuating 
Property damage 
Lives lost 
 
already from the beginning which act(s) to prefer” (Peterson, 2015, 206). The outputs of this 
normative decision model are probability functions and utility functions, which describe the 
decision-maker as an expected utility maximiser. “What Bayesian’s use as input data to their 
theories is exactly what a decision theorist would like to obtain as output” (Petersen, 2009, p. 
207). Non-Bayesian decision theories are comprised of externalist and internalist theories. 
Internalists embrace the Humean belief–desire account of practical rationality by which “acts 
can be interpreted and rationalised by identifying the beliefs and desires that prompted the 
decision-maker to perform the act in question” (Petersen, 2009, p. 208). “…rational decision-
makers choose an act over another to optimise their subjective expected utility”. A decision-
maker’s beliefs and desires in relation to one risky act relative to another is the basis for 
preferring one act over the other. Decision-maker’s preferences measure their degrees of belief 
and desire that “are the reasons for preferring one risky act over another.” Externalists reject 
the Humean belief–desire model of practical rationality as too narrow; instead they argue that 
in addition to the decision maker’s beliefs and desires, rationality is also shaped by facts about 
the external world. However, whether the conception of practical rationality requires something 
in addition to beliefs and desires, comes down to what a normative reason is, whether beliefs 
and desires solely constitute a normative reason and whether an external component is required. 
 
The controversy over Bayesianism has important practical implications. Adapting an example 
from Petersen (2009), a forty-year-old single woman threatened by a bushfire, seeking advice 
about whether to evacuate or not, will get very different answers from the Bayesian and their 
critics. The Bayesian will advise to first clarify her preferences over a very large set of risky 
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acts, including the one being considered, and ensure that all preferences are consistent with 
certain structural requirements such as completeness and transitivity. If none of the structural 
requirements are violated, the woman is free to do whatever she likes, irrespective of her beliefs 
and desires. The non-Bayesian internalist will advise to first assign numerical utilities and 
probabilities to her desires and beliefs, and then aggregate them into a decision by applying the 
principle of maximising expected utility. The externalist would advise consideration of the 
objective probability that she will achieve her aim by undertaking an action. Householders’ 
beliefs and desires therefore play different roles within these three frameworks. They are 
irrelevant to rational decision-making within the Bayesian framework. Within the non-
Bayesian internalist context, beliefs and desires inform subjective probability and utility 
judgements that guide a rational decision based on expected utility maximisation. Non-
Bayesian externalists have an instrumentally rational decision-maker apply their beliefs and 
desires to their judgements on the objective probability of achieving a preferred outcome 
(personal safety) through an action (evacuation).    
 
2.3. Decision Theory and Hazard Decision-Making 
 
Evidence suggests that decision-makers exhibit systematic flaws and biases in weighting 
evidence and reaching decisions that have extensive effects; and in so doing differ from the 
idealized ‘rational actor’ (Dunning 2012). During hazard events, such as bushfires, these biases 
and flaws in decision making become present in many ways. They can arise due to task 
constraints associated with complexity in choosing between alternatives, involving  a large 
number of  complexly related cues (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008) or urgency (Hammond, 2000) 
in a dynamic situation (Lindell, 2014). Interpreting complex and conflicting environmental and 
social cues during a rapidly developing bushfire threat and searching for and interpreting 
information to inform a decision are therefore liable to misjudgement. Cognitive constraints 
can also result in poor judgements. Simon’s (1957) critique of optimal decision-making based 
on perfect knowledge, introduced the concept of bounded rationality by which decision-makers 
settle for  an  accessible acceptable solution or satisfice, was a celebrated example of this. 
 Judgement and decision-making flaws can also arise in identifying and generating alternative 
protective actions, exploring the subjective utilities of each action (how important is protecting 
my property against bushfire?), making subjective probability judgements about the state of 
the world (Will the bushfire hit or miss?), and searching for and assessing information required 
for decision-making.   
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2.3.1.  Identifying/generating alternative actions. 
 
The narrow choice models including Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) presume that a 
decision-maker has a readily accessible set of decision alternatives with well-defined attributes 
(utilities) (Petersen, 2009). However, in a complex and dynamic hazard situation this is 
unlikely to be the case. Decisions can be considerably influenced by the way protective action 
options are generated. (Hertwig et al 2004). In a bushfire, householders may make quite 
different decisions depending on the way alternative actions are generated – whether they are 
informed about their options by others, refer to their previous experiences from memory, or 
identify alternatives themselves. Identifying alternative responses to unfamiliar problems is 
more cognitively demanding as it requires building a mental model1 of the problem or hazard 
from scratch, conversely, relying on others’ opinions and past experiences does not require the 
same cognitive load. The extent to which a householder confronting a bushfire threat can 
readily generate alternative actions depends on the strength of his bushfire mental model. This 
mental model is largely based on their direct and vicarious experience, knowledge, and 
training. 
 
2.3.2.  Constructing subjective probability judgments. 
 
Decision-makers construct personal judgments about whether a specific outcome is likely to 
occur, that is, construct subjective probability judgements about states of the world, by 
remembering personal experiences (Petersen, 2009). During bushfire hazards, these personal 
experiences are drawn from memory, such as how a similarly located bushfire behaved in the 
past, the frequency of the householder’s experience with bushfire, and how recently they had 
experienced a bushfire (Kynn, 2008). Verbal, numeric, or graphic communication about the 
existence of and threat posed by a bushfire, such as those provided by emergency authorities, 
also informs these judgements (Anker, 2006; Bisantz, 2005). However, there is evidence that 
decision-makers do not realistically assess the total probability of all alternative responses to 
an event and overestimate the probability of each component action (Tversky & Koehler, 1994; 
Wright & Whalley, 1983; Lindell et al., 2013). Experience of bushfire and information 
provided by the emergency services on the bushfire do not prevent householders from making 
unrealistically optimistic judgements about the likelihood of responses and outcomes. 
                                                          
1 Bostrom, Fischoff and Morgan  as cited in (Lindell, 2014) define mental models as generic knowledge 
structures that organise the information a decision-maker uses to understand and generate inferences about a 
specific knowledge domain.  
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Unrealistic optimism is defined as a ‘favourable difference between the risk estimate that a 
person makes for themselves and the estimate suggested by a relevant objective standard’; 
whether it be an absolute standard or a comparison to others (Shepperd, Klein, Waters, & 
Weinstein, 2013, p. 396). Unrealistically optimistic judgements are less likely when a decision-
maker expects to be considered responsible for their conclusions, when they have experience 
of the situation, when they make realistic comparisons of themselves with similar others, and 
when they expect to be able to control the outcome through their judgement (Shepperd et al., 
2013). Poor judgement may also be due to their use of heuristics, which are “principles which 
reduce the complex task of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgement 
operations’(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). These rules of thumb can assist decision-
makers toward a correct answer but can lead to major error.   The availability heuristic 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) influences subjective probability judgements as scenarios seen 
as more likely by the decision-maker are more easily recalled than scenarios deemed unlikely. 
The easy recall of several non-threatening bushfires may result in a judgement that the current 
bushfire will be non-threatening. Similarly the representativeness heuristic can result in flawed 
probability judgements  and  disregard  for relevant information because an object is assessed 
as typical of its class without examining base frequency data (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
The view that a bushfire is the same as others can result in a householder making poor 
judgements about the likelihood it will become a threat and to ignore information about the 
threat. 
  
2.3.3.  Constructing utility judgments. 
 
Preferences are often not, as assumed in the rational actor model, well-formed prior to decision 
making (Dunning, 2012). Rather, decisions are shaped by the circumstances confronting the 
decision-maker and are crystalized at the time (Hsee & Zhang, 2004; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 
2006; Petersen, 2009; Peterson & Beach, 1967) . The way alternative actions are framed, where 
a situation is described in different ways, as a compromise or with reference to another , can 
generate different judgements about the utility of an action, influencing the decision-makers’ 
choices (Dunning, 2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). A householder confronted by a bushfire 
is likely to react to current circumstances and decide on the best protective option based on a 
mistaken compromise or an arbitrary assumption about the fire. Decision-makers have 
difficulty making judgements about utilities for which they have no absolute standard of 
evaluation (Hsee, 1996). For example, a householder with limited direct or vicarious 
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experience of bushfires may find it extremely difficult to assess the utility of evacuating. 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggests that decision-makers overstate small 
utilities and understate large ones creating different decision frames, choices and possible 
preference reversal (Lindell, 2014) so householders by understating the benefits of evacuation 
and overstating those of remaining, may prefer to remain.  
 
Decision-makers’ judgements are also affected by outcome delay (Lindell, 2014). When 
outcomes are delayed, decision-makers experience adverse effects such as procrastination 
(Steel 2007), narrow time horizons that focus on short-term outcomes (Kunreuther et al 2013), 
or extreme time discounting so each subsequent unit of delay has decreasing impact on the 
utility judgement (Read et al 2012). Householders who do not receive outcome inputs may 
delay responding to a bushfire threat including failure to prepare their property, their equipment 
or themselves to defend against the bushfire. Delay in the provision of information about 
outcomes may lead householders to focus only on the immediate fact that leaving would 
prevent completion of daily household chores or meeting social commitments. The greater the 
outcome delay, the more householders delay taking protective or evasive action while the 
bushfire is developing, lessening the perceived advantage or necessity of leaving. 
 
2.3.4.  Search for additional information. 
 
Dunning (2012) suggests that decision-makers build mental models of the problems 
confronting them based on the information they have at hand without realising their inadequacy 
for informing the decision properly. In many cases this occurs because decision-makers fail to 
perceive the problem’s full extent, to adequately conceptualise the nature of the problem, and 
to focus on just one aspect of the problem. Consequently, decision-makers fail to recognise the 
need for broader information (Dunning, 2012). When decision-makers seek to establish 
whether a conclusion is correct their search for information may also be biased. Information 
that is consistent with their views are preferred over contradictory evidence.   Decision-makers, 
guided by defence motivation, consciously seek additional information that is consistent with 
their existing attitudes especially when they believe that important beliefs, attitudes, or 
behaviours are being challenged (Hart et al 2009). Attitude consistent information is perceived 
by the decision-maker as high quality when compared to attitude inconsistent information 
(Chaiken et al 1996). Accuracy motivation decreases selective exposure to information only 
when accuracy is related to the decision-making context – the quality of the decision. Accuracy 
motivation increases selective information exposure when accuracy is related to the 
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information search context – when task conditions lead decision-makers to bolster the 
justification for their decision by selecting information that appears to be more valid because 
it is consistent with their pre-existing knowledge (Chaiken et al 1996). Uncertainty about a 
threat is associated with intentions to seek further information whereas uncertainty about the 
efficacy of a protective action is associated with intentions to avoid further information 
(Goodall and Reed 2013). A decision-maker’s information search may be restricted or biased 
by their belief that bushfire is not a threat and evacuation is unnecessary. They may ignore dis-
confirmatory information, seek information that supports their decision and see validating 
information as providing better guidance.  The availability heuristic and the representative 
heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky 1973) lead people to disregard other types of valuable 
information and fail to consider the quality of their information, respectively. Information 
perceived as having value in determining future actions reduces selective exposure and 
information avoidance. (Howell and Shephard 2012) Decision-makers engage in an unbiased 
search (i.e. guided by accuracy motivation) when their beliefs and attitudes or behaviours are 
unrelated to their values, when there is only low-quality information available, when they have 
low confidence in their positions, or when they are open-minded. Information perceived to be 
useful in making decisions that have important personal outcomes enhances accuracy 
motivation (Hart et al 2009). 
 
The way incoming information is used by householders making protective decisions during a 
bushfire is of considerable importance because judgement processes take place in working 
memory, while long term memory acts as a filter for incoming information and incoming 
information influences long term memory retrieval (Matlin, 2009). The biases and flaws in 
householders’ search for additional information are even more important because judgement 
processes operate in this way.    
 
2.4. Expectancy-Valence Theoretical Models 
 
Decision-making and judgement models, based on contemporary decision theory, are useful in 
describing and understanding the behaviour of householders confronted by a hazard. 
Householders’ influenced by their experience, advice of others, the characteristics of their 
mental maps, and the effectiveness of their information search, make flawed and biased 
decisions. The theoretical and conceptual frameworks explaining processes by which 
householders form perceptions of personal risk and take protective responses are, primarily, 
expectancy-valence (EV) models based on expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), the theory of 
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reasoned action (TRA; (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), and the theory of planned behaviour (TPB; 
(Ajzen, 1991).  Expectancy theory suggests that behaviour can be predicted from people’s 
tendencies toward different outcomes, the means by which they take actions to achieve these 
outcomes and their expectations of the relationship between their efforts and successful 
performance to achieve outcomes (Vroom, 1964). The choice of a behaviour is influenced by 
the individual’s belief that their efforts will result in a positive performance and a resulting 
reward that satifies a need that is sufficiently important to justify the effort.  
 
Based on expectancy theory the theory of reasoned action posits three psychological originators 
that can be used to explain behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). These originators are 
behavioural intentions, attitudes toward behaviours based on perceived probabilities and the 
importance of salient consequences, and subjective norms which are based on perceived social 
pressures from significant others (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). To the theory or reasoned action 
the theory of planned behaviour  adds perceived behavioural control which is based on the 
presence of facilitating and/or inhibiting factors that affect the perceived ease or difficulty of 
performing a behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Such percieved costs and difficulties include time and 
effort commitment, and their ability to affect behaviour. Protection motivation theory (PMT: 
(Rogers, 1983) and personal relative to event theory (PrE: (Mulilis & Duvall, 1997) are more 
specifically relevant to hazard adjustment adoption. Protection Motivation Theory focuses on 
explaining responses to threatening events by assessing the likelihood and severity of the 
consequences of no action, people’s self efficacy, and a protective actions response efficacy. 
Individuals compare their threat appraisal with their coping appraisal to establish the extent of 
their protection motivation which consequently influences their behaviour. Threat is assessed 
by comparing the rewards of not taking protective action with severity of the threat and their 
suceptibility to it. Coping appraisal compared their self efficacy and the effectiveness of their 
protective action with the costs of taking the protective action (Beatson & McLennan, 2011).  
PrE theory extends PMT by advancing the idea that perceived responsibility for protection is 
essential to account for taking protective action. The Protective Action Decision Model 
(PADM) is a descriptive model whose foundations are in expectancy-valence theory, but build 
upon it by recognising the effects of social and environmental contexts on behaviour (Lindell 
& Hwang, 2008). PADM seeks to explain and predict protective action decisions taken by 
decision-makers affected by hazard by understanding how their beliefs and desires influence 
their protective actions and behaviour. By using the PADM theory as an analytical framework, 
the findings of this thesis are more likely increase understanding surrounding decision making 
during hazards. There are three main areas in with PADM will deepen insight; the reasons for 
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challenging behaviours, the mechanisms for behavioural change, and the effectiveness of 
interventions (Beatson & McLennan, 2011). 
  
2.5. Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) 
 
In the PADM, environmental cues, social cues, and warnings (comprising the environmental 
and social context) initiate a “series of pre-decisional processes that in turn elicit core 
perceptions of the environmental threat, of alternative protective actions and of relevant 
stakeholders” (comprising the psychological processes; Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 617). These 
perceptions become the basis of protective action decision-making in which decision-makers 
consider whether a real threat exists, the need for protective action, available protective options, 
the best protective alternative and the timing of it implementation (Lindell & Perry, 1992, 2004, 
2012). 
This process in turn generates behavioural responses including information search and emotion 
focused coping. Information search continues as a feedback loop involving decision-makers 
assessing the adequacy of information, identifying information sources and channels 
establishing its required timing. This continues until there is sufficient certainty to allow 
householders to make decisions about appropriate protective actions (Lindell & Perry, 2012). 
The PADM provides a framework of factors that influence householders protective responses 
to threatening events (Lindell & Hwang, 2008; Lindell & Perry, 2012).While there has been 
some criticism of stage models of health behaviour relating to difficulties in identifying stages 
accurately, identifying and altering factors assisting  people to move to the next stage and the 
speed of stage transition (Weinstein, Rothman, & Sutton, 1998) the PADM does not suffer 
from the same shortcomings as the health stage models for three reasons (Weinstein et al., 
1998). First, the PADM differs from other stage models in that protective actions are 
implemented temporarily rather than permanently. while health models require individuals to 
not revert to previous behaviour that puts their health at risk and slip back into an earlier stage. 
Second, the timeframe to which the PADM decision-making stages apply is much shorter than 
that of  health stage models where the timeframe for decision-making is likely to be months or 
years. Finally, the PADM is concerned with concurrent individual decision-making by large 
numbers of people focusing on a common emergency event rather than on a single individual’s 
decision-making around their personal health issue (Lindell & Perry, 2012). 
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Figure 2.1. The Protective Action Decision Model. Reprinted from “The Protective Action 
Decision Model: theoretical modifications and additional evidence,” by M.K. Lindell and 
R.W. Perry, 2012, Risk Analysis, 32 (4), p.617. 
 
PADM assumes an expectancy-valence based interpretation of perceived personal risks and the 
relative acceptability of different hazard adjustments, but differs from expectancy theory, 
TRA/TPB, PMT, and PrE by including social context, environmental cues and social 
information (Lindell & Hwang, 2008). By including these elements, PADM extends the scope 
of the decision-making framework by allowing social context, environmental cues, and 
warnings to influence the decision-maker’s construction of utilities, probabilities, and 
identification of alternatives and information required to best assess this information. Social 
context and cues play an important role in the decision-maker’s identification of alternative 
actions and construction of probability judgements through information, advice, and the direct 
or indirect observation of the others’ actions. Decision-makers may rely on the experience of 
influential others in the neighbourhood or take the same actions as neighbours who they see as 
having superior knowledge and experience. Social context and cues may also be important in 
the decision- maker’s construction of utility judgements in which they have no absolute 
standard of evaluation and require guidance from influential others.  
Similarly, other elements of the PADM address the way decision-makers identify and generate 
alternative actions, construct judgements about subjective probability and utility, and search 
for information. Dash and Gladwin’s (2007) contention that, in responding to evacuation 
warning, people must not simply manage the facts of the situation but do so within a framework 
of social constraints and influence, confirms the relevance of these factors in protective action 
decision-making. Hazard decision-making is inevitably within a context where the situation 
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and circumstances are uncertain. Decision-makers’ ‘intuitive risk judgements’ that are 
influenced by “difficulties in understanding probabilistic processes, biased media coverage, 
misleading personal experiences, and the anxieties generated by life’s gambles, cause 
uncertainty to be denied, risks to be misjudged, and judgements of fact to be held with 
unwarranted confidence” (2007, p. 70). Dash and Gladwin propose that that “models of 
individualised risk perception must include social dimensions based on the decision-maker’s 
frames of reference”(Dash & Gladwin, 2007, p. 70). Decision-makers will process information 
from their point of view and influenced by their personal context. Consequently, different 
decision-makers will interpret the same information in quite different ways. They suggest that 
protective response to a hazard is a process and not simply an outcome, involving 
“…understanding how individuals and households arrive at a decision [emphasis added] to 
evacuate or not” and specifically “what factors people consider as they make their decisions 
and how important those factors are in the process”. Cohn (2006) concurs with Tierney (2001) 
who argues that evacuation is “embedded in a particular social context and influenced by social 
structural factors and ongoing social routines”. Cohn suggests that adaptive behaviour in 
“disruptive situations” is shaped by social structural factors and social routines and by “shared 
interpretations people attach to experiences [which] provide a sense of purpose and order in 
their lives”(2006, p. 40). Behaviours are directed toward adaptive problem solving in a disaster 
situation but are influenced by previous behaviours and routines. 
 
2.5.1.  Environmental cues. 
 
Natural hazards result from interactions between the natural events system (including wind, 
water, and earth processes) and the human use system (locations, livelihoods, and social 
organization; Burton et al. 1993). In bushfire, the natural events system includes bush that is 
subject to ignition and burning, creating smoke, flames, and embers. During a bushfire, 
environmental cues include plumes of smoke in the sky, the smell of smoke, falling embers, 
the sound of burning and flames as the bushfire comes into sight. The environment also 
encompasses meteorological elements including heat, humidity, wind, and the sounds 
associated with firefighting. These environmental cues indicate the existence of a bushfire 
threat and clues to its location, magnitude, direction, and speed of onset. 
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2.5.2.  Social cues. 
 
The social environment, as the milieu in which a person lives and in which things happen, also 
generates processes that provide and communicate information about bushfire and how to deal 
with it, provides advice and assistance in reducing the threat of bushfire, and provides physical 
assistance in dealing with a bushfire event. Social information is transmitted based on a six-
component communication model. These components include source, channel, message, 
receiver, effect, and feedback (Berlo, 1960; McGuire, 1985) the first two being of primary 
importance in understanding social cues. Sources consist of the fire authorities, news media, 
peers and colleagues including family/relatives. Lindell and Perry (1992) identified channels 
as the print media; traditional electronic media; internet; and face-to-face discussions between 
individuals and groups. Social media such as Facebook and Twitter (Alexander, 2014; Bird, 
Ling, & Haynes, 2012; Palen, Vieweg, Liu, & Hughes, 2009; Reuter, Heger, & Pipek, 2013; 
Simon, Goldberg, & Adini, 2015; Sutton, Palen, & Shklovski, 2008) and landline and mobile 
telephones (with text capability) have also become important channels (Bird et al., 2012). 
Householders receive a range of social cues about bushfire from many sources and through 
various channels. The following are important sources: media, especially in radio broadcasts 
and on television news; family, friends and neighbours using telephones, social media, and 
face-to-face interaction; and fire authorities’ websites and fire personnel with on the ground 
information and advice about bushfire. Similar channels communicate unofficial warnings, 
including from family friends and neighbours (Parker and Handmer 1998; Sorenson, 2000; 
Steelman et al 2015).  
Access to and preference for information channels influences the receipt of social cues and has 
been rapidly changing over recent years, influencing the way householders get information 
about bushfire. In Australia, the electronic media, especially radio and television, and the 
internet are widely accessed, with 83 percent of people aged over 15 years of age accessing the 
internet in 2013 ("Household Use of Information Technology, Australia, 2012 – 13," 2014). 
New media use is growing rapidly with sites such as Facebook becoming the most used social 
network in Australia as of February 2016, with an audience of 15.5 million per month and an 
active reach of 71.16% of all internet users. Instagram and LinkedIn visits numbered 7 million 
each, reaching 35.5% of internet users. Twitter had an audience of 5.5 million and Pinterest 4.5 
million. Mobile-only Snapchat had 3.1 million Australians on the service in February 2016 
(Nielsen., 2016). Technological constraints such as limited mobile telephone reception in some 
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remote geographic locations restrict access to channels and make the internet or wireless based 
services unreliable sources of bushfire information. The characteristics of people receiving 
social cues influence their receipt including physical, psycho motor (including sight and 
hearing) capacity, cognitive ability including language, skills, economic resources; and social 
resources including friends, relatives, neighbours, and co-workers (Lindell & Perry, 2012). 
Informal social interactions ‘have been documented to play a significant role in influencing 
disaster response’(Brenkert-Smith, Champ, & Flores, 2012, p. 1148) Warnings,  advice, and 
information from and activity of neighbours, relatives and family members and local 
emergency services provide social cues that influence protective action. People seek advice 
and receive warnings from their family, friends and neighbours, observe neighbours’ 
evacuation behaviour, including preparations and leaving, and respond to invitations from 
friends and relatives to stay with them, away from the hazard   (Baker, 1991; Drabek, 1969; 
Huang, Lindell, & Prater, 2016; Lindell et al., 2015; Whittaker et al., 2013). Although media 
is used primarily for information, evacuation is more highly correlated with receipt of 
information from peers and local authorities (Lindell, Lu, & Prater, 2005) 
 
2.5.3.  Warnings. 
 
Emergency authorities provide official warnings using various channels including radio and 
television, recorded landline telephone messages, SMS text messages on mobile telephones, 
internet, sirens, and emergency services personnel. The objective of warnings is to raise 
householders’ awareness of the threat and motivate a timely protective response (Leonard et 
al., 2008; Mackie, 2013; Quarantelli, 1984). This may not be achieved because householders, 
as part of social networks,  require confirmation from other social sources (Drabek, 1999; 
Quarantelli, 1984) and are subject to interpretation according to receiver, message, contextual, 
and event characteristics (Drabek, 1999; Lindell & Perry, 2004; Mileti & Peek, 2000; 
Quarantelli, 1984)   
The existence of a network of multiple sources of official and unofficial warnings about 
hazards creates the potential for conflicting messages that cause confusion which delay 
protective action decision-making. (Lindell & Perry, 2012). Warnings are discussed in greater 
detail in the context of the Australian literature on evacuation from bushfire reviewed later in 
the is chapter. 
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2.5.4.  Pre-decisional processes. 
 
Taking protective actions in response to information about bushfire from environmental or 
social cues and warnings depends on pre-decisional processes involving exposure, attention 
and understanding the meaning, and implications of the information (Lindell & Perry, 2012). 
Attention to environmentally or socially generated information arising out of a risk situation 
depends on decision makers’ expectations, competing attention demands, and the intrusiveness 
of the information. When information is received, a decision-maker’s understanding of it 
depends on whether the message is conveyed in words that they understand including native 
languages, is esoteric or in the vernacular  (Fiske and Taylor (2008), and whether the 
information is able to be identified as relevant to them. 
 
2.5.5.  Perceptions of threats, protective action, and stakeholders. 
 
Social cues, environmental cues, and warnings may be seen and understood by an individual, 
but their interpretation and action elicited depends on how the individual’s mental models 
influence his perceptions of the bushfire threat, of the stakeholders involved in bushfire, and 
of the alternative actions that the individual may take in responding to bushfire (Morgan, 
Fischhoff, Bostrom, & Atman, 2002; Senge, 2006). 
 
2.5.5.1. Perceptions of threat. 
 
People’s perceptions of environmental threats are comprised of the probability of a threat 
happening and the consequence of it happening. Perceived risk has been described as decision-
makers’ expectations of personal impacts from an environmental disaster  (Mileti & Peek, 
2000; Mileti & Sorenson, 1987). Some researchers have defined it as ‘people’s expectations 
about (a) the probability of the occurrence of an extreme environmental event at a particular 
place within a given period of time, and (b) the probability of personally experiencing the 
adverse physical and social impacts this event causes.’ (Lindell & Hwang, 2008, p. 542). Risk 
perception has, in many studies of different hazards, significant correlates with short-term and 
long-term hazard adjustments (Bourque et al. 2012; Lindell 2013) that reduce risk from 
extreme events in the natural environment (Burton et al. 1993). These include tornado 
(Blanchard-Boehm & Cook, 2004), hurricane (Kim & Kang, 2010; Peacock, 2003; Sattler, 
Kaiser, & Hittner, 2000) and floods (Lindell & Hwang, 2008). Lindell (2013) identifies other 
studies have found mixed evidence of the effects of risk perception on hazard adjustment 
 30 
 
adoption for earthquake (Whitney, Lindell, & Nguyen, 2004), flood (Blanchard–Boehm, Berry, 
& Showalter, 2001) and tornado (Weinstein, Lyon, Rothman, & Cuite, 2000). In only one case, 
non-significant correlations of perceived risk to persons and property with wildfire 
preparedness (seven measures; (Perry & Lindell, 2008) were reported. In studies on 
earthquakes, hurricanes, floods and volcanic eruptions,  risk perception predicts responses to, 
warnings, such as evacuation (Sorenson, 2000) and to long-term hazard adjustments (Lindell, 
2013). Environmental cues, social cues, warnings, and beliefs about hazards influence 
perceptions of the specific personal impacts of prevailing conditions and produces a ‘situational 
perception of personal risk’ (Lindell & Perry, 2012). 
Research has demonstrated that the perception of environmental threat is also associated with 
three factors - the intrusiveness of the threat, experience of the hazard and hazard proximity. 
 
2.5.5.2. Intrusiveness of threat. 
  
The level of intrusiveness of threat influences perceptions of environmental threat. 
Intrusiveness is the frequency with which people think about the hazard in their daily lives, 
discuss it with their peers and get information regarding the threat through the media and public 
authorities (Lindell & Perry, 2012). Frequency of thought, discussion, and passive information 
receipt provide mechanisms to remind decision-makers to take actions that can reduce their 
hazard vulnerability (Lindell & Prater, 2000). If a threat is not seen as immediate, either as a 
current emergency or as a potential in the future, people are likely to focus on the immediate 
demands of daily life at the expense of considering hazard adjustments. Significant correlations 
with elements of intrusiveness and hazard adjustments for earthquake (Lindell & Perry, 2000) 
and tornado (Blanchard-Boehm & Cook, 2004)  have been reported. Similarly Weinstein et al 
(2000) concluded that preoccupation comprising frequent thoughts, vigilance, intrusive 
thoughts, and talk frequency was significantly correlated with doing anything about hazard 
vulnerability. No comparative data are available for bushfire although the measures of 
intrusiveness used in studies of other hazards are appropriate. 
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2.5.5.3. Hazard experience. 
 
Hazard experience include the frequency of fatalities, injuries, and property damage (Arlikatti, 
Lindell, & Prater, 2007) that is experienced by the individual, their immediate or extended 
family, neighbours, friends or co-workers (Lindell & Prater, 2000). In studies of earthquake, 
experience has been defined variously as the number of experiences (Russell, Goltz, & 
Bourque, 1995), quantum of earthquake losses (Jackson, 1981) and personal experience of 
earthquake losses (Turner, Nigg, & Heller-Paz, 1986). Currency, frequency, and intensity of 
an individual’s experience of a hazard event, correlate with perceived personal risk, anticipated 
personal impact and hazard intrusiveness (Ge, Peacock, & Lindell, 2011; Lindell & Hwang, 
2008; Lindell & Prater, 2000; Weinstein, 1989). 
Studies found correlates of earthquake experience including past damage, shaking intensity 
and measures of injury (Blanchard-Boehm, 1998; Heller, Alexander, Gatz, Knight, & Rose, 
2005; Lindell & Prater, 2000; Nguyen, Shen, Ershoff, Afifi, & Bourque, 2006), with pre-and 
post-seismic adjustments. Experience of tornado and volcano damage also correlated with 
adjustment adoption and preparedness (Mulilis, Duvall, & Rogers, 2003; Perry & Lindell, 
1990). However Basolo et al (2009) did not find significant correlations between earthquake 
and hurricane experience and adjustments.  
Many studies have also reported partial relationships between hazard experience and hazard 
adjustment. Hazards include tornado (Blanchard-Boehm & Cook, 2004; Weinstein et al., 
2000), hurricane (Faupel, Kelley, & Petee, 1992; Peacock, 2003), flood (Laska, 1990; Lindell 
& Hwang, 2008; Norris, Smith, & Kaniasty, 1999), earthquake (Perry & Lindell, 2008; Siegel, 
Shoaf, Afifi, & Bourque, 2003).  
Martin et al (2009) found that wildfire experience did not significantly explain risk reduction 
behaviour. Martin posited a disaster subculture (Wenger & Weller, 1973, p. 14) or belief that 
lightning won’t strike twice (Halpern–Felsher et al., 2001, p. 123) to explain the finding. 
Additionally a resilient rather than vulnerable near miss may lead to complacency and a belief 
that future events would not require additional protective actions (Dillon, Tinsley, & Burns, 
2014; Tinsley, Dillon, & Cronin, 2012)  
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2.5.5.4. Hazard proximity. 
 
Hazard proximity mediated through hazard experience influences risk perceptions since hazard 
experience is related to proximity to hazard sources in studies of earthquake, hurricane, and 
flood (Palm, Hodgson, Blanchard, & Lyons, 1990; Peacock, Brody, & Highfield, 2005; 
Preston, Taylor, & Hedge, 1983). Positive and direct relationships between hazard proximity 
and risk perception (Lindell & Earle, 1983) dependent on recognition that the location of 
residence is an area of hazard risk (Arlikatti, Lindell, Prater, & Zhang, 2006; Zhang, Prater, & 
Lindell, 2004) have been found. Hazard proximity and hazard experience also relate to the 
length of time living in a threat area (Lindell & Hwang, 2008).  
A number of studies have identified positive correlations between hazard proximity and hazard 
adjustment, including proximity to an earthquake fault and adoption of adjustments (Farley, 
Barlow, Finkelstein, & Riley, 1993), inland flood proximity and coastal hurricane with flood 
insurance purchase, and adoption of flood and hurricane adjustments (Lindell & Hwang, 2008). 
Two earthquake studies found no association between proximity and adjustment (Mileti & 
Darlington, 1997; Palm et al., 1990).  
 
2.5.6.  Perceptions of hazard adjustments. 
 
A specific interpretation of Fishbein’s Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010) 
suggests that a person’s behavioural response to a hazard is more closely related to the person’s 
attitude toward adjusting or responding to the hazard than to the hazard itself. In general, 
understanding adoption of hazard adjustments requires an appreciation of the perceived 
attributes of the hazard adjustment(s). The actions required to respond to a threat will more 
directly influence behaviour than the nature of the threat itself.  
Studies have identified significant attributes that influence the adoption of hazard adjustments 
including effectiveness (Mulilis & Duval, 1995), cost (Kunreuther et al., 1978), required 
knowledge (Davis, 1989) and utility for other purposes (Russell et al., 1995). Lindell and Perry 
(2012), in summarizing their previous analysis of research on influencing attributes, 
categorised hazard attributes into hazard related and resource related, both of which 
‘differentiate among hazard adjustments’(Lindell, Alikatti, & Prater, 2009, pp. 1078-1080) and 
which correspond to salient beliefs (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) about these adjustments. 
Effectiveness in protecting people and property and usefulness for other purposes (hazard–
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related attributes) significantly correlated with each other, with intention to adopt a hazard 
adjustment and with actual hazard adjustment.(Lindell & Prater, 2002; Lindell & Whitney, 
2000; Terpstra & Lindell, 2009). 
Lindell and Perry (2012) conclude that resource related attributes including cost, knowledge 
and skill requirements, time requirements, effort requirements and required cooperation with 
others are negatively correlated with both intended and actual hazard adjustment. Although, 
these relationships have been small and non-significant possibly because resource requirements 
have been small (Lindell et al., 2009). These resource-related attributes significantly correlated 
with each other. 
 
2.5.7.  Perceptions of social stakeholders. 
 
Studies have classified social stakeholders as federal, state, and local governments; emergency 
authorities, evaluators including scientists and universities, the news media, community and 
environmental groups, industry, and households (Drabek, 1986; Lang & Hallman, 2005; 
Pijawka & Mushkatel, 1991).   
Relations between stakeholders are defined in terms of their power to influence each other’s 
actions or decisions to adopt hazard adjustments. French and Raven’s (1959; Raven, 1965) 
model of social power focuses on four relevant power bases: expert, information, referent, and 
legitimate power. Households respond to these power bases by voluntarily adopting hazard 
adjustments in the anticipation of reduced risk.  
Expert power derives from stakeholders’ hazard expertise including their understanding of 
cause and effect relationships in the environment while information power derives from 
knowledge about environmental circumstances. Stakeholder perceptions are therefore based on 
an assessment of hazard expertise and information. Referent power is dependent on their 
feeling of common interests with another (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) and trust to communicate 
information accurately. Trustworthiness or source credibility (Arlikatti et al., 2007), which is 
central to stakeholder perceptions, is based on a willingness to impartially and accurately tell 
the whole story (Frewer, Scholderer, & Bredahl, 2003; Meyer, 1988). Legitimate power arises 
out of the rights and responsibilities of stakeholders’ in the social network, highlighting the 
question of primary responsibility for threat preparedness and response. Household protection 
responsibility significantly correlates with adjustment adoption for earthquake and tornado 
preparedness and adjustment (Garcia, 1989; Mulilis & Duvall, 1997). 
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Significant differences exist in individuals’ perceptions of the characteristics of stakeholders, 
specifically in relation to expertise, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility (Arlikatti et 
al., 2007; Lindell & Whitney, 2000). Hazard adjustment intentions and adoption significantly 
relate to these characteristics. Stakeholder characteristics also relate to hazard adjustment 
adoption including family and personal earthquake knowledge, personal protection 
responsibility (Lindell & Whitney, 2000); seismic knowledge of local officials, employers, 
peers and family/ self; employer, peer, and family trust; and employer, peer, and family self-
protection responsibility (Arlikatti et al., 2007). 
 
2.5.8.  Protective action decision-making. 
 
Within the PADM framework, following receipt and understanding of environmental and 
social cues and warnings; and having galvanised their perceptions of the threat, of stakeholders, 
and of protective action adjustments, decision-makers engage in a protective action decision-
making process of becoming aware of and assessing risk, searching for, and assessing feasible 
protective actions, and implementing these actions (Lindell & Perry, 2012) as described in the 
following. 
 
2.5.8.1. Risk awareness. 
 
People’s awareness of a threat leads them to a primary appraisal (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) 
to establish whether the situation is normal (Drabek, 1986) or if there is a risk that requires 
attention (Perry, 1979). The question being “Is there a real threat that I need to pay attention 
to?” (Lindell & Perry, 2012) 
Research on a range of disaster types (Baker, 1991; Blanchard-Boehm, 1998; Houts, Cleary, 
& Hu, 1988; Lindell & Perry, 1992; Mileti, 1975; Perry, 1985; Perry & Greene, 1983; Perry & 
Hirose, 1991; Perry et al., 1981) suggest a positive relationship between level of threat belief 
and disaster response (Lindell & Perry, 2012). 
 
2.5.8.2. Risk assessment. 
 
Risk assessment involves examining the personal relevance of the risk (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993) and the potential personal impacts of threat on the individual (Mileti & Sorenson, 1987; 
Perry, 1979). The risk is assessed in terms of the probability of the event occurring and the 
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severity of its impact on the individual (Withey, 1962).The question being “Do I need to take 
protective action?” The assessment of whether action is required provides the motivation to act 
(Fritz & Marks, 1954; Perry, 1983).  
An immediate threat implies a high probability of occurrence and severe consequences. 
Therefore, greater advanced warning of a threat lowers the perceived probability and severity 
and increases the perceived time available to implement protective actions. Advanced warnings 
of a threat can increase the compliance with recommended protective actions but delay those 
actions (Lindell et al., 2005; Perry et al., 1981). 
 
2.5.8.3. Protective action search. 
 
After assessing the probability and severity of the threat and establishing that the risk is 
unacceptable, people examine their options and generate a decision set of feasible protective 
actions (Lindell & Perry, 2012). The question asked is “What can be done to achieve 
protection?” 
People search for options by drawing on their knowledge and personal experience, observing 
actions of their neighbours (Huang et al., 2010), using other people’s response to similar threats 
communicated through the media, family or other sources; and by referring to the warnings 
and recommendations of emergency authorities (Mileti & Peek, 2000; Mileti & Sorenson, 
1987). 
 
2.5.8.4. Protective action assessment. 
 
Options for protective action are evaluated, including taking no action and continuing with 
normal activities. The best method of protection against the threat is established. The question 
asked is “What is the best method of protection?” The consequences of taking no protective 
action may be acceptable or a single protective action or a combination of staged actions may 
be acceptable at that stage. The outcome of this assessment process is a plan for responding to 
the threat (Lindell & Perry, 2012). 
 
2.5.8.5. Protective action implementation. 
 
Having decided on the best protective action plan, a decision on when to undertake that action 
is required. The question is “Does protective action need to be taken now? Except where the 
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threat is perceived as imminent, people prefer not to disrupt their normal activities so there is 
an inclination to postpone the implementation of protective action even when warnings are 
received (Fu, Wilmot, Zhang, & Baker, 2007; Lindell et al., 2005). 
 
2.5.9.  Situational impediments and facilitators. 
 
Circumstances in the physical and social environment can constrain intended protective actions 
or facilitate unintended actions including hampering evacuation (Perry et al., 1981). 
Unavailability of a vehicle and physical disability are important impediments to implementing 
protective actions (Heath, Kass, Beck, & Glickman, 2001; Van Willigen, Edwards, Edwards, 
& Hessee, 2002).The separation of family members in an unexpected or rapidly developing 
threat situation can also prevent or delay protective action, including evacuation (Drabek & 
Boggs, 1968; Killian, 1952). Other potential impediments include time of day, traffic 
conditions on escape routes, emotional reactions of household members, the need to take care 
of domestic and non-domestic pets and livestock (Heath, Kass, et al., 2001; Smith, Taylor, & 
Thompson, 2015; Taylor, Burns, Eustace, & Lynch, 2015), expected cost of accommodation 
when evacuated and lack of access to evacuated properties due to road blocks and areas 
controlled by emergency services (Chaney et al., 2013). This narrow characterisation of 
situational impediments to protective action fails to take account of broader economic, social, 
cultural, ethnic, and gender factors that contribute to vulnerability and constrain protective 
action (Wisner, 2004).  
 
2.5.10.  Information needs and communication action assessment and implementation. 
 
At any stage during the protective action decision process the information available may be 
inadequate to justify action, requiring search for additional information (Hansen, Vitek, & 
Hansen, 1979; Perry & Greene, 1983; Perry et al., 1981). The question asked is “What 
information do I need to answer my question?” Information needs assessment identifies 
additional information required, typically being probability, severity and immediacy of the 
threat, and factors affecting the intended protective action. For evacuation, additional 
information includes availability of safe escape routes, safe destinations, arrangements for the 
disabled and sick, and provisions for domestic and non- domestic pets (Lindell & Perry, 2012). 
Information sources and channels must then be identified and communication options assessed. 
The question is “Where and how can I obtain this information?” Unavailability of preferred 
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information sources and channels may force reliance on the mass media and peers (Lindell & 
Perry, 1993). An immediate threat stimulates an active pursuit of information from the most 
appropriate source and channel, however, ambiguity of the timing of the impact reduces 
information seeking (Perry, Lindell, & Greene, 1982). The question asked is “Do I need this 
information now?”  
The prospect of imminent disaster motivates people to seek confirmation from a number of 
social sources (Drabek, 1969; Drabek & Stephenson, 1971) and by frequently monitoring news 
media (Morss & Hayden, 2010). This process of identifying information needs, assessing 
information sources, and information gathering represents a feedback loop in the PADM which 
gives it a dynamic character. 
 
2.6. Evacuation from a Bushfire 
 
North American research on protective response to natural hazards, including evacuation, 
dominates the literature. Literature on protective response to hazards other than bushfire 
(wildfire) will not be reviewed here except where relevant to the PADM which was discussed 
previously.  North American and other international literature on evacuation from wildfire and 
forest fire is summarily reviewed because householders are subject to mandatory evacuation 
orders creating a context of evacuation compliance (McCaffrey, Rhodes, & Stidham, 2014; 
Paveglio, Carroll, & Jakes, 2010) that contrasts strongly with that faced by Australian 
householders’ who have the option of evacuating or remaining to defend against a bushfire 
(McCaffrey & Rhodes, 2009; Teague et al., 2010). However, appropriately trained and 
equipped community members, through rangeland fire protection associations (RFPA), may 
assist in fighting wildfire in public rangelands (Stasiewicz & Paveglio, 2016).  This review 
focuses on evacuation and does not address pre-fire mitigation or recovery preparedness except 
where they are inseparable from evacuation. 
 
Much of the non-Australian international literature is focused, within the context of mandatory 
and voluntary orders, on mathematical modelling of a range of issues in wildfire including 
optimisation of evacuation decision making (Cova, Dennison, & Drews, 2011), traffic 
management (Cova & Johnson, 2002; Wolshon & Marchive, 2007) and evacuation triggers 
(Cova et al., 2016). The role of communication in wildfire evacuation has also been reported 
including the importance of providing reliable and trustworthy information (Steelman, 
McCaffrey, Velex, & Briefe, 2015; Stidham, Toman, McCaffrey, & Shindler, 2010), 
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information needs (McCaffrey, Knox Velez, & Briefel, 2013; Taylor et al., 2007) and the role 
of social media (SM)  including Twitter (Wang, Ye, & Tsou, 2016). A great deal of debate has 
been generated, both before and after the ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires, on the relevance and 
perceptions of the Australian Stay or Go paradigm in the North American context (Cote & 
McGee, 2014; McCaffrey & Rhodes, 2009; McCaffrey, Rhodes, et al., 2014; Mutch, Rogers, 
Stephens, & Gill, 2011; Paveglio, Boyd, & Carroll, 2012; Paveglio, Carroll, & Jakes, 2008). 
The characteristics of those who intend to evacuate or not including gender, age, numbers in 
the household, income, education and length of residency  (Mozumder, Raheem, Talberth, & 
Berrens, 2008; Paveglio, Prato, Dalenberg, & Venn, 2014) and previous action taken when 
threatened (McCaffrey & Winter, 2010). Literature on decision-making in wildfire addresses 
evacuation preferences including waiting to see what happens (McCaffrey & Winter, 2010; 
Paveglio et al., 2014), perceptions of risk and intrusiveness, fire experience (Mozumder et al., 
2008), choice of evacuate or shelter (Cova, Drews, Siebeneck, & Musters, 2009), and problems 
surrounding deciding to evacuate (Cohn et al., 2006). 
 
The Australian literature relating to self-evacuation is based mainly on post-bushfire research 
including those following the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires. Considerable research is reported 
on intended and actual response to a bushfire threat including evacuation, stay and defend and 
‘wait and see. The demographic characteristics of Australian evacuees are summarily described 
in most studies (Beringer, 2000; Haynes et al., 2010; McLennan et al., 2012; McLennan et al., 
2013; McLennan, Paton, & Wright, 2015; Proudley, 2008; Whittaker et al., 2013) but tend to 
be highly specific to the sample. The impact of gender on protective action is discussed in some 
studies (Handmer & Tibbits, 2005; Whittaker, Eriksen, & Haynes, 2016) 
 
2.6.1.  Evacuate or stay and defend. 
 
A study of survivors of the 2009 Murrindindi bushfire complex, one of the Black Saturday 
bushfires (McLennan et al., 2012), suggested that protective decision-making and action was 
primarily influenced by commitment to an existing plan assessed under prevailing bushfire 
conditions. Within this context, the decision to leave was influenced by two factors: heightened 
threat perception created by evacuation advice, observing the evacuation of others and 
environmental cues including smoke and embers; and receipt of reliable information on 
bushfire location. The decision to remain and defend was primarily driven by a belief that 
householders were adequately prepared to fight the fire and by a commitment to property 
defence. The Murrindindi complex represented a large-scale bushfire, involved relatively 
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homogenous vegetation, landform and property type and affected a socially cohesive 
community. This served to maximise the impact of psychological rather than environmental 
factors, on protective action decision-making  (McLennan et al., 2012).  These data provide the 
most extensive insight into factors influencing decision-making during the Black Saturday 
bushfires and as such provide an important understanding of householders’ decisions to 
evacuate or remain and defend. 
 
Quantitative analysis of face-to face interviews on the safety related plans, decisions, actions 
and outcomes of householders impacted by the worst Black Saturday bushfires (McLennan et 
al., 2013) suggested that emotional attachment to property and neighbours, perception of self-
responsibility for property, and commitment to a plan to defend primarily influenced the 
decision to remain. Those who evacuated did not have a plan to defend, some because they did 
not perceive a bushfire threat, others because of concern for the personal safety of household 
members, and most lacked an evacuation plan.   Official and unofficial warnings of danger, 
reliable information about proximity or severity of the bushfire, and environmental cues 
influenced the decision to evacuate (McLennan et al., 2013). 
 
Whittaker’s mail based survey research of residents who were affected by the Black Saturday 
bushfire, within the major fire complexes  found a range of factors influenced residents’ 
intended protective actions including health, physical capacity and mobility; responsibility for 
dependents, pets  and livestock; perception of preparedness and capability to defend, and 
presence or absence of household members (Whittaker et al., 2013) . It found that half intended 
to remain, less than one-fifth intended to leave in advance of a bushfire and more than one 
quarter were undecided, intending to leave only if threatened or waiting to see how the 
circumstances developed before making a protective decision. Significantly more men than 
women intended and did stay and defend. Generally, those who intended to stay and defend or 
to evacuate acted in accordance with those intentions although over one third of those who 
intended to remain, left because of equipment or water failure, heightened danger or because 
their house caught fire. Most of those who planned to wait and see, evacuated. The study 
concluded that environmental cues, including seeing smoke, social cues from neighbours and 
family and official warnings alerted residents to the bushfire. Evacuees saw personal safety as 
more important than property protection, which was not worth the risk. Varied levels of 
bushfire awareness, planning and preparedness were reported with the authors concluding that 
their results probably exaggerated awareness, which did not necessarily motivate planning and 
preparedness in any case, and said little about people’s understanding of bushfire risk. They 
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found that the most common form of preparation was low cost, easy property maintenance such 
as clearing leaves and grass. Many of those who remained successfully defended their property, 
suggesting that ‘stay and defend’ is a viable alternative to evacuating with adequate planning, 
preparation and firefighting assistance.   
 
2.6.2.  Wait and see. 
 
A paper summarizing results from post bushfire season surveys of residents of bushfire prone 
areas in Victoria undertaken by the Country Fire Authority since the 2009 Black Saturday 
bushfires reported that  almost one third of respondents intended to ‘wait and see’ but leave if 
threatened (Gilbert, 2014). This was consistent with a quantitative study of residents of bushfire 
prone areas of Tasmania, New South Wales, Australian Capital Territory and North-East 
Victoria that found 30% respondents would “wait and see what develops before finally 
deciding whether or not to leave, or to stay and defend” (McLennan & Elliott, 2012, p. 5). They 
intended to wait and see because of a perceived small threat from bushfire, expectations of 
warnings and assistance, self-reliance and reluctance to leave due to complicating factors. 
Respondents perceived a low risk because the bushfire would not reach them and if it did it 
would have little impact or they would have safe, last- minute escape options. Warnings, advice 
and direction from emergency authorities and from family and neighbours allowed them to 
wait and see. Perceived self-efficacy and preparedness of their property created confidence that 
they could wait. Potential loss of home, property, pets and livestock; dangers in evacuating into 
the bushfire, disruption and inconvenience, and not being able to return also prompted a 
decision to wait and see. McLennan et al (2012) recognized that the extent to which participants 
intended to wait and see how the fire developed was constrained by hindsight bias and that the 
limited findings in the literature on this protective intention were difficult to confidently 
interpret. The paper argued that it was possible to interpret all planned protective action as 
involving some degree of waiting and seeing before a plan is implemented and that changing a 
plan from defending to evacuating could be a form of waiting and seeing that is mediated by 
the strength of the commitment to defend. A similar conclusion was drawn in a paper reviewing 
seven Australian post-bushfire studies between 2009 and 2014 in which a substantial minority 
(5-29%) planned to wait and see and appreciable numbers of non-defenders reported waiting 
to see if they would be threatened before deciding to evacuate (McLennan, Paton, & Wright, 
2015). Over one quarter of respondents to a mail survey of residents in the worst affected Black 
Saturday fire complexes adopted a wait and see approach in determining their protective 
response to the bushfire (Whittaker et al., 2013). Late evacuation and escape from failed 
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defence was highly dangerous due to smoke, poor visibility, traffic, flames, embers and fallen 
trees. A mail survey of residents living in fire prone peri-urban areas around Perth, Western 
Australia reported that the strongest predictor of delaying a protective action decision was a 
lack of difference in the perceived value of evacuating or actual value of evacuating meaning 
they were equally attractive and indistinguishable (McNeill, Dunlop, Skinner, & Morrison, 
2015).  
 
2.6.3.  Evacuating late. 
 
The danger of late evacuation from bushfire, problems understanding the meaning of leave 
early, and deciding when it is safe to leave are major themes in the Australian literature. 
Analysis of a database of fatalities from bushfire between 1900 and 2008 found that late 
evacuation accounted for almost one third of fatalities and was the most common activity at 
time of death, although this proportion, to total fatalities, has decreased over the last 50 years 
(Haynes et al., 2010). Late evacuation, mostly after sheltering, accounted for a majority of 
female and child deaths and the second most fatalities for men after defending property outside. 
Study of a detailed dataset of Black Saturday bushfire fatalities suggested that last minute 
disagreements between women, who wanted to leave, and men, who preferred to remain and 
defend, may have undermined plans and preparations leading to late evacuations (Handmer & 
O'Neill, 2016). A paper examining evidence from research and post-bushfire reviews observes 
that late evacuation can result from extreme fire behaviour, and the attitudes and behaviour of 
householders and the emergency services, reports the uncertainties of determining when it is 
safe to leave and concludes that the evidence establishes the danger of last minute evacuation 
(Handmer & Tibbits, 2005). Focus group research of residents of North-East Victoria and East 
Gippsland identified uncertainty over what constitutes leaving early and appropriate decision 
triggers confirmed the importance of householder attitudes in late evacuation (Tibbits & 
Whittaker, 2007). Few believed it meant leaving as soon as they knew the area was threatened 
and most would be prompted to leave by official advice or environmental cues in the immediate 
area, creating the likelihood of late evacuation, and consequently, dangerous evacuation. 
 
2.6.4.  Factors influencing self-evacuation.  
 
The factors influencing evacuation decisions are explored by many authors who address the 
role of official warnings (McLennan et al., 2012), information to inform evacuation (Cao, 
Boruff, & McNeill, 2016; Tibbits & Whittaker, 2007), responsibility for pets or livestock 
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(Smith et al., 2015; Taylor et al., 2015), survivability of evacuated property (Whittaker et al., 
2013). The influence of the failure to undertake long-run hazard adjustments including property 
preparation and equipping for bushfire on evacuation decision-making is discussed in a limited 
number of studies (McLennan et al., 2012; McLennan, Paton, & Beatson, 2015). Those who 
stay and defend in a bushfire sometimes evacuate due to failure to defend property, physical or 
emotional incapacity, injury and failure of equipment and therefore become self-evacuators by 
default (McLennan et al., 2012; Tibbits & Whittaker, 2007). 
 
2.6.5.  Hazard adjustments (mitigation) and evacuation. 
 
Differences in protective response to Australian bushfire have been found to be related to 
differences in level of householder preparedness including property maintenance, preparation, 
equipping and self-protective actions. Householders who intended to defend undertook more 
defence preparatory actions than those who had less definite intentions and those who intended 
to evacuate undertook the fewest defence and property preparations (McNeill, Dunlop, 
Skinner, & Morrison, 2013). Intended evacuees were less likely to prepare than those who 
intended to remain and defend (Penman, Eriksen, Horsey, & Bradstock, 2016). Fewer intended 
evacuees than intended remainers engaged in planning, preparation for active house defence 
and preparations to reduce danger and vulnerability to the house (McLennan, Elliott, & Wright, 
2014). Paton et al (2006) found that ‘Outcome Expectancy’ (hazard adjustment perceptions) 
was a significant predictor of intention to prepare and of bushfire preparedness. 
  
2.6.6.  Mathematical modelling of evacuation. 
 
Mathematical modelling of bushfire evacuation decision-making is addressed to a limited 
extent in the Australian literature. A paper critically assessing emergency evacuation models 
argues the need for better transport planning and management modelling in Australia to 
facilitate resident evacuation and access by emergency authorities (Alsnih & Stopher, 2004). 
A conference paper on bushfire related evacuation specifies the necessary constituents of 
bushfire advance planning models and argues for the development of tactical operational 
models for simulated or actual emergencies (Taylor & Freeman, 2010). A decision model using 
a heuristic solution method is presented to address the complex Vehicle Routing Problem 
presented by the need to assign vehicles, optimise routes and establish evacuation schedules in 
a bushfire emergency (Shahparvari, Abbasi, Chhetri, & Abareshi, 2016).  A paper addressing 
late evacuation problems in the Black Saturday bushfires developed optimal resource allocation 
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models, based on Just-in-time resource allocation, to enhance the fire service’s late evacuation 
response (Shahparvari, Chhetri, Abareshi, Abbasi, & Alahakoon, 2015). A tactical planning 
decision-making model was developed to support short-notice evacuation and was tested on 
bushfire scenarios applying sensitivity variables including short time windows, resource 
availability and road disruption to demonstrate its strength and reliability (Shahparvari, 
Chhetri, Abbasi, & Abareshi, 2016). 
 
2.6.7.  Characteristics of evacuators and remainers. 
 
The psychlogical characteristics of evacuees and protective response archetypes are discussed 
in a small number of papers and a government report produced by a research team lead by Alan 
Rhodes of Emergency Management Victoria. Research on the psychological differences 
between intended evacuators and remainers resident in bushfire prone areas of south-eastern 
Australia (McLennan, Paton, & Beatson, 2015) found that intended evacuees reported greater 
concern about bushfire danger, saw themselves and their property as vulnerable, and believed 
that others perceived leaving as the most desirable protective response. They were concerned 
their property was likely to be destroyed in their absence and that leaving would be 
inconvenient. Notwithstanding their strong intention to leave and concern for their home, they 
were less likely to have an evacuation plan or to prepare their property for undefended survival. 
Intended remainers believed they were likely to successfully protect their valued property and 
saw themselves as well connected with other community members. Thematic analysis of 120 
face-to-face interviews with residents in three bushfire-affected areas in Victoria identified 
seven archetypal groups. They were characterised by the ways bushfire risk was typically 
understood, and their attitudes, intentions and priorities  including self-efficacy and 
responsibilty, bushfire experience, threat perception, preparedness, use of environmental and 
social cues, and networks, and intended protective response (nous Group., 2013). Archetypes 
were useful in understanding the similarities and differences between how householders living 
in bushfire prone areas perceived and responded to bushfire threat.  
 
The concept of an archetype  was developed by Carl Jung (1964) from his work on the 
collective unconscious, as a typical character to whom an observer might emotionally resonate. 
The collective unconscious embraced impersonal, universally shared, fundamental 
characteristics of humanity that he referred to as primordial images or archetypes (Jung, 1959), 
based on myths, legends and esoteric teachings, forming part of the individual’s unconscious 
mind. While Jung saw archetypes as universal across time and culture, others have relied on 
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social cues replicated through dominant discourse (Campbell, 1988) and collective memory, 
as shared experiences are constructed and validated through social interaction (Halbwachs, 
1992).  Archetypes that exist in literature include The Hero, the Mother, The Mentor, The 
Scapegoat and The Villain, all of which have ‘a universal acceptance, as readers identify the 
characters…in their social and cultural context’ (LiteraryDevices Editors., 2013). Archetypes 
have not been the subject of Australian bushfire research. Archetypes have been discussed in 
the international wildfire literature in developing community typologies, based on local social 
context and community characteristics, that influence approaches to wildfire planning 
mitigation (Paveglio et al., 2015; Paveglio, Nielsen-Pincus, Abrams, & Moseley, 2017) and in 
the development of fire-adapted communities (Carroll & Paveglio, 2016). The formulation of 
Australian archetypes using cluster analysis in a large study by the Department of Families, 
Housing, Community Service and Indigenous Affairs established the concept as an important 
tool of public policy in Australia (Berry, Butterworth, Caldwell, & Rodgers, 2008). The 
development and use of self-evacuation archetypes will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 6, A Model of Self-Evacuation Archetypes. 
 
2.6.8.  Predicting self-evacuation. 
 
Findings of a study of householders’ strength of intention to self-evacuate, using a model based 
on the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), indicated that subjective norms and behavioural 
controls about leaving, attitudes to leaving as a safe action and self-determination were 
significant positive independent predictors of strength of intention to leave (McLennan, 
Cowlishaw, et al., 2014). Attitudes to staying and defending and self-determination were 
significant predictors of intentions to stay and defend. Using a model based on Protection 
Motivation Theory (PMT), self-efficacy and response efficacy were significant predictors of 
leaving while self-efficacy and susceptibility to threat predicted the intention to stay and 
defend. In interpreting results from the two models, the intention to leave represented an 
expression of true self rather than being controlled by the bushfire threat, and the intention to 
remain reflected a commitment to protect property and accept personal risk rather than to 
protect personal safety. 
 
2.7. Conclusions 
 
When threatened by a hazard people must make critical decisions about what actions they will 
take to protect their personal safety, the safety of household members, and to protect their 
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property. Their decisions are typically made under pressure and in an environment of great 
uncertainty about the situation and likely outcomes. Decision theory provides a framework for 
explaining, analysing, and predicting decision-making within normative and descriptive 
traditions. The first assumes people as rational logicians and the second as imperfect judges. 
Both accept that people make decisions based on their beliefs and values but in normative 
models, these are implicit and play no direct role, while in descriptive models, beliefs and 
values directly influence the decision-makers aims, perceptions of alternative actions, 
probability judgements about states of the world and utility judgements about outcomes. 
Research has demonstrated that people exhibit systematic flaws and biases in their decision-
making with potentially far-reaching consequences. 
Contemporary decision theory has shaped the development of social science models designed 
to “better approximate how people go about the business of their daily lives” and improve 
understanding of the reasons behind human behaviour (Dunning, 2012, p. 252) . Expectancy – 
valence models based on Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory provide a psychological 
framework for conceptualising behaviours based on some of the precepts of decision theory. 
Protection motivation theory (PMT: (Rogers, 1983) and person relative to event theory (PrE: 
(Mulilis & Duvall, 1997) have been used in the analysis of behaviour within a hazard context. 
The Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) reflects Vroom’s insights and draws on the 
psychological concepts of the PMT and PrE-models while incorporating the social and 
environmental context of the decision-maker and accommodating the conclusions of 
judgement and decision-making theory and research. This model has developed from and has 
been used in several hazard studies but not for Australian bushfire. Australian householders 
confronting a bushfire threat must decide whether they will remain or evacuate. Evacuating is 
considered by the emergency services, to be the safest option, and late evacuation is associated 
with fatalities. Understanding peoples’ self-evacuation decision-making can contribute to 
increasing safe evacuation and reducing fatalities in bushfire. Australian researchers have 
suggested that here is a need to better understand householders’ decisions and actions during 
bushfire, including the reasons they wait and see before taking decisive protective action, the 
role of warnings in evacuation decisions, and the factors influencing householders’ decisions 
to stay and defend or evacuate. The use of theoretical models as frameworks to investigate 
decision-making based on householders’ accounts of their actual  protective decision-making 
and actions during bushfire is advocated (McLennan et al., 2012; McLennan et al., 2013). This 
thesis therefore addresses the gap in the literature by examining the factors influencing 
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householder self-evacuation decision-making by investigating their attitudes and behaviour 
during a bushfire in which they were recently involved.  
 
The PADM in both reflecting the insights of expectancy theory and incorporating social and 
environmental contexts provides an effective bushfire research framework. This thesis 
therefore uses the PADM as a descriptive and analytic framework to describe and analyse 
Australian householders’ self-evacuation decision-making in a bushfire. In so doing, it attempts 
to establish the role that social and personal factors play within the PADM in self-evacuation 
decision-making and the specific factors that predict evacuation. It also provides an insight into 
the characteristics that influence householders’ self-evacuation decisions. Finally, this thesis 
critically examines the PADM’s suitability for the analysis of Australian bushfire and ways to 
improve it. 
The following chapter outlines the research philosophy that guided this research, the mixed 
methods that were used to collect data to answer the research questions and the nature of the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis that was employed.  
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the mixed methods (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 
2009) research strategy used in this thesis to address the primary aim:  to identify factors that 
influence householders’ self-evacuation decisions during bushfire and answer the following 
research questions:  
 
i. What are the factors that influence householders’ decisions to self-evacuate? 
ii. What factors predict self-evacuation? 
iii. What are the characteristics of self-evacuators? 
iv. What improvements can be made to the PADM to enable better analysis of 
householder self-evacuation decision-making? 
 
The philosophical framework of the research strategy, based on constructionist ontology and 
critical realist epistemology, is discussed and the reasons for preferring this approach is 
explained. The populations of bushfire-affected households and the sampling procedure to 
select participants for this study are presented and the development and pre-, and pilot testing 
of the data collection instruments, is then explained. A discussion of the administration of 
telephone surveys and face-to-face interviews follows. The treatment and analysis of data is 
reported, including the use of appropriate statistical and analytical procedures to extract both 
quantitative and qualitative insights. Finally, the approach to ethical considerations is explained 
and the problems and limitations of the research are described. 
  
3.2. Philosophical Framework 
 
Assumptions about the nature of reality and how we come to know reality centrally influence 
the approach that is taken to scientific research. Whether reality is perceived as packed with 
facts and phenomena to be discovered through the application of the senses, or, as elusive and 
dynamically generated through generative mechanisms, these assumptions influence all aspects 
of research from the conception of research questions, to methodology and analysis.  The 
ontological and epistemological perspectives that influenced this thesis are therefore important 
to consider, to understand the approach to this research. 
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3.2.1.  Ontology.  
 
Ontology addresses the question of what reality is or what can be said to exist. An objectivist 
ontological position implies that social phenomena, their meanings, and the categories we use 
in everyday discourse, have an existence that is independent of social actors (Bryman, 2016). 
Alternatively, a constructivist argues that social reality is created through the interaction 
between social actors. “Social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social 
interaction but… are in a constant state of revision” (Bryman, 2016, p. 33). The factors 
influencing self-evacuation decision-making are intimately connected with the actions and 
interactions of social actors within a dynamic context. A constructionist ontological approach 
is therefore most appropriate here.  Although a constructionist view is adopted in this thesis, 
the accounts presented are not viewed as the researcher’s constructions, but reflect the real, 
actual and empirical domains of the critical realist epistemology (Bhaskar, 2008).  
 
3.2.2.  Epistemology.  
 
Epistemology is the philosophy of knowledge: how we come to know things and how we think 
we know them.  It is concerned with the nature of knowledge, what constitutes valid 
knowledge, what can be known and who can know. The way “valid” knowledge is generated 
differentiates the main epistemological trends; these are, positivism, interpretivism and critical 
realism.  
 
The worldview upon which positivism is based derives from a modernist outlook produced 
during the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment 
(Spretnak, 2012). Positivism asserts that only certainty and empirical knowledge are valid ways 
of knowing. The positivist universe is deterministic, so truth is revealed through the laws of 
cause and effect, which are discerned through scientific method. Positivism advocates the use 
of the methods of the natural sciences to investigate and write about human experience. 
Knowledge reflects phenomena that are experienced; so, the purpose of science is to observe 
and measure phenomena. The principles of positivism are: knowledge derives only from 
observation of phenomena through the senses (i.e., phenomenalism and empiricism) so 
scientific, not normative, statements are the true domain of the scientist; the purpose of theory 
is to enable hypotheses to be tested and for the assessment of laws (i.e., deductivism); the 
gathering of facts provides the basis of laws on which knowledge is founded (i.e., inductivism); 
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and, the conduct of science must be free of value (i.e. objectivism) (Bryman, 2016). Positivist 
abstraction and the creation of universal principles fragments human experience rather than 
treating it as a complex whole (Ryan, 2006) as advocated by interpretivism.  
 
Interpretivism (Hughes, 1990) is a rejection of positivism. Interpretivism comprises the notions 
hermeneutics, phenomenology and Verstehen. Hermeneutics is the theory and method of 
interpreting human action. Phenomenology is concerned with how people make sense of the 
world and the exclusion of preconceptions by the researcher (Schutz, 1967). Verstehen 
considers an interpretive understanding of social action aims as a causal explanation of its cause 
and effects (Weber, 1947). Interpretivism views people and institutions as fundamentally 
different from the subject matter of the natural sciences, requiring an epistemology to be 
applied to the study of the social world that is distinct from that of the natural sciences, and it 
reflects and utilises that difference. This fundamental difference exists because social reality 
has a meaning for actors who therefore act based on meanings they attribute to their acts and 
those of others. Because social action is meaningful to actors, researchers must interpret actions 
and the social world from the actor’s point of view (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975). This fundamental 
difference and its implication for epistemology is captured by Shultz.  
 
The world of nature as explored by the natural scientist does not ‘mean’ anything to 
molecules, atoms and electrons. But the observational field of the social scientist-social 
reality-has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the beings living, acting and 
thinking within it. By a series of common-sense constructs, they have pre-selected and 
pre-interpreted this world which they experience as the reality of their daily lives. It is 
these thought objects of theirs which determine behaviour by motivating it. The thought 
objects constructed by the social scientist, in order to grasp the social reality, have to 
be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men 
(sic), living their daily life within the social world. (Schutz, 1967, p. 59). 
 
 
Critical realism, as a critique of positivism and interpretivism, was developed by Ram Roy 
Bhaskar (Bhaskar, 2008) and his work on Transcendental Realism, his general philosophy of 
science, and Critical Naturalism, which is his application of this general philosophy to the 
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social world. Bhaskar distinguishes between ontology and epistemology by establishing an 
intransitive ontological dimension of science, which constitutes processes and phenomena that 
exist independently of scientists and their activities and by a transitive epistemological 
dimension comprising scientific activities, theories and discourse.  This approach addresses the 
failings of the philosophies of science that suffer from what Bhaskar calls the epistemic fallacy: 
the definition of being in terms of our knowledge of it and the fatal reductionism of ontology 
to epistemology. These philosophies are too restrictive because they fail to clearly distinguish 
epistemology from ontology through their limited view of people as separate passive 
responders to atomistic events in a closed system. This view, therefore, limits knowledge, 
“ruling out as epistemologically untenable, adequate formulations of the sociohistorical nature 
of embodied human agency and the structured and differentiated nature of social realities” 
(Shotter, 1990, p. 444). On the other hand, Bhaskar sees these philosophies as 
epistemologically too permissive because they allow improbable theories of ‘human nature to 
become institutionally entrenched’ (Shotter, 1990, p. 444).  
 
Where Positivists seek to establish meaning by observing the relationship between cause and 
effect at the level of events, Critical Realists search for causal relationships at the level of 
generative mechanisms. Within Bhaskar’s conception, real natural or social objects exist 
irrespective of whether they are known or recognised. These objects have structures and 
generative mechanisms with enduring properties that shape their behaviour and can be acted 
upon by other conditions or mechanisms, which produce an actual event (or non-event) when 
an object’s causal potential is activated. Events that are observed and experienced (i.e. the 
empirical), require knowledge of the “real” or “actual”, which may not be observable (cf. 
Figure 3.1) The events and discourses of the social world can only be understood by identifying 
the structures at work that generate those events and discourses. When structures are not 
spontaneously apparent in the observable pattern of events, they can only be identified through 
the practical and theoretical work of the social sciences (Bhaskar, 2010). Explanation and 
theory building requires retroductive reasoning (Blaikie, 2004) rather than induction or 
deduction which address only the empirical domain and result in generalisation of cause based 
only on observed effect. Retroductive reasoning involves analysis within the transitive 
dimension and inferences about structures and generative mechanisms that underlie, and are 
responsible for, consistently observable phenomena within the social world in the empirical 
domain. 
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Generative mechanisms, in combination with conditions, context, or other mechanisms that 
influence whether and how generative mechanisms are themselves set in motion, bring about 
the entities and processes that constitute the observed phenomena. Identifying and 
understanding the context that interacts with the generative mechanism to produce observed 
regularity in the social world is therefore central to explanation and theory building. This is 
because the conditions that promote or impede the operation of these mechanisms are 
illuminated through context (Bryman, 2016).  
 
Critical realists recognise that a multitude of different effects or events could be produced 
depending on the different conditions acting on a generative mechanism (Sayer, 2000). The 
complexity and dynamic nature of the mechanisms, processes and effects operating in the 
social world have important implications. Generative mechanisms that are not directly 
observable are accepted into theoretical explanation and theory building due to their observable 
effects. The failure of a posited mechanism to be realised does not mean that it does not exist, 
as claimed by the Positivists; rather it may be un-activated, activated but not observed or 
activated but counteracted by other mechanisms within the context in which it exists. The 
continual emergence of new phenomena (Sayer, 2000), through on-going conceptual 
improvements to better understand generative mechanisms, is in contrast with Positivists’ static 
postulations of independent and dependent variable coincidence. Conceptualisation of reality, 
rather than directly reflecting reality, is simply a way of knowing reality. Science therefore 
strives to systematically articulate in thought, the nature of things that exist and act 
independently of thought (Bhaskar, 2008).  
 
A critical realist philosophy was used because the focus of this thesis is on exploring the factors 
that the PADM theorises, influence householders’ protective action decision-making, and in so 
doing, test the PADM theory. It was also used because the ‘actual’ domain in which 
householders make self-evacuation decisions is an open and dynamic one in which context and 
conditions effect outcomes. Critical realism enables the observed bushfire self-evacuation 
behaviours of householders in the empirical domain to be analysed and interpreted within a 
framework that accepts the importance of context, including social context, on processes and 
events in that domain. Critical realism also provides a rationale and a logic for the creation of 
hypotheses and theories about structures, generative mechanisms and context in the ‘real’ 
domain, based on observation of householders’ behaviours in the ‘empirical’ domain. It also 
highlights the dynamism of the ‘actual domain’ generating the continuous development and 
emergence of new phenomena (Bryman, 2016; Sayer, 2000) that are capable of identification 
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and analysis.  Neither positivist nor interpretivist epistemologies provide an adequate rationale 
for the exploratory and integrative analysis of quantitative and qualitative data, using inductive 
deductive and retroductive processes, that is undertaken in this thesis.  Critical realism, because 
of its effective separation of ontology and epistemology also  facilitates the simultaneous use 
of both quantitative and qualitative methods and therefore supports the mixed-methods 
research strategy that is employed here (Sayer, 2000).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.  Real, actual and empirical domains. Adapted from An Outline of ‘Basic’ Critical 
Realism for Educational Research by Collaborative Group Learning, 2015, Retrieved from 
https://collaborativegrouplearning.com/2015/10/19/an-outline-of-basic-critical-realism-for-
educational-research/ and Design of a Socio-technical Change Management Process: A 
Critical Realist Perspective by B.M. Alexander,  2013, Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264046432_Design_of_a_Socio-
technical_Change_Management_Process_A_Critical_Realist_Perspective 
 
3.3. Mixed-Methods Research Strategy 
 
To establish the extent and importance of factors that influence an Australian householder’s 
decision to self-evacuate from a bushfire, a mixed-methods approach was used (Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009). Mixed-methods research integrates both quantitative and qualitative 
research strategies in a single research project  (Bryman, 2016; Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2011). 
The strengths of quantitative and qualitative methods are reinforced and weaknesses 
simultaneously addressed by combining methods (Eriksen, Gill, & Bradstock, 2011). The 
approach is preferred, given that epistemological, ontological and paradigmatic criticisms of 
mixed-methods , have effectively been addressed (Bryman, 2016; Cresswell & Plano Clark, 
2011). A mixed-methods strategy was also preferred because of its characteristics of 
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methodological eclecticism, paradigm pluralism, and its support of an iterative, cyclical 
approach to research” (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2012, p. 775). The methodological eclecticism 
of the mixed methods approach facilitated the use of the most appropriate methods for which 
the researcher had knowledge and skills. Its acceptance that a variety of paradigms can provide 
an “underlying philosophy for the use of mixed methods” (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2012, p. 779) 
accommodated the researcher’s critical realist philosophical orientation.  Its support of the use 
of both quantitative and qualitative methods incorporating  the logic of justification (testing 
theories and hypotheses) and discovery (understanding phenomena and generating theories) 
facilitated the simultaneous exploration of the PADM as a theory of decision-making and the 
deep understanding of factors influencing self-evacuation decision-making  (Johnson & Gray, 
2010)  
 
This research employed a critical realist epistemology, combining a quantitative telephone 
survey also comprising some qualitative elements, and a qualitative semi-structured interview 
of a sample of telephone survey participants who had evacuated from the bushfire. The methods 
were given equal weighting but the quantitative element proceeded the qualitative so is 
categorised as a QUAN → QUAL according to Morgan’s (1998) classification. A breadth of 
quantitative data was collected to capture the factors involved in, and their influence on, self-
evacuation decision-making. This also facilitated identification and analysis of inferences 
about associations among variables and investigation of phenomena that were not directly 
observable. Qualitative data were vital in providing the necessary insights into the manner and 
process in which these factors coalesced to produce the complexity of actions taken by 
individual householders confronted by bushfire.  
 
The mixed-methods approach enabled triangulation of results, achieved completeness of data, 
broadened insights into structures and processes, and supported detailed explanation, vivid 
illustration and general enhancement of findings (Bryman, 2006). The results from the 
quantitative telephone survey and information from the face-to-face interviews facilitated 
triangulation, a complete treatment of the research questions, insight into both fixed and 
procedural elements of the data, and offered a detailed explanation of relationships between 
variables. The mixed data also established a clear and broad context for the analysis of the data, 
providing quotes from interviewees to illustrate quantitative findings, and enhancing 
explanations of findings through the exploration of consistencies and reconciliation of 
differences arising out of the two methods (Bryman, 2016). The methodological eclecticism of 
the mixed-methods approach provided “the tools necessary to gain a better understanding of 
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the diverse… parts that make up the whole of the natural hazard” (Eriksen et al., 2011, p. 23), 
enabled an understanding of the factors influencing self-evacuation and confidence in the 
findings.  
 
3.4. Population and Sample 
 
The suburbs of Parkerville, Stoneville, and Mt Helena, in the Perth Hills and 13 towns in the 
Adelaide Hills area experienced major bushfires in January 2014 and 2015 respectively, 
resulting in the loss of homes, property and livestock.    
 
Householders residing in both affected Perth and Adelaide localities with landline or mobile 
telephone listed in the Whitepages telephone directories, were included in the sample frames 
(Perth Hills, N = 1941; Adelaide Hills, N = 1537). Two separate samples of 1000 telephone 
numbers were drawn randomly from each frame by matching each telephone number with a 
random number automatically generated in Microsoft Excel, and arranging the random 
numbers, with corresponding telephone numbers attached, in ascending order and selecting the 
first 1000 numbers from each frame. Purposive samples of evacuees from both locations were 
selected from participants’ telephone surveys, for face-to-face interview.  
 
To assess the a priori power requirements for the minimum sample needed to detect an effect 
size commonly reported in the literature, (or where none are reported a small effect size will 
be applied), the quantitative tests that were intended for use in this study, were considered. 
These were cluster analyses, discriminant function analyses, logistic regressions, factorial 
ANOVAs, Chi-squared goodness-of-fit tests, and bivariate, zero-order correlations. 
 
For cluster analysis, power analysis is not appropriate because probability based tests in 
determining similarity and linkage are not used. Discriminant function analysis does not require 
power analysis because its purpose is to determine the percentage of cases correctly classified 
into clusters using discriminant functions of the set of clustered variables. 
  
The remaining are all probability based hypothesis tests and as such required sample size can 
be determined. Because of the absence of literature on adequate effect size for long-run hazard 
adjustments and for perception of protective actions and no clear conventional effect size, a 
priori power analysis was conducted using a small effect size as a benchmark. A small effect 
size of 0.1 requires 787 cases. This target was not reached in this research, which means that 
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the test would be underpowered to detect an effect of that size. However, with a sample of 429 
and a factorial ANOVA of the intended design, the test can detect an effect of 0.14 at minimum 
using the conventional power cut-off of 0.8. 
 
For a Chi-square goodness-of-fit test, a sample size of 1785 would be necessary to detect a 
small effect of 0.1 for a contingency table with 13 degrees of freedom, which is the maximum 
size that is planned for the most complex cross-tabulation generated in this study. Again, this 
target was not reached. However, a sample of 429 and a goodness of fit test with 13 degrees of 
freedom can detect an effect size of 0.20 using the conventional power cut-off of 0.8.  
 
In relation to the logistic regression model, given the absence of literature indicating a common 
effect size, an a priori analysis was conducted using a small effect as a benchmark. To run an 
a priori power analysis we were guided by methods to convert an odds ratio to a Cohen’s d 
(Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009), which is a standardized mean difference 
effect size. Guided by calculations undertaken by Chen et al (2010), a small effect size of 
Cohen’s d (0.2) is approximately equivalent to an odds ratio of 1.68. In addition, for a medium 
effect size where Cohen’s d = 0.5, an odds ratio of 3.47 is approximately equivalent, and a 
large effect size (d = 0.8) an odds ratio of 6.71 is approximately equivalent. Consequently, an 
a priori power analysis suggests that 788 cases are required to detect a small effect, assuming 
an equal distribution between householders who evacuated and remained.  
 
Because the study was predominantly exploratory in nature, sufficient numbers of face-to-face 
interviews were required to address a potentially broad range of issues to achieve data 
saturation (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). However, a number of factors act to reduce the number 
of qualitative face-to-face interviews that were required; these factors include the specificity of 
the sample of evacuees, the theoretical framework that focused much of the questioning, and 
the simple, thematic analysis strategy used (Malterud, Siersma, & Guassora, 2015). Also 
supporting saturation with a smaller number of interviews, the semi-structured, face-to-face 
interview methodology enabled the same questions to be addressed by all interviewees (Guest, 
Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). Methodological triangulation enabling data to be correlated through 
both qualitative and quantitative methods also assisted in achieving saturation of qualitative 
data with fewer interviews (Bekhet & Zauszniewski, 2012).  
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3.5. Development of Instruments 
 
A telephone survey schedule and a semi-structured interview guide were the two instruments 
used to collect data for this study. The Protective Action Decision Model (PADM), in providing 
the theoretical and analytical framework for this study, guided the issues that were addressed 
by both research instruments. The telephone survey, designed to collect data on the range of 
factors influencing self-evacuation, addressed how householders became aware of the bushfire 
including information sought and warnings received, their perceptions of threat, of the best 
way to respond to threat, and their perception of stakeholders involved in the bushfire. The 
survey instrument was developed by the researcher referencing the hazard research literature 
in general and in some cases by adopting or modifying questions used in Australian bushfire 
research. Demographic items used were appropriate for the collection task and have been 
shown to be reliable and valid, based on standardized scales developed by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics. These included items relating to age and gender. Some items were adapted 
from a tested and extensively used instrument developed for research into the Black Saturday 
bushfires by RMIT University’s Centre for Risk and Community Safety and the Bushfire 
Cooperative Research Centre (Whittaker, Haynes, McLennan, Handmer, & Towers, 2009). 
These included items on information sources, intended and actual response to the bushfire, 
immediacy of threat, long run hazard adjustments, household composition, property type, home 
ownership and insurance type. Items measuring perceptions of threat (Mileti & Peek, 2000), 
hazard adjustment (Lindell et al., 2009; Lindell & Perry, 2000), stakeholders (Arlikatti et al., 
2007; Drabek, 1986), expectation of future threat, threat intrusiveness (Lindell & Perry, 2004; 
Lindell & Prater, 2000; Weinstein et al., 2000), hazard experience (Lindell, 2013) and self-
efficacy (Rogers, 1983), and personal protection responsibility (Mulilis & Duvall, 1997) were 
all adapted from the hazard literature. Expert colleagues in the Australian bushfire and hazard 
research community critiqued the survey instrument, ensuring content validity. It was then pre-
tested by the researcher with four householders living in Stoneville and Mt Helena using a 
probing cognitive interview technique (Collins, 2003). Following amendment, the pretested 
instrument was pilot tested again by the researcher on six randomly selected participants within 
the Perth Hills sample and administered under actual survey conditions. The final telephone 
survey instrument, comprising 59 questions, is appended (Appendix A) and discussed below.  
 
The semi-structured face-to-face interview (Marshall & Rossman, 2016) was designed for two 
purposes. First, it created an opportunity for the interviewee to tell their story without the 
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preconceptions of the researcher restricting the topics and directions taken by the interview. 
This open, broad ranging approach allowed issues and themes not envisaged in the framework 
of the semi-structured interview to be raised by the interviewee and to emerge naturally 
although interviewees’ narratives may have been influenced through their participation in the 
telephone survey stage of the study. This element of the interview shed further qualitative light 
on some of the quantitative data collected through the telephone survey.  Second, the face-to-
face interview allowed the exploration of themes through the eyes of the interviewee on their 
protective action decision-making process (Lindell & Perry, 2012), a central theoretical theme 
that was not readily amenable to quantitative capture. The theoretical themes addressed were 
risk identification and assessment, search for protective options, choice of a preferred 
protective action and timing of its implementation. A copy of the interview schedule is 
appended (Appendix B). 
 
3.5.1.  Measures. 
 
The scales used in this dissertation comprise part of a larger questionnaire that were developed 
by the researcher, the Bushfire Evacuation Survey, Version 10, that was used for the telephone 
survey stage of the research and addressed other questions that were not included in this thesis. 
The instrument aimed to capture the experiences of householders who had been affected by an 
Australian bushfire event. It sought to measure location and proximity to the bushfire, intended 
and actual response to the hazard, self-efficacy and self-responsibility, experience of bushfire, 
intrusiveness of the bushfire threat, threat perceptions (current and future) and perceptions of 
impact, perceptions of the attributes of protective actions, protective actions undertaken, 
perceptions of stakeholders involved in the bushfire event, sources of information and warnings 
about the bushfire, pre-decisional processes, protective action decision-making processes, 
impediments to evacuation, and householder demographics. The survey also identified 
householders’ decisions to evacuate or remain during the event and the reasons for their actions. 
Where respondents were unable to respond to a question because it did not apply to them, for 
example if they did not have neighbours or did not interact with neighbours during the bushfire, 
or they did not have a view, these data were treated as missing. Questions in the survey are 
described in Table 3.1 that details the concept, question stem, individual items and the 
measurement scale and are attached in Appendix H.   
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3.6. Data Collection  
 
3.6.1.  Data collection in the Perth Hills. 
 
The telephone survey of randomly selected residents of Parkerville, Stoneville and Mt Helena 
was conducted between 17 March and 15 April 2014. To ensure consistency of questioning 
and approach the researcher undertook all 217 telephone surveys personally. Following the 
completion of the telephone survey and preliminary processing of the data, all evacuees were 
identified and those who had consented to participating in follow-up face-to-face interviews 
were contacted by telephone between 8 and 27 July 2014. Face-to-face interviews were 
conducted in 29 households involving 53 householders as individuals, couples and family 
groups. Interviews were at their homes (except in one case, which was conducted at a cafe, 
between 11 July and 3 August 2014. All face-to-face interviews were conducted, audio-
recorded and transcribed by the researcher 
 
3.6.2.  Data collection in the Adelaide Hills. 
 
A similar structure, in which the researcher conducted all telephone surveys and face-to-face 
interviews, was used for research on the Adelaide Hills bushfire. Respondents were randomly 
selected residents of thirteen towns within the fire area, namely Chain of Ponds, Cudlee Creek, 
Forreston, Gumeracha, Houghton, Humbug Scrub, Inglewood, Kersbrook, Lower Hermitage, 
One Tree Hill, Paracombe, Sampson Flat and Upper Hermitage. Two hundred and forty-one 
householders participated in the telephone survey between 3 February and 28 March 2015. 
Consenting evacuees were contacted between 24 and 31 May to organise face-to-face 
interviews that were then conducted between 6 and 14 June 2015 (30 households, comprising 
59 householders as individuals, couples and family groups.). Again, all face-to-face interviews 
were conducted, audio-recorded and transcribed by the researcher. In both instances, the face-
to-face interview process was strictly organised. Preliminary telephone contact was followed-
up with a second call one day before the scheduled interview to re-confirm the interview time. 
To ensure that the researcher arrived for interviews on time, a detailed calendar of appointment 
times and locations was created and hard copy and electronic mapping for the planning of travel 
time and route were used. Interviewees were given additional information about the study and 
the purpose of the face-to face session. An interview consent form (Appendix E) was provided 
at the beginning of the interview that was signed and returned to the researcher at the  
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Table 3.1: Measures 
Concept Question stem Item Scale type Scale 
Intrusiveness: the extent to 
which householders perceived 
the salience of bushfire in their 
daily lives. 
During this current bushfire 
season but before the recent 
fire in your area, how 
frequently would you say you 
had… 
• Thought about the threat of bushfires? 
• Talked to your friends/ neighbours about the threat of bushfires? 
• Heard about the threat of bushfires through the media? 
• Read information on bushfire in brochures, newspapers, the Internet, 
etc.? 
5-point 
Likert 
1 = Not at all 
 2 = Very little 
3 = Some of the time 
4 = Often 
5 = Very often 
 Don’t know -non-metric 
Experience with bushfire: The 
extent bushfire had, directly or 
indirectly, played a part in the 
householder’s life. 
 
 
Activity fighting or training for 
bushfire 
Before the recent bushfire, in 
the past, have you or any 
people in your household 
experienced any of the 
following? 
 
 
 
Have you had any of the 
following training or 
experience? 
• Seen or smelt smoke? 
• Experienced property damage due to bushfire? 
• Evacuated from a bushfire? 
• Been injured by a bushfire? 
• Experienced death as a result of bushfire? 
 
• Currently or previously a member of a fire brigade? 
• Formal or informal training from people with bushfire experience? 
• Personal experience fighting bushfires? 
• Other bushfire experience or training 
Binary  1 = Yes 
2 = No 
Don’t know -non-metric 
Future likelihood of bushfire: 
the likelihood that a bushfire in 
the future would pose a threat to 
the householder 
In the future, how likely do 
you feel it is that a bushfire 
will…? 
• Threaten your property? 
• Injure you or family members? 
• Disrupt you or your job? 
• Disrupt your normal day-to-day activities such as shopping or 
recreation? 
5-point 
Likert 
1 = Very unlikely 
2 = Unlikely 
 3 = Neither likely or 
unlikely, 
4 = Likely 
5 = Very likely 
Not applicable–non-metric 
Responsibility of emergency 
services: 
Householder’s perception that 
emergency services are 
responsible for protecting their 
personal safety and property. 
To what extent do you agree 
or disagree with the following 
statements? 
• The emergency services will tell me if I need to leave my home during 
a bushfire” 
• The emergency services are responsible for protecting me if there is a 
bushfire 
• The emergency services are responsible for protecting my home if a 
bushfire threatens it 
5-point 
Likert 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree or 
disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
Responsibility of the 
householder: 
Householder’s perception that 
they were responsible for 
protecting their personal safety 
and property 
 
To what extent do you agree 
or disagree with the following 
statements 
• I know that I need to be self-reliant in the event of a bushfire 
• I accept responsibility for my home and property during the bushfire 
season 
5-point 
Likert 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree or 
disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
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Concept Question stem Item Scale type Scale 
Main sources of information 
about the bushfire: 
 
 
Which of the following were 
the main sources of 
information that you used 
when you were at home 
during the bushfire? 
• Environmental cues – flames, embers and smoke, wind, heat” 
• Radio 
• Television 
• Fire agency (CFS/DSE/DFES) website 
• Twitter on my computer 
• Facebook on my computer 
• Family and/ or friends 
• Neighbours 
• Twitter on my mobile 
• Facebook on my mobile 
• Other (please describe 
• Did not get any information 
• Prompt for non-exemplar responses, (“Were there any other sources?”) 
Binary  0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 
Types of information sought: 
Nature, location and progress of 
the bushfire 
What type of information did 
you mainly try to get from 
these sources? 
• Confirmation that there was a bushfire 
• Severity of the bushfire 
• Location of the bushfire 
• Proximity of the bushfire to my home 
• Where the bushfire was heading 
• How fast the bushfire was travelling 
• Safe escape routes that I could use 
• Location of community refuge 
• Other 
Binary  0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 
Types of fire authority 
warnings received: 
Official designations of these 
warnings 
Did you receive any of the 
following bushfire warnings 
from the fire authorities? 
• Alert – informed that there was a non-threatening fire 
• Watch and Act – informed there was a threatening fire Emergency 
Warning - that you were in danger and should leave or prepare to fight 
• Emergency Warning - that it was too late to leave 
• No warning received 
• Don’t know 
Binary  0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 
Means by which official 
warning messages were 
received: 
Channels that were authorised to 
communicate formal bushfire 
warnings 
Which of the following ways 
did you receive the warning 
message from the fire 
authorities? 
• Recorded warning message on my landline telephone 
• SMS message of my mobile phone 
• Message on my App on my mobile telephone 
• Fire agency (CFS/DFES) website 
• Siren 
• Door-knocking by emergency services 
• On the radio 
• TV 
• Other 
Binary  0 = No 
1 = Yes 
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Concept Question stem Item Scale type Scale 
Threat of the bushfire: 
The perceived danger posed to 
personal safety and property 
At the height of the bushfire, 
when you were still at home, 
how much of a threat did you 
feel the bushfire was to…? 
• You (and your family)? 
• Your property? 
6-point 
Likert 
1 = No threat, 
2 = Very small threat 
3 = Small threat 
4 = Medium threat 
5 = Large threat 
 6 = Very large threat 
Impact of the bushfire: 
Magnitude of effect it would 
have on people and property 
At the height of the bushfire, 
when you were still at home, 
how much of an impact did 
you think the bushfire would 
have on…? 
• You (and your family)? 
• Your property? 
6-point 
Likert 
1 = No impact 
2 = Very small impact 
 3 = Small impact 
4 = Medium impact 
5 = Large impact, 
 6 = Very large impact 
Likelihood of impacts of the 
bushfire: 
The likelihood of death or injury 
or property damage 
At the height of the bushfire, 
when you were still at home, 
how likely did you think it 
would have the following 
impacts…? 
• Cause death to you or close family members 
• Cause injury to you or close family members 
• Damage or destroy your house? 
• Damage or destroy other property 
• Cause death or injury to pets 
• Cause death or injury to livestock 
5-point 
Likert 
1 = Very unlikely 
2 = Unlikely 
 3 = Neither likely or 
unlikely, 
4 = Likely 
5 = Very likely 
Not applicable–non-metric 
Immediacy of threat from the 
bushfire: 
The time it was expected to take 
to become a threat 
At the time, you first became 
aware of the bushfire how 
quickly did you expect it to 
become a threat to you (your 
family) and your property? 
• Immediately or within minutes 
• Within 30 minutes, 
• Within 1 hour 
• 1-2 hours 
• 3-5 hours 
• 6-12 hours 
• 13-24 hours 
• More than 24 hours 
• Didn’t expect it to become a threat 
Ordinal  
Process of protective action 
search and assessment: 
Identification and choice of 
protective actions 
Before or during the bushfire 
did you do any of the 
following things 
• Thought of different ways to respond to bushfire? 
• Weighed up the best ways of responding, including doing nothing 
• Decided on the way you would respond to the bushfire 
• Developed a clear plan of what you and your family would do to 
respond to the bushfire 
Nominal 1 = Before the bushfire 
started, 
2 = During the bushfire 
3 = No – neither before nor 
during the bushfire 
Long-run hazard 
adjustments: 
Actions taken to maintain, 
prepare and equip the household 
against bushfire 
Before or during the bushfire 
did you do any of the 
following things… 
• Cleared gutters of leaves 
• Cleared leaves, twigs and long grass 20 – 30 metres around the house? 
• Moved combustible materials like firewood or garden furniture away 
from the house? 
• Removed bushes close to the house and cut back overhanging tree 
branches? 
Nominal 1 = Before the bushfire 
started, 
2 = During the bushfire 
3 = No – neither before nor 
during the bushfire 
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• Covered all gaps and vents to reduce the risk of embers entering the 
house or cavities? 
• Obtained and prepared firefighting equipment like a pump and hoses? 
• Turned on sprinklers or sprayed your house and surrounding area with 
water? 
• Obtained and prepared equipment such as ladder, bucket, and mop to 
put out spot fires? 
• Filled gutters with water 
• Prepared personal items and memorabilia for evacuation? 
• Prepared a kit of personal protective clothing for each household 
member? 
• Moved your car into a position for quick evacuation? 
Short-run protective actions: 
The decision to evacuate or to 
remain at their property 
Did you at any stage during 
the bushfire, evacuate 
yourself (and your family) 
from your home or did you 
remain at you home 
throughout the bushfire? 
 Nominal 1 = Evacuate yourself (and 
your household) 
2 = Remain at your home 
throughout 
3 = Other. 
 
Perception of evacuating: 
Effectiveness in protecting 
safety and property and the 
resources involved 
I would like you to think 
about the following 
statements and tell me if you 
strongly agree, agree, neither 
agree or disagree, disagree or 
strongly disagree with them… 
• Evacuating is the best way to protect myself (and my family) 
• Evacuating is the best way to protect my property 
• It is not expensive to evacuate 
• I need knowledge and skills to evacuate 
• There is time and effort required to organise to evacuate 
• I need cooperation from family/ friends to evacuate 
5-point 
Likert 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree or 
disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
Perception of remaining: 
Effectiveness in protecting 
safety and property and the 
resources involved 
I would like you to think 
about the following 
statements and tell me if you 
strongly agree, agree, neither 
agree or disagree, disagree or 
strongly disagree with them… 
• Remaining is the best way to protect myself (and my family) 
• Remaining is the best way to protect my property 
• It is not expensive to remain 
• I need knowledge and skills to remain 
• There is time and effort required to organise to remain 
• I need cooperation from family/ friends to remain 
5-point 
Likert 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither agree or 
disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
Perceptions of oneself as a 
stakeholder: 
Influence, capability and 
responsibility in relation to self 
and immediate family. 
Now thinking about your 
experience of this bushfire 
and bushfire generally, and 
with the following individuals 
and organisations, on a scale 
from 1 to 10, where 1 is not at 
all and 10 is a great extent, to 
what extent do (you/ your 
family) … 
• Influence your thinking and what you do during a bushfire? 
• Have specialist knowledge and understanding of how a bushfire is 
likely to behave? 
• Well informed about what is actually happening during a bushfire? 
• Responsible for protecting you (and your family) and your property 
against a bushfire 
10-point 
continuous 
1 through 10 
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Concept Question stem Item Scale type Scale 
Perceptions of neighbours as a 
stakeholder: 
Influence, capability, reliability 
and responsibility in relation to 
neighbours. 
Now thinking about your experience 
of this bushfire and bushfire 
generally, and with the following 
individuals and organisations, on a 
scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is not at 
all and 10 is a great extent, to what 
extent do neighbours… 
• Influence your thinking and what you do during a bushfire? 
• Have specialist knowledge and understanding of how a 
bushfire is likely to behave? 
• Well informed about what is actually happening during a 
bushfire? 
• Responsible for protecting you (and your family) and your 
property against a bushfire 
10-point 
continuous 
1 through 10 
Perceptions of the media as a 
stakeholder: 
Influence, capability, reliability 
and responsibility in relation to 
neighbours. 
Now thinking about your experience 
of this bushfire and bushfire 
generally, and with the following 
individuals and organisations, on a 
scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is not at 
all and 10 is a great extent, to what 
extent do the media… 
• Influence your thinking and what you do during a bushfire? 
• Have specialist knowledge and understanding of how a 
bushfire is likely to behave? 
• Well informed about what is actually happening during a 
bushfire? 
• Responsible for protecting you (and your family) and your 
property against a bushfire 
10-point 
continuous 
1 through 10 
Perceptions of the emergency 
services as a stakeholder: 
Influence, capability, reliability 
and responsibility in relation to 
emergency services. 
Now thinking about your experience 
of this bushfire and bushfire 
generally, and with the following 
individuals and organisations, on a 
scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is not at 
all and 10 is a great extent, to what 
extent do the emergency services… 
• Influence your thinking and what you do during a bushfire? 
• Have specialist knowledge and understanding of how a 
bushfire is likely to behave? 
• Well informed about what is actually happening during a 
bushfire? 
• Responsible for protecting you (and your family) and your 
property against a bushfire 
10-point 
continuous 
1 through 10 
Situational impediments: 
Factors that delayed or slowed 
evacuation once the decision to 
leave had been made 
To what extent did the following 
factors make it difficult, delayed or 
prevented you from evacuating? 
• Availability of a safe escape route 
• Availability of transportation 
• Time of day/ night 
• Traffic conditions on your escape route 
• Expected cost of accommodation when evacuated 
• Emotional reaction of myself and/ or household member, to 
bushfire threat 
• Not having a thought-out evacuation plan 
• Disability of myself and/ or household member 
• Separation of household members during the bushfire 
• Need to take care of domestic pets (cats, dogs) 
• Need to take care of non-domestic pets (hens, pigs, sheep) 
• Need to take care of livestock 
• Concern that roadblocks might prevent you returning home 
5-point 
Likert 
1 = Not at all, 
2 = Small extent 
 3 = Moderate extent 
4 = Substantial extent 
5 = Very large extent 
First awareness of bushfire: 
Manner of first awareness 
 
How did you first become aware that 
there was a bushfire in your area? 
 
• A single long-form response was sought. Open-ended Coded 
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Concept Question stem • Item Scale type Scale 
Why bushfire perceived as a 
large threat: 
 
 
What was the main thing that made you 
feel that the bushfire was a large/very 
large threat to you/your family/your 
property? 
• Responses were sought until all reasons were expressed. Open-
ended 
Coded 
Why bushfire perceived as a 
small threat: 
 
What was the main thing that made you 
feel that the bushfire was a 
medium/small/no threat to you/your 
family/your property? 
• Responses were sought until all reasons were expressed. Open-
ended 
Coded 
Factors influencing decision to 
evacuate: 
 
What were the most key factors that 
influenced your decision to evacuate from 
your home 
• Responses were sought until all factors were identified. Open-
ended 
Coded 
Factors influencing decision to 
remain: 
 
What were the most key factors that 
influenced your decision to remain at 
your home throughout the bushfire 
• Responses were sought until all factors were identified. Open-
ended 
Coded 
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completion of the session. Two audio recorders were used for every interview to provide backup 
and redundancy.  
 
3.7. Data Analysis 
 
To establish the range of factors that influenced householders’ decisions to evacuate, the factors 
that predicted evacuation and defined self-evacuation archetypes, quantitative telephone survey 
data were analysed quantitatively using SPSS 22, 23 and 24 and AMOS 23.  Qualitative data 
collected through face-to-face interviews were all transcribed and analysed thematically using the 
Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) NVivo Versions 11. 
 
3.7.1.  Quantitative analysis. 
 
Data were summarised and described primarily using descriptive statistics including frequency 
analysis that produced a table of frequency counts and percentages for each variable. Inferential 
statistics including cross-tabulation of variables was undertaken to establish whether the 
distribution of values on a variable was linked to the distribution of values on a second variable. 
Chi-square, expected count and standardised residual statistics were generated. The data were 
examined to ensure that the expected count for any cell was five or more. Bivariate correlations 
were also undertaken. Inferential techniques were used in establishing the the relationship between 
independent factors that influenced householders’ decisions to evacuate including threat, hazard 
and stakeholder perception, bushfire experience, intrusiveness and long-run protective actions.  
 
Binary logistic regression was used to identify important factors that predicted householder 
evacuation because the dependent variable was binary and the independent variables both 
continuous and binary. The binary variables in the model, both dependent and independent, were 
dummy coded (0 and 1) (Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 2003). For the independent variables, 
cases that had attributes of research interest were coded as 1. The dependent variable depicting 
whether householders evacuated or remained was coded on the basis that cases who evacuated 
were the target group of the study and were coded 1 while those who remained were the reference 
group and were coded 0. Latent variables reflecting an underlying construct not measured were 
created by averaging several measured, or observed, variables. A unidimensional factor structure 
was confirmed for each of these hypothesised higher-order variables. This confirmation involved 
three stages: principal axis factoring constraining all component item loadings to a single 
dimension; confirmation of a unidimensional structure using eigen values indicating the 
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dominance of a single eigen vector that accounted for common variance amongst the items; and 
assessment of factor loadings within the structure matrix to ensure they were all adequately larger 
than .40. To test the reliability of the latent factors that had been created, Cronbach's alpha was 
used to measure the internal consistency of each factor’s items. The tests applied to establish the 
viability of the logistic model to predict householder evacuation were the Omnibus Test of Model 
Coefficients, the Nagelkerke pseudo R2, the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test and the percentage of 
group membership correctly classified using the set of predictors. The Wald test of significant 
coefficients was used to identify significant variables predicting evacuation and the adjusted log-
odds ratio measured the multiplier effect of one variable on predicting evacuation with all other 
variables held constant. 
 
A K-means cluster procedure was used to define self-evacuation archetypes. Ordinal variables 
were converted to z-scores for the analysis to aid interpretation of cluster means. To identify the 
most appropriate number of clusters, the K-means analysis was run for 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 clusters 
to establish where the greatest level of stability was achieved. Univariate ANOVAs were run to 
establish whether clustered groups differed significantly (p < .05) on the differentiating variables. 
Final cluster centres and the number of cases in each cluster were established. A multiple 
comparison test of the variables describing the clusters was undertaken to draw out similarities and 
differences between them. The Tukey test for pairwise comparisons compared each cluster with 
every other cluster (family-wise comparison) for each variable using the standard error of the mean 
and Studentized Range distribution. The overall (family-wise) error rate was controlled at the rate 
for the entire set of all pairwise comparisons. An explanatory discriminant function analysis was 
also undertaken to demonstrate the statistical validity of the clusters to significantly predict cluster 
membership. A set of weighted linear combinations of the quantitative variables that best 
differentiated the clusters was generated. 
 
3.7.2.  Qualitative analysis. 
 
In examining the phenomena of a bushfire event the qualitative component of this research sought 
to ‘discover significant classes of things, persons and events and the properties that characterise 
them’ (Schatzman & Strauss, 1973). Specifically, the purpose of the qualitative face-to-face 
interviews was to understand how participants made decisions about, and took protective actions 
by allowing them to tell their story of the bushfire. 
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The audio recordings from each interview were transcribed by the researcher, in a verbatim style, 
using Nuance Dragon Naturally Speaking Version 12 voice transcription software.  Every draft 
transcript was comprehensively checked by simultaneously reviewing the audio tape and editing 
the draft. Transcriptions were thematically coded by the researcher using NVivo 10 and 11.  
 
All householder face-to-face interviews from each bushfire were completed before formal analysis 
commenced so that preconceptions did not influence or bias the interview process. However, the 
researcher adjusted his observation strategy to some extent, in response to his informal analysis of 
insights gleaned about householders’ experiences that influenced their understanding and attitudes. 
In this context, emerging ideas were checked and tested along the way. Analysis was guided both 
by a template and an editing process (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). The template approach involved 
the creation of categories and codes informed by the theoretical framework provided by the 
protective action decision-making process, placing interview data within that context and revising 
categories as the analysis proceeded. The editing strategy involved ‘naively engaging the text to 
generate and illustrate categories of meaning’ (p. 20). Salient categories emerged from the 
experiences and beliefs expressed by the householders and the meanings they had drawn from the 
bushfire experience.  
 
The typical process of analysis of an interview involved a preparatory read through. This was 
followed by the detailed systematic examination of each sentence. Themes that fit were coded into 
an appropriate existing template which was based on the stages of the PADM and on the elements 
of the protective action decision process. The top-level nodes included environmental and social 
cues and warnings; perceptions of risk, hazard adjustment and stakeholders; protective action 
decision-making; information needs, communication action assessment and implementation; and 
situational impediments. Typically, these top-level nodes where further partitioned and these sub 
nodes were often further separated. For example, environment and social cues and warnings were 
sub-divided into environmental cues; social cues; warnings; and information- radio, TV, Internet. 
Environmental cues were further separated into Hot/bad weather; red glow; sirens, flashing lights; 
smoke, small; and water-bombing aircraft. The nodes and sub nodes used in the analysis of the 
Perth and Adelaide Hills face-to face interviews can be found in Appendix H. Where a new, 
emergent theme was not captured by an existing code, a new one was created as a draft concept, 
which could be refined or amended as new data. In the process of coding passages of data by 
categories, themes and sub-categories theoretical, thematic and analytical insights were generated. 
These were captured by the researcher in analytic memos, and in a small number of cases, in draft 
case studies (Rossman & Rallis, 2012). This writing assisted the researcher to clarify and 
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synthesize insights and interpretations, to draw connections between data, to better understand 
attitudes and behaviour, and to build the story that emerged into an analysis. The process of coding 
and writing memos and case studies assisted in the researcher identifying connections and patterns 
and the clarification of the detailed elements and characteristics of the categories and themes.    
 
The researcher was consistently alert to potential alternative interpretations of the interview data 
as he undertook this detailed process of coding and exploration. Themes and interpretations 
emerging from all interviews were constantly compared with one another. Quantitative insights 
were also used to challenge the explanations and interpretations drawn from the face-to-face 
interviews. For example, several face-to-face interviewees in the Adelaide Hills were highly 
critical of the performance of the Country Fire Service during the Sampson Flat bushfire and given 
the strength and consistency of that criticism, would have taken on a greater importance in the 
analysis and findings if it had not been for the much more positive views of the emergency services 
that were captured in the quantitative telephone survey data.  
 
The analysis of both the Perth and Adelaide Hills face-to face interviews generated recurring 
patterns for an overwhelming majority of themes that had been explored, suggesting a saturation 
of data. No negative instances of patterns were identified and where saturation did not appear to 
be absolute, very clear themes had emerged.   
 
3.8. Ethics 
 
This research project required prior written approval (Appendix D) from the College Human Ethics 
Advisory Network (CHEAN) to ensure that the ethical principles and practices applied to this 
project were consistent with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct  in Human Research, the 
Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research and RMIT University policy including 
the human research ethics procedure and the research integrity policy.   
 
Participants in this research had recently experienced a bushfire. Consequently, a key ethical 
consideration in approaching and interviewing them was to ensure that this process did not cause 
them harm in any way, including as a result of raising issues or prompting memories that caused 
anxiety or distress. Three aspects of the research design safeguarded the interests of participants in 
this regard. The first sentence of the introduction of the telephone survey explained immediately 
that the focus of the study was on their experience of the recent bushfire allowing them to 
immediately assess whether they wanted to continue the conversation. The purpose and objectives 
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of the research and the procedures that would be pursued were explained in detail before potential 
participants were asked to consent to be surveyed. This detailed and extended explanation allowed 
potential participants considerable time to consider whether participation was in their best interests. 
Potential participants were also told within the first sixty words, that should any question cause 
distress, that line of questioning would be immediately discontinued and that they could choose to 
terminate the interview at any time. Any participant who became distressed during an interview 
was also offered information on psychological support services that were readily available.  
 
Participants who consented to be surveyed by telephone were also informed of the arrangements 
for anonomymity and confidentiality of their views before the survey was commenced. They were 
informed of who would have access to their information, in what form it would be stored and then 
destroyed, how the information would be used and of their rights to withdraw as a participant at 
any time, to have unprocessed answers withdrawn and destroyed and to have any questions they 
had, answered. 
 
On completetion of the telephone survey all participants were offered a copy of the ‘Participant 
Information Form’ in the mail or email (Appendix F) which detailed the information that had been 
provided in the telephone survey introduction. Just in excess of two thirds of participants requested 
that the written information be provided. This information provided the investigators’ contact and 
academic details; the purpose of the research; how the participant would be involved; possible 
advantages, disadvantages and benefits of participation; the use of the information provided and 
how it would be kept confidential and secure; the participants rights; and who to contact if required. 
 
Some participants who, as part of the telephone survey, had agreed to be contacted again, when 
recontacted were reminded of the purpose of the research and of their rights as participants.  The 
second telephone contact with a limited number of participants organised face-to-face interviews 
with participants who had evacuated from the bushfire. Participants who agreed to a face-to-face 
interview were offered a second copy of the ‘Participant Information Form’. Before commencing 
the face-to-face interview the researcher provided a copy of the ‘Participant Information Form’ 
and summarised its contents. The interviewee(s) signed a consent form (Appendix D) 
acknowleging the information that had been provided, agreeing to participate in the project, to be 
interviewed and to be audio-recorded. Interviewees were reassured that should any aspect of the 
interview cause them distress, that line of enquiry would be discontinued or the interview as a 
whole would be terminated. Although no interview was terminated and all lines of enquiry were 
fully explored with all interviewees, on a small number of occassions, interviews were suspended 
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for a short time or the trajectory of the interviewing adjusted slightly due to the visible upset of an 
interviewee.  In no case was an interviewee significantly distressed and all interviewees who had 
shown any level of distress were in the company of a familty member or companion after the 
interviewer had left. 
 
The anonymity of participants was achieved through the separation of their data from any form of 
personal identifying information. This separation was achieved through the use of a unique number 
code for each response case. On this basis no information could be identified as belonging to a 
particular participant.  
 
Confidentiality of participant information was achieved primarily by limiting data access only to 
the researcher and only in the number code form which ensured anonymity. All data were 
processed and reported on an aggregate level so individual participants could not be identified. In 
reporting verbatim quotes from face-to-face interviews aliases were used to ensure participant 
anonymity and confidentiality. 
 
All research data including data files of telephone surveys and audio recordings of face-to-face 
interviews have been stored securely on the University Network systems. Memory sticks have been 
used for archiving , data transport and for some work in progress. All data will be kept for five 
years after the completion of the final publication of this research.  
   
3.9. Delimitations and Limitations 
 
The scope of this research is limited by its focus on Australian householders because their attitudes 
and response to a bushfire event is framed by the Australian public policy context which is unique 
in the world, except for southern France. While findings about evacuation behaviour are therefore 
not generalisable to other countries they may inform sub-jurisdictions in Europe and the US where 
a similar public policy exists formally or informally. The use of a single theoretical framework, 
the PADM, also limited the scope of the research and the extent of the analysis of the data collected. 
However, the PADM incorporates or is consistent with highly respected theories used in hazard 
research including the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB:(Ajzen, 1991),  Protection Motivation 
Theory (Rogers, 1983) and the Person-Relative-to-Event  model (Mulilis & Duval, 1995) thereby 
diminishing the limiting effect of its use. By focusing on factors defined within the PADM and a 
disciplinary perspective that largely discounts the influence of socio-economic and cultural level 
factors on protective action decision-making, the study is also limited.   
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Householders participated in this research two to four months after their experience of the bushfire. 
In that period, they had adequate opportunity to reflect on its outcomes informed by physical 
observations of their locality, discussions with family and neighbours and media reporting. 
Consequently, hindsight bias, by which recollection and reporting of decisions and actions are 
influenced by outcomes (Bradfield & Wells, 2005) may have swayed householder responses to 
survey and interview questions.  Roese (Roese & Vohs, 2012) suggests that hindsight bias may be 
introduced due to memory distortion or changes in beliefs about the likelihoods of outcomes during 
an event because of the knowledge of outcomes. Selective recall of information based on what is 
now known and sense-making to impose meaning and order on their knowledge may result in a 
narrow focus on single explanations, events or processes to the exclusion of broader explanations 
(Roese & Vohs, 2012). The researcher conducted all telephone surveys and face-to face interviews 
and encouraged participants to honestly and comprehensively recount their experiences by 
emphasising the importance and potential community benefit of their candid insights and by 
carefully managing the processes to minimize the potential for hindsight bias. The nature of many 
of the quantitative survey questions elicited factual and objective answers that did not provide an 
opportunity for, or encourage responses distorted by hindsight bias. Interviewees told their stories 
of the bushfire face-to-face interviews in an open, genuine manner and recounted episodic rather 
than semantic or autobiographical memories (Tulving, 2002) cited by (McLennan et al., 2012).   
 
By focusing on the attitudes and behaviour of decision-makers in households involved in a 
bushfire, the views of householders who did not make decisions or were on the periphery of the 
decision-making process, especially teenagers and young adults and older/dependent people, were 
not fully reflected in this research or its findings.  The extent to which conclusions could be safely 
drawn based on quantitative data was, in some cases, limited by the inadequacy of the sample size. 
This was an issue for the binary logistics regression model, which was unable to identify the full 
range of factors that predicted evacuation because there was inadequate power to confirm small 
effects.  
 
3.10.   Conclusions 
 
Researching the diverse factors that influence householders’ self-evacuation decision-making 
required a research philosphy based on critical realism.  It was used because it posits an ‘actual’ 
domain that is open and dynamic in which context and conditions effect outcomes, like the one in 
which householders make bushfire self-evacuation decisions. The creation of hypotheses and 
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theories within the critical realist philosophy are based on observation of householders’ behaviours 
in the ‘empirical’ domain. The continuous development and emergence of new phenomena that is 
capable of identification and analysis through Critical Realism is consistent with the objectives of 
this thesis in both exploring the factors influencing self-evacuation and testing the PADM model. 
The critical realist philosophy also conceptually supports the mixed research methodology used in 
this thesis. 
 
The blending of quantitative and qualitative data reflected in the mixed methodology of this thesis 
is evidenced in the Chapters 4 and 5 that follow.  These two chapters report the results of telephone 
and face-to-face interviews with bushfire affected householders resident in the Perth and Adelaide 
Hills. 
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Chapter 4: Results: The 2014 Perth Hills Bushfire 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter begins with a synopsis of the 2014 Perth Hills bushfire and presents both quantitative 
and qualitative data from householders involved in the bushfire, structured around the key stages 
of the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM). Chapter 5 is similarly structured and discusses 
the Adelaide hills bushfire. Two hundred and eighteen fire affected residents of the Perth Hills 
were interviewed during March 2014 using a structured telephone survey containing fixed choice 
and open-ended questions. Fifty-three participants, representing 29 evacuating households, were 
interviewed by the researcher in July and August of 2014 using a semi-structured interview 
framework. Participants described in detail their experience of the bushfire and were then asked 
specifically about aspects of their decision-making. In reporting the results of this mixed 
methodology, presentation of quantitative and qualitative results is mixed throughout. For ease of 
understanding, quantitative data are generally reported first, referring to householders and are 
supported by appended statistical data when appropriate. Discussion of the results of face-to-face 
interviews refer to householders as interviewees and is generally introduced as “face-to-face 
interviews” or “qualitative data”. 
 
4.2. The 2014 Perth Hills Bushfire 
 
The suburbs of Parkerville, Stoneville, and Mt Helena, within the Shire of Mundaring are situated 
in the urban-rural interface of the Darling Range. They are in a line between 35 and 40 kilometres 
east-north-east of the Perth Central Business District in Western Australia. The State Emergency 
Management Committee (2014) reported that the 2014 Perth Hills bushfire, in those three suburbs, 
ignited near the corner of Johnson and Granite Road in Parkerville at approximately 11 am on 
Sunday, 12 January 2014. A fallen power pole caused ignition of vegetation on private property. 
The bushfire quickly spread into a bridle path on the Sarah Brook dramatically increasing in 
intensity due to the high fuel loads along the creek line. It continued in both easterly and northerly 
directions, spreading through Parkerville, Stoneville and in a north-east direction into the western 
side of Mount Helena. Figure 4.1 illustrates the bushfire ground and perimeter. The report 
recounted that a Total Fire Ban had been in place and Extreme Fire Danger Rating forecast for the 
day. At midday, recorded wind speeds were 25 kilometres per hour with gusts of 35 kilometres per 
hour; the temperature was 42 degrees centigrade; relative humidity was 9 per cent; and, a Grassland 
Fire Danger Index (GFDI) of 42. Approximately 8100 mobile SMS services and 113 fixed-line 
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services received warning messages issued by the emergency authorities. Nearly 230 000 visitors, 
generating 11 million hits, visited the Department of Fire and Emergency Services (DFES) website. 
Residents used social media, including Facebook and Twitter, to send and receive information. 
Volunteer fire brigades from the local area, and career fire fighters from DFES and the Department 
of Parks and Wildlife attended the bushfire. Firefighting was restricted to parallel attacks along the 
flanks of the fire and to defensive asset protection while the bushfire burnt at high intensity. In the 
evening, with improving conditions, direct attack of the head fire was possible. Sixteen 
firebombing aircraft were deployed; these included helitacs, the Air Crane and fixed-wing 
bombers, in addition to 211 fire trucks and more than 500 associated firefighting personnel. At its 
greatest extent, the bushfire travelled 3.5 kilometres east and 2.5 kilometres north-east from the 
intersection of Stoneville and Richardson Road, covering over 392 hectares. The bushfire 
destroyed 57 homes. One thousand, three hundred and eighty-six people were displaced as 
registered evacuees. Fortunately, no lives were lost (State Emergency Management Committee., 
2014). 
 
4.3. Environmental and Social Cues, Warnings, and Information  
 
Table 1 displays the proportion of householders reporting the source of their first awareness of the 
bushfire. Householders first became aware of the bushfire primarily through environmental cues, 
particularly seeing and smelling smoke and hearing the operation of emergency services aircraft 
and appliances. Social cues involving contact by family, friends and neighbours were also an 
important initial source of awareness of the existence of the bushfire. A small number of 
householders had a warning from the authorities as their first indication of the bushfire and very 
few became aware of it through the traditional or social media. 
 
Qualitative interviews confirmed the importance of environmental and social cues in first alerting 
householders to the bushfire threat. The main environmental cues that alerted householders to the 
bushfire were seeing or smelling smoke, seeing the light change colour because of the smoke, and 
hearing emergency services activity including the sound of fire-bombing helitacs, fixed-wing 
aircraft and sirens on fire-fighting appliances. Social cues were received primarily from neighbours 
but also from family members and friends. Neighbours who were generally at home and easily 
accessible, talked face-to-face or on the phone and watched their neighbours’ actions. Family 
members and friends, often from beyond the fire risk area, having become aware of the bushfire 
through the media or because of receiving a warning message on their mobile telephone, contacted 
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interviewees and alerted them to the potential bushfire threat. In some cases, interviewees were 
otherwise unaware of the threat.  
 
Daniel and I were here and we could see smoke coming out from towards Parkerville. At 
that stage, it was only the average blue – grey smoke. (James2, Stoneville) 
 
The first thing we were aware of was the water bombers flying overhead which is not a 
nice sound in summer. (Emily, Stoneville) 
 
A neighbour… phoned me to say that the fire had started in Parkerville and was tipped to 
head in this direction so I stayed home basically at that point (rather than going to work). 
(Sarah, Stoneville) 
 
Most householders reported receiving a warning message from the fire authorities during the 
progress of the bushfire, but as previously reported in Table 1, very few as a first indication of the 
bushfire. Some received different levels of warning but most commonly it was the highest level of 
alert, an “Emergency Warning” instructing them to decide whether they should leave immediately 
or prepare to stay and defend their property. The speed with which the fire developed necessitated 
the fire authorities move directly to the highest level of warning (Appendix G1). Overwhelmingly 
emergency authorities communicated warning messages through SMS on mobile phone and 
automated recorded warning messages on landline telephone (Appendix G2). 
 
Qualitative data confirmed the response frequency data. In many cases, landline telephone 
messages were ignored after the first call because SMS warnings had preceded them and 
interviewees were busy responding to the bushfire. 
 
[T]he first message came as an SMS on my (mobile) phone. It told me to be aware that 
there was a fire in Parkerville. (Jessica, Stoneville) 
 
I got a message on our answering machine of our home phone which… was rather urgent 
and basically (told me) get out now this is an emergency. (Emma, Stoneville)
                                                          
2 Pseudonyms are used throughout this thesis to protect the identities of interviewees. 
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Figure 4.1. 2014 Parkerville Stoneville Mt Helena Bushfire Fire Perimeter. Reprinted from WAToday, 2014, Retrieved from 
http://images.watoday.com.au/2014/01/13/5071897/Fire-map.jpg?rand=1389569857046
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Table 4.1.  
Sources of First Awareness of Bushfire 
  
 
N % 
Environmental Cues   
See smoke 83 28.5 
Smell smoke 21 7.2 
See fire 12 4.1 
Ash/burnt leaves from sky 3 1.0 
See/hear water bombers/ helicopters 38 13.1 
Hear sirens 21 7.2 
See ES vehicles 5 1.7 
Total Environmental Cues 183 62.8 
Social Cues   
Contacted by family 48 16.5 
Contacted by neighbours/ friends 15 5.2 
Total Social Cues 63 21.7 
Warnings   
Get warning message on mobile 19 6.5 
Get warning message on landline 6 2.1 
Message on pager (FESA connection) 6 2.1 
Total Warnings 31 10.7 
Information Sources   
Radio 7 2.4 
Facebook (Equestrian and Darlington community) 4 1.4 
Total Information Sources 11 3.8 
Other 3 1 
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4.4. Perceptions of Environmental Risk, Hazard adjustments and stakeholders 
 
4.4.1.  Pre-decisional processes. 
 
To have some insight into the bushfire and to decide their response to it, householders needed 
to have an awareness and understanding of it. 
,  
During the bushfire, most householders checked their information sources frequently (69.9%), 
considered information they received from those sources very or extremely carefully (86.9%) 
and felt that the information was easy to understand (84.9%) (Appendix G3). Of the 
householders who had some difficulty understanding information, most were confused by 
geographic directions using points of the compass, others by terminology, and some by what 
they perceived as contradictory information suggesting the fire was headed in an opposing 
direction. 
 
4.4.2.  Perceptions of threat. 
 
Householders perceived different levels of threat the fire posed to themselves and other 
household members compared to their home and property. The difference in perceived threat 
due to the bushfire is due to differences in the substantive conditions that they faced and their 
own perceived capacity to deal with the situation (Appendix G4). While many householders 
perceived a large (or very large) threat to personal and family safety (62.0%), a significant 
minority saw it as medium, small, very small or no threat. More prevalent was householders’ 
perception of a large threat to their property (73.1%) from the bushfire.  
 
Householders perceptions of a large threat were influenced by four main factors (Appendix 
G5): its proximity to their property; its movement toward them, driven in their direction by 
strong, swirling and unpredictable winds; its perceived severity evidenced by the large volume 
of smoke it was generating; and, the proximate fire-fighting activity of the emergency services. 
 
Qualitative data confirmed that householders perceived the threat to be large primarily due to 
the bushfire’s proximity, severity, and immediacy. Interviewees saw smoke growing in volume 
and changing from white to black as evidence of the increasing size and intensity of the 
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bushfire. As smoke moved toward and over their homes they reporting knowing that the fire 
was moving toward them. In some cases, they could hear gas bottles or other flammables 
explode and saw flames burning toward them. The noise and clamour of the fire-fighting 
created a sense of high risk. Interviewees noted the presence of highly prominent fire-fighting 
helitacs, particularly the Air Crane, and the sirens and strobe lights on appliances and police 
vehicles. Also, heightening the perception of risk, was the receipt of serious warnings from the 
fire authorities and sometimes desperate ones from family members. 
 
[B]y then it was really obvious that the helicopters were out and you could see how 
close they were bombing the water… (and) at that stage we could hear things exploding 
and trees falling down so we knew how close the fire was. (Sarah, Stoneville) 
 
We could tell that it was pretty savage because one after the other pretty quickly we 
saw in amongst all white and brown smoke there was black smoke. And every time that 
black smoke went up we knew was another house gone. And in very rapid time there 
was probably 10 or 12 bursts of black smoke. (Charles, Stoneville) 
 
I was probably starting to get a little more anxious… when the kids were ringing and 
saying go, go, go, leave, leave, leave. I was saying we had better go, we’d better go. 
(Chloe, Stoneville) 
 
On the other hand, some householders felt that the bushfire was a medium, small, very small or 
no threat because it was moving away or parallel to them, driven by a favourable wind (56.1%); 
their property was clear of fire fuels (11.1%); and they had evacuated or were evacuating before 
it became a threat (22.2%) (refer Appendix G5). Some householders also felt the considerable 
distance of the fire from their property, the presence of emergency services fighting the fire or 
their own preparedness to fight the fire made it a small threat. 
 
Many of the interviewees who perceived a small threat saw the bushfire moving away or 
parallel to them, evidenced by a lack of smoke in their vicinity or wind not blowing in their 
direction, as meaning that they would not be under direct threat. Some interviewees felt that 
the behaviour of the bushfire was not threatening because it was slow-moving or lacking 
intensity. A few believed that the threat was small because the emergency services would 
protect them, particularly the fire-bombing aircraft, and the volunteer and career fire fighters 
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on the ground. A few interviewees also felt that the work they had done on their home and 
property to prepare it to endure the bushfire reduced the risk posed by the bushfire. Those who 
evacuated believed that the fire fighters were more likely to devote their resources to properties 
that were well prepared and would be more readily defendable, and those who remained felt 
that they could more readily defend their property themselves.   
 
[J]udging by the wind I had the impression that it wasn’t actually going to come and 
get us… we weren’t getting any smoke so I figured it was blowing in a different 
direction to us… we were going to be safe. (Sarah, Stoneville) 
 
It came up to the neighbours down the back… I could see flames but... there wasn’t a 
great deal of breeze blowing it towards me. There was no smoke coming towards me… 
it wasn’t roaring up as a threat. It was coming up slowly… it was just creeping along. 
(Thomas, Stoneville) 
 
There was no significant difference in the level of perceived threat to oneself/family between 
householders who evacuated and those who remained throughout the bushfire. However, 
householders who evacuated, more than those who remained, perceived a large threat to their 
property while those who remained, more than those who evacuated, perceived a small threat 
to their property (p < .05) (Appendix G6). 
 
4.4.3.  Hazard adjustment perceptions. 
 
Householders’ perceptions of the attributes of the hazard adjustments available to them 
influenced the protective actions that they took. Hazard-related attributes, namely the 
effectiveness of the hazard adjustment in protecting personal safety or property, were of 
primary importance in householders’ decisions about protective response. See Appendix G7 
for hazard adjustment perceptions by those who evacuated and those who remained. 
Householders who evacuated almost unanimously (95.9%) agreed that evacuating was the best 
way to protect personal safety, while they overwhelmingly disagreed that it was the best way 
to protect their property. While a majority (60.2%) of those who remained agreed that 
remaining was the best way to protect personal safety almost one third disagreed. Those who 
remained at their property overwhelmingly (79.6%) agreed that remaining was the best way to 
protect their property.  
 
 
82 
 
 
Most evacuees (88.4%) and remainers (79.3%) agreed that the action that they took was not 
expensive. Householders who evacuated were equally divided in their responses as to whether 
it required knowledge and skills, while most (84.9%) of those who remained believed that their 
action required knowledge and skills. Many of those who evacuated saw their protective 
actions as requiring time and effort to organise (74.5%) while those who remained 
overwhelmingly (88.2%) believed that this was the case.  Similarly, many evacuees believed 
that cooperation from family and/or friends was required for evacuation while an even larger 
proportion of those who remained believed that cooperation was required. Differences in 
hazard adjustment perceptions between those who evacuated and those who remained were 
statistically significant (p < .05) in relation to the effectiveness of their action in protecting 
personal safety, in protecting property, knowledge and skills and time and effort required 
(Appendix G7).  
 
Qualitative data highlighted three primary hazard adjustment attributes that influenced 
interviewees’ decision to evacuate or remain; these are: knowledge, skills, and capacity; the 
effectiveness of evacuating in protecting personal safety; and, the effectiveness of remaining 
in protecting property. Many interviewees who evacuated said that they lacked the knowledge, 
skills or capacity, including mental and physical capabilities or prior experience, to be able to 
remain and fight the bushfire. 
 
We had... agreed beforehand that we would not try to stay and defend… because we 
both felt we don’t have the right constitution just to think clearly in those situations. 
(George, Stoneville) 
 
It’s because we weren’t capable of fighting a fire like that… that was obviously out of 
control… because we are city people basically… we’ve only been here a few years.  
(Ronald, Stoneville) 
 
On the other hand, many interviewees who remained felt that they had the physical and mental 
capability and previous experience to be able to deal with the bushfire. 
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At the time of making a decision… we were going to stay and defend… everybody on 
the street stayed pretty much… because we all have that… country idea that … ‘she’ll 
be right’ and ‘we can do this.’. (Sarah, Stoneville) 
 
Many interviewees who saw evacuating as the most effective way of protecting personal safety 
attributed this to the responsibility they felt for others in their household, particularly for 
children. It was also based on concerns for the detrimental health effects of bushfire on 
themselves and/or family members and the physical danger posed directly by the bushfire, and 
on a strongly held principle of protecting life over property. 
 
I wasn’t prepared to hang around here with a five-year-old and risk her life. (Georgia, 
Parkerville) 
 
[M]y son… has a bit of trouble… with his breathing… asthma related allergies and he 
had a bad bout of pneumonia a few months prior.  (Lily, Stoneville) 
 
Several interviewees who believed that remaining was the most effective way of protecting 
their property were certain that they could extinguish spot fires that threatened buildings and 
equipment if they remained at their property. 
 
We’d sort of thought we were organised enough to sort of ride it out while it went over 
and then… mop up afterwards, you know, the spot fires. (Christopher, Stoneville) 
 
A few interviewees saw the cost of evacuating in terms of the outlays involved in activities to 
prepare their property. This included removing trees and bushes, and mowing grass close to 
buildings to create a defendable space, and installing sprinklers around the property to improve 
its survivability. Cost also involved replacing damaged or destroyed property. Interviewees 
who remained to defend their property saw the main cost as purchasing and installing 
firefighting equipment and establishing an independent water source. 
 
To put in certain precautions… if I’m not here... like sprinklers on your roof… they are 
quite costly. (Donald, Stoneville) 
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 Leah said that one of the pumps burnt out a motor because it was going non-stop for 
eight hours… but they still had two others. So, they were really geared up to fight. They 
had lots of expensive equipment. (Amy, Stoneville) 
 
 
4.4.4.  Stakeholder perceptions. 
 
Householders perceptions of the extent to which stakeholders were knowledgeable, informed, 
trustworthy, and responsible influenced their protective responses to the bushfire. 
Householders overwhelmingly saw themselves and their immediate family as highly influential 
(87.9%) in their thinking and actions, and as responsible for protecting themselves and their 
property (91.5%) during the bushfire (Appendix G8). A majority rated highly how well they 
were informed about what was happening during the bushfire, while just fewer than half rated 
their specialist knowledge and understanding of bushfire highly. A majority (51.0%) of 
householders rated their neighbours’ influence on their thinking and actions during the bushfire 
as low; however, almost one-quarter said neighbours were highly influential. Approximately 
one-third rated highly their neighbours’ knowledge and understanding of bushfire and how 
well informed they were about was happening during the bushfire. They rated the accuracy 
completeness and impartiality of information provided by neighbours and their responsibility 
for protecting the householder approximately equally between low, medium, and high. 
Householders were approximately equally divided in their low, medium, or high rating of the 
influence that media had on their thinking and actions during the bushfire and of the media’s 
specialist knowledge and understanding of bushfire. Approximately one-third rated the media 
highly on how well informed it was about what was happening during the bushfire and in 
providing accurate, complete, and impartial information, and a further one-third rated the media 
as medium for both factors. Most (74.0%) believed that the media had a low or medium level 
of responsibility for protecting them, but rest believed media responsibility was high. Many 
householders rated the emergency services highly in relation to their influence (76.6%), 
specialist knowledge and understanding (92.4%), being well-informed (91.3%) and providing 
accurate information (81.7%). Almost seven in ten also believed that the emergency services 
had a high level of responsibility for protecting them and their property. There were no 
significant differences between those who evacuated and those who remained in relation to 
perceptions of family, neighbours, media, or emergency services stakeholder attributes.  
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Qualitative data suggested that neighbours were seen primarily in positive or supportive terms. 
Neighbours with bushfire knowledge, capabilities or experience assisted and advised about 
evacuating, particularly for people who were vulnerable due to their age or inexperience.  
Neighbours also cooperated with each other both in staying and defending and in organising to 
evacuate from the bushfire, with some loosely supporting each other and others working 
closely together. In diverse neighbourhood settings, including residential interface and rural 
neighbourhoods, there was extensive cooperation between neighbours in sharing information 
and advice about the bushfire, assisting in preparations of property and for evacuation and in 
evacuating vulnerable neighbours and animals, especially horses. Some interviewees perceived 
neighbours who remained to defend their property as taking on the responsibility for defending 
houses and neighbourhoods in a manner like the volunteer bushfire brigades. For some who 
had evacuated this posed a major ethical dilemma because they felt that their decision to leave 
to be safe meant that they could not support their neighbours who remained to defend not only 
their own properties but also the evacuee’s property and in so doing put themselves at risk. 
 
(Our neighbours), they’re not particularly well and the son is not particularly sharp… 
we helped get them and their dogs organised and then put sprinklers on their roof and 
that sort of stuff. (Identity concealed) 
 
Michael next door, Brian who has got the house directly behind us and myself stayed 
in close contact with one another. So, although we weren’t together we weren’t just a 
single person within an area. If you were going to do it you are going to sort of basically 
be doing it together, the three of you. (William, Stoneville) 
 
There was a guy at the back of Parkland Road who stayed and he put out fires with his 
esky. He saved houses as well. Just one person with an esky. It is amazing what he 
could do. He risked his life by putting out spot fires. I honestly think him and our 
neighbours saved our house because of those spot fires had started here there would 
have been no one to put them out. (Olivia, Stoneville) 
 
Interviewees believed strongly that they were primarily responsible for their actions and their 
safety during the bushfire because they were in the best position to make appropriate decisions 
that reflected their circumstances. They recognised that bushfire-related knowledge and skills 
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were influential in what they did during the fire. Those who felt that they lacked bushfire 
capability, expertise and experience saw evacuation as a sensible response. 
 
I think in the end when everything is said and done is up to the householder to decide 
to stay or go no matter what DFES tell them, it’s up to you… so really in the end it’s 
your decision… taking into account your situation. (Sophie and Donald, Stoneville) 
 
It’s really an individual thing. You have to see what you can deal with mentally and 
physically and make the rational decision for yourself. (Charles, Stoneville) 
 
There was an implicit appreciation of the work of the emergency services in fighting the 
bushfire and limited criticism expressed by interviewees particularly in relation to the volunteer 
fire fighters. The fact that firefighters did not feature in the stories told by interviewees is 
consistent with the fact that many evacuated and were not in locations where firefighters were 
present. However, there was some limited criticism and questioning of the knowledge and 
effectiveness of firefighters in the bushfire because of the perceived leadership role of the 
Metropolitan Fire Brigade and their perceived lack of local knowledge compared to the local 
volunteer brigades. Interviewees who had been long-term volunteer firefighters were critical 
of the volunteer brigades because of what they saw as an undesirable change in the modus 
operandi and the culture of the volunteer brigades. 
 
The local volunteer firemen know the area. But you get the guys coming up from 
town… who come and take over. And they didn’t really listen to the local guys. 
(Donald, Stoneville) 
 
I am critical of how the volunteer brigade has changed… (When I was involved)…a 
fire breaks out… you drop what you are doing... went to the fire and put it out… (Now) 
you can have only so many people on the unit because it’s licensed to carry so many 
kilos… If anybody had had alcohol they weren’t able to attend the fire… A lot of the 
people who came out from the city… it was another avenue of… excitement and a 
social activity… we lost a lot of experienced people who had grown up in the area, 
knew the country and knew where the wind came from. (William, Stoneville) 
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Some interviewees commended the media, particularly ABC radio, for the information it 
provided. However, a few interviewees were critical of the media for what they considered as 
inaccurate, incomplete, and sensationalised reporting. 
 
Some of the stuff was inaccurate… There was a TV reporter I remember, who said he 
was on Schlock Road, which is the next road through the bush, and he was talking about 
all those houses on fire and ‘it looks like the place has definitely gone.’ But later it 
emerged there were no houses lost on that road at all. (Daniel, Stoneville) 
 
4.5. Protective Action Decision Making 
 
The protective action decision making process was informed by insights provided by 
environmental and social cues and information and warnings and householders’ perceptions of 
threat, hazard adjustment options and stakeholders. These influenced awareness and 
assessment of risk, the search for and assessment of feasible protective actions, and the 
implementation of those actions.  
 
4.5.1.  Risk awareness. 
 
As established previously in the discussion of environmental and social cues and warnings 
householders first became aware of the bushfire primarily through environmental cues - seeing 
and smelling smoke and through the activity of the emergency services. In several cases seeing 
or hearing fire-bombing aircraft prompted a search for other evidence of bushfire. Social cues 
involving contact by family friends and neighbours were also an extremely important element 
in householders’ initial risk identification. 
 
4.5.2.  Risk assessment. 
 
By considering whether the bushfire threat was of relevance to them and the extent of its 
potential threat, householders assessed whether they needed to take protective action. Perceived 
impact on the personal safety of household members and on property, the likelihood that the 
bushfire would cause death or injury to household members or animals and whether it was 
likely to damage or destroy property indicated the extent of threat. 
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Many householders (62.5%) expected that the impact of the bushfire on themselves/ family 
would be large although more than one quarter expected its impact to be small or nil. Many 
more householders (73.6%) expected the impact on their property to be large. Those who 
evacuated, more than those who remained, expected a large or very large impact on themselves/ 
family and on their property while those who remained, more than those who evacuated, 
expected a medium, small, very small or no impact on themselves/ family and on their property 
(Appendix G9). 
 
Most householders felt that the bushfire was unlikely to cause death (84.7%) or injury (81.0%) 
to themselves or their family. However, many thought it was likely to damage or destroy their 
home (77.8%) and other property (80.8%).  Of those householders with pets, many thought it 
was unlikely that the bushfire would cause them death or injury while a majority of those with 
livestock believed that it was likely to cause them death or injury. Householders who 
evacuated, more than those who remained, believed the bushfire was unlikely to cause death 
or injury to themselves or their family but was likely to damage or destroy their home and other 
property. Those who remained, more than those who evacuated, believed that the bushfire was 
unlikely to damage or destroy their home or other property (Appendix G10). 
 
Interview data suggested that after identifying the threat, interviewees decided that they needed 
to take protective action, primarily based on five factors – the smoke that they could see 
including its volume, its direction, and its colour; the proximity of the bushfire; the strength of 
the wind and its direction; the receipt of an SMS or telephone warning; and the operation of 
fire- bombing aircraft in their area. Some interviewees also decided that they needed to take 
protective action because of the prevailing hot and dry weather conditions, the presence of 
falling embers or burnt leaves; or following discussions between friends, family, or neighbours. 
 
As the bushfire grew the volume of smoke also increased and expanded in their direction 
indicating a heightening threat level necessitating protective action. The colour of the smoke 
also indicated an increasing threat level. When smoke was white the fire was small and not 
threatening but as it turned brown and black, the fire was consolidating, burning more intensely, 
and destroying homes. 
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Once the volume of the smoke built up and I could see that it was a big fire and it still 
wasn’t under control. I just got hoses ready and connected them in a good position and 
I just waited… (Sarah, Stoneville) 
 
Realizing that the bushfire was coming closer to their property increased the immediacy of the 
threat and the need to take protective action. Where the bushfire was so close it could be seen 
and its size and intensity more accurately judged. As the wind strengthened or changed 
direction, blowing the fire toward them, interviewees also perceived a heightening threat that 
required protective action. 
 
The wind was blowing. It was coming straight at us…because of experience I knew 
with the velocity of the wind and the direction it was blowing in, that we were going to 
get hit, so I was already going into action making sure the gutters were blocked, filling 
them up with water, wetting down the roof, wetting down the vicinity… (Jessica, 
Stoneville) 
 
SMS or telephone warnings received from the Department of Fire and Emergency Services 
(DFES) was a certain indication to interviewees of the seriousness of the bushfire and the 
increased risk that required protective action. 
 
But I suppose for us we got the message and once we got the message…I thought, well, 
we need to probably act… (Tim, Mount Helena) 
 
4.5.3.  Protective action search and assessment.  
 
Having determined that the bushfire threat required a protective action response, householders 
faced a decision set comprising three options – to evacuate, to remain and defend their property 
or to shelter in place (SIP). No participant chose to shelter in place. At this stage, they examined 
the factors influencing whether they stayed or evacuated from the bushfire. Householders’ 
identified and weighed up their protective options and decided on a preferred protective action. 
 
Many householders identified their protective action options before the bushfire, some during 
the bushfire and a small number did not identify protective action options at any stage (cf. 
Table 4.2). Many also weighed up options before the bushfire, while almost one third did so 
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during the fire and a small number did not weigh up options at any time. A majority decided 
on their best option for protective action (whether to evacuate or remain) prior to the bushfire, 
while well over one third decided during the bushfire and a very few at no stage decided on the 
protective response they would take.  
 
Table 4.2. 
Protective action decision process - Perth Hills  
Before fire During fire Not at all  
N % N % N % 
Thought of different ways to respond 152 70.4 46 21.3 18 8.3 
Weighed up best way to respond 132 61.1 68 31.5 16 7.4 
Decided on response 121 56 85 39.4 10 4.6 
  
 
Consistent with these findings, many householders (64.8%) had developed a clear plan of how 
they would respond to a bushfire before the event, while a significant minority (23.1%) 
developed a plan during the fire. Almost one in eight did not develop a plan at any stage 
(Appendix G11). Those who developed a plan before the bushfire had considered in advance, 
their options and their preferred protective action although some reconsidered during the fire. 
Those who developed a plan during the fire considered their options and decided on a protective 
action during the fire (Appendix G12).  Householders who remained, more than those who 
evacuated, weighed up the best way to respond during the bushfire.  
 
Interviews revealed that in contemplating the option of evacuating as a possible protective 
response, most were influenced by heightened threat perception caused by the proximity to 
bushland and limited escape options, lack of fire-fighting equipment and resources and 
underprepared property, and limited mental and/or physical capabilities to deal with the 
bushfire. The main factors that influenced interviewees’ consideration of remaining were their 
perceptions of the bushfire as non- threatening, their capacity to fight the bushfire by being 
well resourced, prepared, and physically and mentally capable, and a strong commitment to 
protecting their property growing out of emotional and financial ties to their home. The reasons 
for considering protective actions are like those that influenced the choice of action and are 
discussed in detail in what follows 
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Four factors were critical to interviewees’ decisions that evacuation was the best option for 
protective action. Concern for the safety of the people who were at home, especially dependents 
(children and the elderly) and visitors, keeping the household together, addressing fear and 
stress and keeping pets or livestock safe was a key factor in interviewees’ decision that 
evacuation was their best option for protective action. Many of those who chose the safety of 
evacuation recognised that this choice placed their home at risk but they consistently stated that 
the lives of their family members were more important than protecting property. Because the 
bushfire was perceived as extremely dangerous, out of control or as an imminent threat to the 
household evacuation was considered the best protective option. Householders read the signs 
of threat – the growing volumes of darkening smoke over or enveloping them, frantic fire-
fighting activity near their property and feeling the heat generated by the fire, even at some 
distance away. Physical and mental limitations and health problems including asthma, recent 
surgery and old age made evacuation the best option for several interviewees. They felt that 
their health or the health of other household members would be at risk or that they were 
incapable of defending their property because of limitations imposed by ill health. In some 
cases, interviewees recognised that they were no longer physically capable of fire- fighting 
because of their age. Evacuation was the best protective option for some interviewees because 
they lacked firefighting equipment or a reliable water or power supply that would allow them 
to effectively defend their property. They recognised that to successfully fight the bushfire they 
would need pumps and hoses designed for the task and a large, independent, and reliable water 
source rather than simply a garden hose fed by scheme water that was likely to have inadequate 
pressure as demands on it increased. 
 
I didn’t want to be responsible for anyone’s death…I was responsible for someone 
else’s life – Mike and my Dad’s with dementia… (Jessica, Stoneville) 
 
I think my husband probably wouldn’t have minded staying to fight. But we had agreed 
given that we have got a young son that we’d rather all be together than be separated… 
(Emily, Stoneville) 
 
…It pretty quickly built up…huge plumes of smoke in the distance so we could actually 
see for ourselves that there was an imminent threat…And the choppers were going quite 
low directly overhead and they weren’t going very far away so the interval between 
them passing was very close, so that built the sense of urgency… (Lily, Stoneville) 
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 It’s because we weren’t capable of fighting a fire…that was obviously out of control. 
We weren’t in any position to protect our house physically. Brenda and I are not young 
anymore. You know what you can do and what you can’t do. In our situation, there was 
no chance that we were going to stay… (Ronald, Stoneville) 
 
 In fact, …Rosemary was ill, so that was a significant factor in my decision making. 
I’m going. …with Rosemary’s health, I didn’t want to put her through that stress, so 
off we went… (Eric, Stoneville) 
 
 …unless you’ve got some big pond out the back that you can empty and you got your 
own diesel pump going or something that’s not relying on electricity and scheme water 
and whatnot, then really, I think you’re probably making the wrong decision to stay 
around really… (Donald, Mount Helena) 
 
We don’t have fire-fighting equipment (and) you can’t run your equipment without a 
generator... (Stephen, Stoneville) 
 
I think the thing that mostly made my mind up was the water. We lost the water so we 
lost a means of defence… (Jessica, Stoneville) 
 
Interviewees decided that remaining at their property was the best protective action for three 
main reasons.  First, the bushfire was perceived as non- threatening or controlled so remaining 
at home was their best option. For some the fire was moving parallel to their property or even 
away from it. Others considered that it was not burning in their direction because of the lack 
of smoke, embers or burnt material. Some interviewees reported a drop in the wind strength as 
the reason for their confidence that the bushfire would not threaten them. A few also felt that 
they had escape options readily available including jumping into a swimming pool, seeking 
shelter in large clear areas and using escape routes away from the bushfire. For some remaining 
to fight the fire was the best choice because they were mentally and physically capable of 
protecting their well-prepared property with firefighting equipment and water and/or power 
sources which were up to the task. They felt that they were experienced, level headed and 
courageous, that their properties were clear and defendable and that they had the equipment 
and water for its effective defence. Some interviewees who were highly invested in property 
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protection and committed to protecting their homes from the bushfire or from what they 
believed could be simply “a few embers causing spot fires” saw remaining as their best 
protective option. A compelling emotional attachment to their home or in some cases financial 
motivation to protect property that was uninsured or vital to their livelihood appeared in many 
cases to be the basis of interviewees’ commitment to property protection.  
 
We could see it and it was gradually moving even further away so I thought there’s no 
point (in leaving) ... (Donald, Stoneville) 
 
I was encouraged by the fact that we weren’t getting any smoke so I figured it was 
blowing in a different direction to us. So, I figured that we were going to be safe…No 
ash nothing.…I couldn’t smell smoke for the entire time…So, using that as a guide we 
were always confident that it wasn’t coming to us… (Sarah, Stoneville) 
 
I thought of the route that we would take to get out safely.…So I figured, you know, 
we just know that there’s a way out. We would have headed that way, away from the 
fire… (Sarah, Stoneville) 
 
Our deal was if worst came to the worst Michael and myself and my wife for that matter, 
would just grab the blankets and bail into the pool. We just go underwater with a blanket 
and come up for air as much as you can get. And then if you had to get out just go back 
out through where the burn was... (William, Stoneville)” 
 
 …We have our own firefighter, we mow the paddocks we mow them to about two 
centimetres, we spent thousands clearing all the undergrowth, wattles. And the 
sprinklers on the roof cover the whole roof plus some. We pump out of the pool. It’s a 
reliable source. We don’t rely on the electricity because once the power goes off…The 
pump is a petrol engine. So, we are covered pretty well here… (Larry, Stoneville) 
 
…The way this fire was happening was pretty much literally spot fire starting ahead of 
itself. There wasn’t enough bush to create that sort of rolling fire. I knew that I had a 
damn good chance of putting it out... (Patrick, Stoneville) 
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4.5.4.  Protective action implementation. 
 
Interviewees had decided to either evacuate or to remain at their property. However, the key 
final step in the decision-making process was to determine when to implement the decision to 
remain or to evacuate (Appendix G12A). The imminent threat of the bushfire focused 
householders’ consideration of their preparedness and capability to deal with it, triggering the 
implementation of their protective action. 
 
The main factors that householders identified as most important in triggering the 
implementation of their decision to evacuate were their; 
 
• physical and psychological safety and that of household members (26.0%) and pets 
(4.9%) 
• perception of the bushfire as dangerous (5.4%), threatening and moving toward their 
property (16.1%)  
• incapacity to prepare or defend the property against the bushfire including not being 
physically or emotionally equipped (6.7%), the property not being adequately prepared 
(5.8%) and household members being disabled, sick, vulnerable or old (4.9%). 
• receipt of an official warning to evacuate (9.0%). 
 
The factors that influenced householders’ decisions to remain were their;  
 
• perception that they were experienced (4.6%) and able to defend (7.2%) their property 
that was well prepared (9.9%) and equipped (5.3%) 
• perception that the bushfire was not moving toward their property (15.1%) or a wind 
change was blowing the bushfire away (9.2%)  
• commitment to property protection (17.8%) 
  
Three main evacuation triggers were identified by interviewees. The factors that together 
constitute the major trigger to evacuate at that time-imminent threat, is comprised of: seeing 
increasing amounts of smoke, the proximity of the fire or seeing flames, having embers 
dropping on their property, the operation of fire-bombing helitacs and fixed wing aircraft in 
their area and a wind change toward their property. The second important trigger to evacuate 
was for some a perception that they should take available safe evacuation options. For those 
 
 
95 
 
who were not under immediate threat it was better to leave then and to be ‘safe rather than 
sorry’ but for others confronted by an imminent threat, their evacuation would only be safe if 
they acted immediately. The third important trigger was receipt of a warning message from the 
emergency services through a radio broadcast, automated landline message or text message on 
mobile. Many Stoneville residents received a warning message for Parkerville which prompted 
their evacuation preparations and the subsequent emergency warning message for Stoneville 
was a trigger for leaving immediately. 
 
I could see the smoke and it was definitely over this way more, as opposed to up the 
road there. The helicopters were coming through and I thought ‘no....it’s getting pretty 
close, time to go… (James, Stoneville) 
 
 It was when I saw the flames on the street. That’s what made my mind up. I said ‘I’m 
not staying, I’m going now… (Christopher, Stoneville) 
 
And (the driveway) is our main exit and the fire was coming straight towards it. There 
were no implications for leaving too early but there were plenty for leaving too late… 
(Amy, Stoneville) 
 
You have to leave early. You learn from other people’s mistakes I suppose. And even 
if we had been silly and had left for no reason, it’s better safe than sorry... (Olivia, 
Stoneville) 
 
 But I suppose for us we got the message and once we got the message I thought well 
we need to probably act… (Donald, Mount Helena) 
 
4.6. Information Needs and Communication Action Assessment and Implementation 
 
Once householders had become aware of the bushfire threat and had decided that it required 
attention, at any stage during protective action decision making, available information could 
be inadequate to justify action, so they identified required information and available 
information sources. 
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4.6.1.  Type of information required by householders. 
 
Householders wanted to assess the likelihood of the threat that the bushfire could pose 
primarily by getting information on its location (63.8%) and direction it was heading (69.5%). 
They also sought to judge the immediacy and extent of the threat based on information on its 
proximity to their home (37.6%), the speed the bushfire was travelling (18.3%) and its severity 
(18.8%). (Appendix G13). Those who sought other information primarily wanted to know the 
extent of the risk that the bushfire posed to them, whether they needed to evacuate, weather 
conditions including wind direction and wind changes and the extent of firefighting efforts. 
Householders who remained, more than those who evacuated, sought information on how fast 
the bushfire was travelling (Appendix G14).  
 
Qualitative interview data confirmed that householders primarily required information about 
the location of the bushfire, its direction or progress, its proximity to their property and its 
severity; wind direction; details of escape routes; and whether they should remain or evacuate.  
Interviewees wanted to know where the bushfire was in relation to their property, the property 
of family and friends and to places such as a road or other landmark, which once passed by the 
fire, would trigger evacuation.  They also wanted to know the severity of the bushfire, its 
direction and rate of progress and wind direction so they could make judgements about the 
likelihood and immediacy of the threat and its potential impact on them so they could make 
informed decisions about the nature and timing of their response. Some interviewees felt that 
if the emergency services directed them to evacuate, they should also provide information on 
safe escape routes, especially when it was not clear where the fire was and the direction in 
which it was moving. This was of importance to those who felt they lacked knowledge and 
experience of bushfire because they found it extremely difficult to accurately read 
environmental cues and identify safe escape routes themselves. 
 
After the first warning, I went to look on the FESA webpage to try and pinpoint where 
the fire was… (Jessica, Stoneville) 
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Where it currently is, where it’s jumped, where it’s going. And then you can go barleys3, 
I can make decisions…if…there was a north-westerly wind we would think …it’s going 
away from us so …it’s not quite as urgent... (Larry, Stoneville) 
 
How fast is that wind travelling and what direction is the wind travelling? So, that 
would have been helpful… (Zoe, Mount Helena) 
 
… If you do have to leave straight away it would be good if you could be told what 
roads to leave on. Because we knew the fire was around here somewhere but not exactly 
where. If they are going to tell you to leave now they should tell you where to go first… 
(Lucy, Stoneville) 
 
People were just listening (to the radio), ‘oh should we go, should be stay? (Jess, 
Stoneville) 
 
4.6.2.  Where information was sourced. 
 
During the bushfire householders sourced the information that they needed primarily through 
the electronic media and the Internet, particularly radio and emergency services websites. 
Environmental and social cues initially had a predominant role in revealing the bushfire threat 
and remained of considerable importance to householders in providing them with ongoing 
information about the status of the bushfire throughout the event (cf. Table 4.2). 
 
Interviewees said that they got information on the bushfire through three main sources – friends 
and neighbours, on the radio and visual observations from their property or from other strategic 
locations. They also derived some information through the SMS or the landline warnings, by 
accessing the FESA website, speaking face-to-face with emergency services personnel, using 
a computer or radio scanner, accessing Facebook, watching television, or using a telephone 
hotline. 
 
Many interviewees got their information through neighbours and the neighbourhood network. 
In neighbourhoods where residential sized blocks predominated much of this information 
sharing was face to face, over the fence or on the side of the road but in areas where there were 
                                                          
3 A colloquialism used in some Australian states meaning a child playing a game was in a safe area or couldn't 
be caught. 
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mostly hobby farms or larger blocks, and greater distances separated homes, neighbours were 
in contact with each other on the telephone. Information came both through direct sharing and 
indirectly through neighbours with contacts with third parties located in the fire area, working 
as volunteer firefighters or from scanners monitoring the activities of the emergency services.  
A majority of those who used the radio for information on the bushfire said that they listened 
to the ABC for information and warnings because they saw it as providing the most accurate 
and up to date information. Many were aware that the ABC provided regular or continuous  
 
Table 4.3 
Sources of Information While at Home 
Source n N % 
Information 
 
238 45.0 
Radio 117 
  
Websites 98 
  
Scanners (Internet and radio) 16 
  
TV 17 
  
Environmental Cues 
 
146 27.6 
Social cues 
 
123 23.3 
Family/friends 49 
  
Neighbours 41 
  
Facebook 30 
  
Twitter 1 
  
Telephone tree 2 
  
Warnings 
 
21 3.8 
Telephone hotline 8 
  
Local brigade/ES 7 
  
SMS/ text message 5 
  
Mobile App 1 
  
Other 
 
2 0.4 
Total Sources 
 
530 100.0 
 
 
coverage of the bushfire as the emergency services broadcaster. Most radio users also knew 
that they needed to have a battery powered radio in case they lost power. Environmental cues, 
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especially the volume, direction and colour of smoke and the activity of fire-bombing aircraft, 
accessed through interviewees’ visual observations from their properties, provided ongoing 
information about the progress and nature of the bushfire. Many interviewees also stressed that 
hearing gas bottles and other flammables exploding made them aware of the severity of and 
the danger posed by the bushfire. Some interviewees left their properties to establish precisely 
where the bushfire was, and how they might respond to it. Some sought a higher point where 
they could survey the full scene while others wanted to get closer to the bushfire to assess its 
severity and assess the size and effectiveness of the emergency response.  
 
Pauline rang us when we were in Darlington. She had the pager that Chris had because 
Chris was a volunteer fireman. So, we had that advantage of just a little bit more 
information... (Zoe, Mount Helena) 
 
Brian’s got a red flashing light on the top of his ute…And he could drive to areas past 
police because he looked like he was part of the deal. He’d do his run in the vehicle and 
come back and say it’s got to there. It was good for us because it gave us an idea of 
how far away the fire was... (William, Stoneville) 
 
We monitored the ABC radio which was terrific. It was the only hands-on thing we had 
because Internet was slow. And we knew what was going on because the ABC was 
doing it every 15 minutes... (Ronald, Stoneville)” 
 
I was out on the back deck and I was watching it from there. I was watching the smoke, 
which way the smoke was going and I could see helicopters bombing any fire that came 
on this side of the road... (Jason, Stoneville) 
 
We could see the water bomber was going over obviously by that stage and they were 
doing a very rapid turnaround so we knew how close the fire was. Plus, we could hear 
(the fire). At that stage, we could hear things exploding. We could hear trees falling 
down so it was getting pretty obvious that it was close... (Sarah, Stoneville) 
 
We drove down the road to see where it was precisely and to see what effect it would 
have on us… (Chloe, Stoneville) 
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We immediately drove down Richardson Road to see if it was across Richardson 
because that’s a major trigger for us... (Charles, Stoneville) 
 
A few interviewees felt that text and recorded warning messages from the emergency services 
authorities received on their mobile and landline telephones communicated information about 
the bushfire and how they should respond to it. A small number also received a warning directly 
from emergency services personnel. While a small number relied exclusively on the FESA 
website most of the others restricted their use to the early stages of the bushfire to ascertain its 
location but later found it to be out of date and operating too slowly to be relied on as a key 
information source. A small number of interviewees used scanners to listen in on conversations 
between emergency services personnel who were working on the fire ground to get live 
information on what was happening. Many of these people used their knowledge or detailed 
maps of the geography, topography, and predominant vegetation in the area to translate this 
information into highly accurate and up to date insights into the location, speed, and behaviour 
of the bushfire.  A small number said that they got first-hand information from Facebook sites 
established specifically to provide local information. 
 
FESA sends a broad message…to all the mobile phones in the area…Be prepared to 
leave or defend but don’t leave it too late because then once you do leave it too late you 
can’t go... (Jess, Stoneville) 
 
The police were down at the corner and they came up here with the loudspeaker thingy 
saying we have got to go... (Christopher, Stoneville)” 
 
I decided to come back up to the house and check if there was an alert on the FESA 
website…Where I identified where the fire had started and I could look that up on a 
map myself... (Emma, Stoneville) 
 
…on the radio two way the whole time so we could pick up the Fire Brigade’s two-way 
and I heard …that the fire was approaching the roundabout and all that sort of stuff. So, 
you were getting a bit of it back from them… (William, Stoneville) 
 
I was on my iPad trying to get fire information on a Perth Hills chat forum on Facebook. 
I got more information off that than I did off anything else. There were people on there 
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who had a relative who was a helicopter pilot and other ones who were in here doing 
volunteering work so I got information off that quicker than anything else... (Olivia, 
Stoneville) 
 
4.6.3.  Timing of information. 
 
Most interviewees preferred to get information ‘live ‘or rapidly updated. Information that they 
received, especially warning related information, was too slow or not updated and some 
information was misleading because it was ill timed although a few felt that some types of 
information were up-to-date. 
 
Interviewees said that they needed live information so they could make informed choices that 
accurately reflected the current situation. They wanted to be able to actively monitor the 
bushfire and make decisions about the appropriate protective response reflecting the prevailing 
circumstances rather than reacting to generalised warnings or to stale and therefore misleading 
and unhelpful information.  However, many interviewees said information, especially SMS 
messages, was not timely or updated fast enough, especially the DFES website. 
 
Now if we had dedicated information coming in, I don’t care if it’s repeated…every 2 
minutes or 3 minutes…if they keep updating it every few minutes you can actually sit 
with a map and say right okay it’s there. ‘Oh shit, its heading for me. I’ve got to get out 
of here’… (Eric, Stoneville)” 
 
I got a message to say there was a fire, so that would have been something like an hour 
after it had started... (Lyndsey, Stoneville) 
 
4.7. Situational Impediments  
 
Householders experienced a range of impediments to their evacuation (Appendix G16), most 
having a limited effect in delaying their evacuation including: 
 
• emotional reactions to the bushfire by the householder and family members including 
stressed and crying children and adults immobilised by fear (32.0%) 
• need to care for domestic (17.8%) or non-domestic (17.9%) pets 
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• concern road blocks would prevent the householder from returning (15.1%). Many 
householders did not perceive a problem when they left but because they were unable 
to return when they wanted they said they would not evacuate from a bushfire again 
• traffic conditions on the escape route including dangerous driving and large numbers 
of sightseers parking dangerously along roadside evacuation routes (14.4%) 
 
Interviewees delayed their evacuation to assist elderly and disabled neighbours and family 
members in their evacuation. This often involved alerting elderly neighbours to the need to 
leave, helping them pack their bags and loading their belongings and pets into vehicles. 
Catching and placing pets into containers for travelling and stowing them in vehicles and 
rounding up horses and coaxing them into floats was a particularly time consuming and 
demanding exercise with frightened and confused animals.  Some interviewees made 
considerable efforts before they evacuated to give abandoned livestock the best chance of 
survival by opening gates so that they had access to potentially safer areas of the property 
including dams. Heavy traffic generated by fellow evacuees, many pulling horse floats, 
caravans, and overloaded trailers, some of them driving recklessly delayed interviewees’ 
evacuation. To the dismay of interviewees, large numbers of sightseers idling around in their 
vehicles or parked dangerously by the roadside also caused congestion and confusion as they 
attempted to evacuate. Some interviewees chose not to leave until they had completed chores 
around their property that they hoped would protect it from the bushfire. This included moving 
combustible materials, such as gas bottles and wooden garden furniture, away from the house, 
hand watering and leaving the sprinklers on to soak the ground around the house, placing 
temporary sprinklers on the roof and shutting windows and doors and drawing the curtains and 
other window treatments. A small number of women delayed their evacuation because they 
were reluctant to leave their husbands to defend their property. 
 
…my son picked up my mother whose down Stoneville Road and took her so they were 
out of the area… (William, Stoneville) 
 
“… we had to go and get the cat boxes. Then try and locate and catch the cats. They are 
not calm friendly cats. So just to get them in there, you know push, push shove, shove. 
I reckon it probably took a good ten minutes each… (Jess and Dennis, Stoneville) 
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We had four horses at the time so that means you have to get someone in with another 
float… (Laura, Stoneville).  
 
“By that stage I could see a lot of people driving up to see what was going on. And you 
don’t want to get caught up in the sightseeing, and people who lived further east 
obviously wanted to come and see to make their own decisions. And so, there was quite 
a lot of traffic. It’s a single road. (Amy, Stoneville) 
 
… For an hour between when I saw the smoke and when I left… I had filled the gutters 
with water and had done bits and pieces around to help. So, it was a bit of peace of 
mind both for George and myself… I had done as much as I could in time to prepare. 
(Emma, Stoneville) 
 
“I was with Thomas at home for a while because I didn’t want him to stay here on his 
own. But finally, the firies came down the road and said to us you’ve got to make a 
decision now. So, I got in the car and went… (Christina, Stoneville) 
 
4.8. Conclusions 
 
The protective response of bushfire effected residents of the Perth Hills was influenced by a 
range of situational and social factors. It was a small but severe and fast moving fire in a 
primarily residential location. For many, environmental cues, especially smoke and the sound 
of firefighting aircraft, provided first awareness and on-going information during the bushfire. 
Contact from neighbours and family members which was of initial importance became more 
so as the fire progressed. Official warnings to evacuate or prepare to defend, were received and 
acted on by many householders throughout the course of the bushfire. 
 
Environmental and social cues and official warnings provided key informational inputs into 
householders’ decisions to take protective action. They identified and responded to heightening 
threat as the bushfire moved rapidly through the peri-urban landscape. Many had undertaken 
only basic property preparation and most lacked equipment capable of fighting a severe 
bushfire. Most were unprepared and incapable of defending their home and many evacuated. 
Some waited to see what the fire would do before deciding on their response while a very few 
defended their homes, most using cobbled together equipment and resources and a lot of luck.  
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The rapid progress of the fire through peri-urban areas meant evacuation impediments were 
mostly about organising the evacuation of pets, negotiating traffic out of the threat area and 
worrying about not being able to make a convenient return home.  
 
The next chapter follows a similar structure in discussing the factors influencing self-
evacuation from the Sampson Flat bushfire in the Adelaide Hills.  
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Chapter 5: Results: The 2015 Adelaide Hills Bushfire 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter begins with a synopsis of the 2015 Adelaide Hills bushfire and presents both 
quantitative and qualitative data, structured around the key stages of the Protective Action 
Decision Model (PADM), collected from householders involved in the bushfire. 
 
The same structured telephone survey used for the Perth Hills bushfire, was used to interview 
249 householders in the Adelaide Hills during February and March 2015.  In July 2015 fifty-
nine face-to face interviews with 31 evacuating households, were conducted also using the 
same semi structured interview framework as was used in Perth (Appendices A and B). 
Participants were invited to describe their experience of the bushfire in detail and then asked 
specifically about aspects of their decision-making. Like Chapter 4, reporting of quantitative 
data references ‘householders’ and are accompanied with Appendices in parenthesise that 
contain statistical data. Discussion of the results of face-to-face interviews refer to interviewees 
and is generally introduced with ‘face to face interviews… or qualitative data…’ 
 
5.2. The 2015 Adelaide Hills Bushfire 
 
Every et al. reported that the 2015 Adelaide Hills bushfire ignited on Shillabeer Road, Sampson 
Flat on Friday 2 January 2015 at midday from an unknown source although a residential 
incinerator may have been involved (ABC News, 2015). It started 3 kilometres south of One 
Tree Hill, approximately six kilometres from Adelaide’s medium density peri-urban interface 
and 30 kilometres north-east of Adelaide CBD.  A Total Fire Ban had been declared and a 
Catastrophic Fire Danger Rating for the Mount Lofty Ranges Fire Ban District had been 
declared for that day. The temperature in the area peaked at over 43°C with winds of 20 to 25 
kilometres per hour on average. On Saturday temperatures dropped slightly to 38°C but wind 
speeds increased to an average of 25 to 30 kilometres per hour.  Although temperatures further 
moderated on Sunday, they progressively rose again to 40° C by Thursday 7 January and 
average wind speeds remained in the 20 to 30 kilometres per hour range (Every et al., 2015).  
 
Spot fires burnt south and east of Sampson Flat into areas of steep slopes and gullies. The fire 
travelled in several directions throughout Friday afternoon and throughout its duration because 
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of frequent wind shifts and the influence of gully winds in the area, that made local wind 
direction and strength highly unpredictable, especially during the night. Throughout Friday 
afternoon the fire burnt south-east through forest and then with a wind change, north-east 
towards Kersbrook and north-west towards Gould Creek, Hermitage, Golden Grove and 
Greenwith in the urban fringe. By Saturday morning it threatened the south-east again 
including Inglewood, Paracombe, Cudlee Creek. In the afternoon, Gumeracha, Kenton Valley 
and Birdwood were under threat. Later it changed direction again toward Kersbrook, Forreston, 
Mt Crawford, South Para and Humbug Scrub. 
 
The fire burnt through undulating pasture, scrub and forest vegetation much of which was in 
difficult and inaccessible terrain. It directly threatened many townships, villages and localities 
including those already mentioned and Chain of Ponds, Houghton, Inglewood and Upper and 
Lower Hermitage. Thunderstorms later in the week reduced temperatures and produced rain 
over some areas of the fire ground assisting in mopping up and extinguishing the bushfire.   
 
More than 700 Country Fire Service (CFS) volunteers and Metropolitan Fire Service (SAMFS) 
fire fighters were involved in fighting the bushfire. These were supported by firefighters from 
the NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) and the Victorian Country Fire Authority (CFA). A total of 
31 firebombing aircraft were used. The fire was extinguished on 8 January 2015 after it had 
destroyed 24 houses, approximately 140 other structures, killed pets and livestock and burned 
an area of more than 12,500 hectares with a perimeter of 237 kilometres. No lives were lost 
(Every et al., 2015). Figure 5.1 illustrates the bushfire perimeter.  
 
Rural and agricultural regions that were affected by the fire support orcharding, winegrowing, 
livestock production, tourism and rural lifestyle activities. Commercial forestry had also 
recently developed in the area including pine and eucalypt plantations. This plantation 
vegetation supplemented long established native and recreational reserves including Parra 
Wirra Recreation Park, Mount Gawler Native Forest Reserve and the catchment area for 
Millbrook Reservoir.   The area is dotted with townships and small villages that service rural 
properties around them and in many cases, play a major part in the tourism industry of the area.  
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Figure 5.1. 2015 Location of Sampson Flat fire in the Adelaide Hills, South Australia. 
Reprinted from “Capturing community experience in the 2015 Sampson Flat fire, report for 
the South Australia Country Fire Service,” by D. Every, A. Reynolds, L. Clarkson, C. 
Bearman, R. Matthews, L. Haigh and D. Dawson, 2015, Bushfire and Natural Hazards CRC, 
Melbourne. p. 13.
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5.3. Environmental and Social Cues, Warnings and Information  
 
Householders first became aware of the bushfire primarily through environmental cues, 
particularly seeing and smelling smoke and seeing the fire.  Information sources, primarily 
radio but including Internet sources and television were also important. Social cues involving 
contact by family friends and neighbours were also an important initial source of awareness. 
(cf. Table 5.1).  
 
Seeing smoke was the environmental cue mentioned by most interviewees as first making them 
aware of the bushfire. Because ultimately the fire ground covered a large area, many 
interviewees saw the smoke at a distance, well before it became a threat. The activity of the 
emergency services including fire-bombing aircraft and local fire-fighting appliances was also 
an important cue, particularly for interviewees who were close to the bushfire threat. Family 
members, friends and neighbours provided social cues including phone calls, text messages 
and face-to-face information from other suburbs, interstate and overseas. In some cases, 
worried family members or neighbours communicated the high level of imminent threat. The 
actions of their neighbours influenced the responses of some interviewees. 
 
…I just went out about one o’clock… to hang the washing at the back of the house, and 
as I looked …there was a massive plume of smoke coming from behind the hill... (Ella, 
Inglewood). 
 
We…had been shopping down in Tea Tree Plaza and we always come up over Checker 
Hill and you could sort of see the smoke far in the distance… (Kenneth, Forreston). 
 
...the first things I heard …were the fire bombers...the minute you hear a couple of those 
planes and the helicopter …you know straight away, right there’s a fire… (Steven, 
Chain of Ponds). 
 
… (my daughter) was working, and …all these people kept coming in …And they said 
that there’s a fire…she rang and said you’ve got to get out of there, it’s bloody right on 
top of you… (Charlotte and Edward, Cudlee Creek). 
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Table 5.1.  
Sources of First Awareness of Bushfire-Adelaide Hills 
  
Source N % 
Environmental Cues   
See smoke 88 32.6 
Smell smoke 12 4.4 
See fire 11 4.1 
See/hear water bombers/ helicopters 5 1.9 
Hear sirens 7 2.6 
See ES vehicles 1 0.4 
Total Environmental Cues 124 46.0 
Social Cues   
Contacted by family 23 8.5 
Contacted by neighbours/ friends 28 10.4 
Total Social Cues 51 18.9 
Warnings   
Get warning message on mobile 5 1.9 
Get warning message on landline 3 1.1 
Message on pager  6 2.2 
CFS App 9 3.3 
Total Warnings 23 8.5 
Information Sources   
Radio 37 13.7 
Facebook   3 1.1 
CFS website 14 5.2 
TV 14 5.2 
Total Information Sources 68 25.2 
Other 4 1.5 
 
 
As the bushfire progressed, many householders received an ‘Emergency Warning’ message, 
the highest level of alert, instructing them to leave immediately or prepare to defend their 
property (70.1%). Almost one third received a ‘Watch and Act’ message of a potentially 
threatening bushfire that required monitoring and preparation. More than one in ten did not 
receive a message at any stage (Appendix G1). Householders received warning messages from 
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the fire authorities primarily through two sources -SMS text message on mobile phone (84.6%) 
and an automated recorded warning message on landline telephone (52.4%). Radio was an 
important secondary channel for the warning.  The new CFS App was used by few 
householders, although more than used the CFS web site (Appendix G2). 
 
Qualitative data revealed many interviewees received several official warnings of the bushfire 
through SMS messages on their mobile telephone and automated recorded messages on 
landline mostly warning to leave immediately if not defending. Friends and neighbours also 
sent warnings. A few interviewees questioned the veracity of the SMS and landline warnings 
because they were dispatched prematurely or to areas far removed from the bushfire. 
 
…during the course of Friday, I got several automated robo dialler kind of messages 
and SMSs …which…were for here…far too premature (Michael, Lower Hermitage)  
 
The phone went. It was a lad from over the road... he said…’get out of there now... it’s  
coming down the hill that fast it’s unreal’… (Jasmine, Sampson Flat) 
 
5.4. Perceptions of Environmental Risk, Hazard Adjustments and Stakeholders 
 
5.4.1.  Pre-decisional processes. 
 
To perceive the bushfire, householders needed to have awareness and understanding of it 
(Appendix G3). During its course, most householders (86.4%) checked their information 
sources many times and considered information they received from those sources very 
carefully (93.1%). Most (78.1%) felt that the information they received from their main sources 
was easy to understand. Most householders who had difficulty understanding the information 
did not recognise Sampson Flat as a place in their area.  
 
5.4.2.  Perceptions of threat. 
 
Householders’ substantive circumstances and their capacity to deal with these conditions 
influenced their perception of the threat that the bushfire posed to their household and to their 
property. A majority of householders (58.2%) perceived a large or very large threat to 
themselves and /or their immediate family while the remainder saw it as a medium, small, very 
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small or non-existent threat. Many (72.7%) perceived a large threat to their property (Appendix 
G4). The main reasons householders perceived a large threat to the household and to their 
property was the proximity of a very severe bushfire, driven toward them by strong, swirling 
and unpredictable winds; their proximity to fire prone bushland or paddocks; and the large 
volume of smoke the bushfire was generating. 
  
The main reasons interviewees perceived high levels of risk were the bushfire’s proximity, 
severity and immediacy. Large walls of flame moving in clear sight, in many cases close or 
moving toward their property raised interviewees’ threat perceptions. A bright orange glow at 
night confirmed the size and severity of the bushfire for many interviewees.  A small number 
of interviewees perceived a heightened risk resulting from hearing sirens or seeing fire bombers 
operating in their area. 
 
At that stage I started to get worried because (it was) running along the ridgeline past 
where we live…it's going...very, very close… (Caitlin, Houghton). 
 
11.30 at night … on the corner there, it was 20-metre wall of flame coming at us right 
at the corner of the property… (Holly, Humbug Scrub).  
 
All the water bombers were coming over and the cat was terrified because there was 
one after the other. The noise was like the war was on. And I said to Raymond ’look 
here Elvis is low’. It …started getting serious… (Jasmine, Sampson Flat). 
 
 Many householders felt that the bushfire was a medium, small, very small or no threat 
(Appendix G5) because it was a considerable distance away from their property, it was moving 
away or parallel to them or it was sedate and slow. Many also felt their property was clear of 
bush or grass fuels and that they were prepared to fight the fire. Many also felt safe because 
they had evacuated or were evacuating before the bushfire became a threat, they could easily 
escape if necessary, or because of firefighting and bombing activity by the emergency services. 
 
Many interviewees who perceived a low risk from the bushfire thought it was too far away to 
be a threat or to affect their daily routines. Because of its long and large size many interviewees 
could observe smoke and sometimes flames at a distance on hillsides. Many also thought it was 
heading away from them and would not threaten their local area because smoke was not moving 
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over them or in their direction. Others believed that the emergency services would control and 
extinguish it. Some perceived a low risk because they lived in a safe area with limited bushfire 
fuels or open ground and well cleared paddocks or because they lived within a town that the 
emergency services would prioritise for protection. 
 
…when we heard Samson Flat, One Three Hill, its far away, half an hour’s drive. So, 
in your imagination it’s just like okay, doesn’t really apply to us…just like normal, we 
thought the police, the fire brigade would be on it, we would be okay (Lauren, 
Houghton).  
 
…It was only smoke in the air, we hadn’t seen any fire. You couldn’t smell it and…it 
wasn’t obviously burning in our direction… (Ella, Inglewood) 
 
…the smoke as it went to higher altitude sort of drifted off towards the east and so 
clearly it wasn’t coming towards us and so I wasn’t particularly concerned about it… 
(Carl, Lower Hermitage). 
 
A few felt that the bushfire risk was small because the area in which they lived was relatively 
safe and not bushfire prone, others because there were very limited bushfire fuels or a lot of 
open ground or well cleared paddocks. Others believed that because they lived within a 
residential area in town that the fire would not reach them or that the emergency services would 
make the town a high priority. 
 
5.4.3.  Hazard adjustment perceptions. 
 
The perceived attributes of hazard adjustments, particularly the effectiveness of adjustment in 
protecting personal safety and property influenced householders’ protective actions (Appendix 
G7). Householders who evacuated overwhelmingly agreed (88.2%) that evacuating was the 
best way to protect themselves and/or their family but overwhelmingly disagreed (84.9%) that 
it was the best way to protect their property. While a large majority of householders (68.7%) 
who remained agreed that remaining was the best way to protect themselves and/or their family, 
over one quarter disagreed, but they almost unanimously agreed (95.6%) that remaining was 
the best way to protect their property. A very large majority of both those who evacuated 
(72.7%) or remained (78.1%) agreed that the action that they took was not expensive. Two-
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thirds of evacuees (66.1%) and almost all remainers (94.1%) believed that their action required 
knowledge and skills. A very large majority of those who evacuated or remained believed it 
required time and effort to organise and that cooperation was needed from family and/or friends 
Those who remained more than those who evacuated (p < 0.05) believed that remaining was 
best in protecting property, and required knowledge and skills and time and effort. Those who 
evacuated believed that it was best in protecting personal safety. 
 
Face-to-face interviews revealed that perceptions of evacuating or remaining during the 
bushfire focused primarily on the effectiveness of evacuating in protecting personal safety and 
the effectiveness of remaining in protecting property. Interviewees also mentioned knowledge 
and time and effort required and the cost of evacuating or remaining. 
 
Many interviewees who perceived evacuating as the most effective way of protecting personal 
safety placed the highest priority on and saw themselves as responsible for protecting 
themselves and family members, especially children. Some referred to their direct and indirect 
experience of the loss of lives in bushfires and others to reports in the media of death and injury 
as being instrumental in their decision to evacuate. Many commented on the priority of 
protecting life before defending property, some referring to insurance as providing a safety net. 
Some interviewees recognised that because of age or incapacity they could no longer safely 
remain and defend so evacuating was the best option for them.  
 
We’ve got kids, we wouldn’t want to risk them, and I wouldn’t want to… leave Kevin 
here on his own…our family unit is more important... (Katie, Houghton). 
 
Well, I always wanted to stay and defend when my husband was alive…but I knew... I 
couldn’t do it on my own…when…I could see, the smoke getting closer and bigger...I 
thought "no, it’s time to get out of here"… (Jade, Kersbrook). 
 
…I took a lot of note of what happened over at King Lake, and what people said and 
you know, leave and live and I thought you know, it’s true you can start again… 
(Chelsea, Inglewood)  
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A small number of interviewees thought that remaining at their property was the safer option 
because they believed that the protection of the emergency services or the physical location of 
their home meant it would be safer to stay.  
 
I actually felt...that we were quite safe with the water bombers patrolling around here 
all the time and the helicopter and the CFS truck everywhere; I felt confident we 
wouldn’t get touched… (Raymond, Kersbrook). 
 
… we talked about whether or not he would leave. The biggest concern with our 
location is that we have a one-way in-road. And if it got too bad and the fire could 
always spin around and cut us off…so we've always…considered that the house was 
probably the safest location for where we're at… (Belinda, Humbug Scrub). 
 
Most interviewees who remained and some who evacuated felt that remaining was the most 
effective way to protect their property because they expected not to have to defend against a 
fire front but primarily against spot fires that they could readily extinguish. Some were strongly 
emotionally committed to defending their home that they ‘built themselves’ while others had 
extensively prepared their property and felt it was highly defendable. A small number of 
interviewees felt that their previous bushfire fighting experience made remaining an effective 
response. 
 
I could keep an eye on things and put out ember attack fires…I thought there was more 
I could do to protect the house and I didn't want to be away from it...when there was 
still a whole lot more I could do to... (Richard, Kenton Valley) 
 
Well I suppose the main thing was you know, we built this house. That was the main 
thing, you want to look after that… (Steven, Gumeracha) 
  
…so, we knew that if we needed to stay and defend we were in a defensible place. 
…that was part of the decision-making really was that the house is appropriate for 
where it is… (Abbey, Lower Hermitage) 
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Several interviewees who evacuated said that they lacked the knowledge, skills, or capacity to 
remain and fight the bushfire or to put out spot fires. Many of those who were older believed 
that their lack of physical capability meant that they had no choice but to evacuate.  
 
And I was thinking I can’t cope with that. I'm not good enough, not clever enough or 
strong enough to do that.  ... We’ve never practiced that in the dark ... Well there's no 
light down there, it's pitch. I didn’t realize that I couldn’t do it in the dark (Mia, 
Houghton). 
 
Alternatively, many interviewees who remained felt that they had sufficient knowledge, based 
on prior experience and training and readily available information to make sensible decisions 
and effectively deal with the bushfire. 
 
…with our little part of the street just in one of these community fire safe groups. So, 
for years we’ve been doing training, you know getting the CFS out to you know explain 
the options and updating their thinking (Michelle, Humbug Scrub) 
 
5.4.4.  Stakeholder perceptions. 
 
Householders almost unanimously (99.6%) saw themselves and their immediate family as 
highly influential in their thinking and actions and as responsible for protecting themselves and 
their property (94.6%) during the bushfire (Appendix G8). Many rated highly how well 
informed they were about what was actually happening during the bushfire (76.5%) and their 
specialist knowledge and understanding of bushfire (79.1%). Two-thirds (67.9%) rated their 
neighbours’ influence on their thinking and actions during the bushfire and one-half rated their 
responsibility for the householder and their property as low. Over one in five rated both as high. 
A majority (53.1%) rated highly their neighbours’ knowledge and understanding of bushfire 
and how well informed they were about was happening during the bushfire (59.9%). Two thirds 
(67.0%) rated the accuracy, completeness and impartiality of information provided by 
neighbours as high. A majority rated the influence that media had on their thinking and actions 
during the bushfire (54.9%) and its responsibility for them (57.1%) as low. Approximately one-
third respectively rated the media’s specialist knowledge and understanding of bushfire as low, 
medium or high. More than four in ten rated the media highly on how well informed they were 
about what was happening during the bushfire (45.3%) and in providing accurate, complete 
 
 
117 
 
and impartial information (45.2%) while approximately one quarter gave a low rating for both. 
Householders overwhelmingly rated the emergency services highly in relation to their 
specialist knowledge and understanding of bushfire (92.4%), how well informed they were 
about the bushfire (85.7%) and the provision of accurate and complete information (82.3%). 
Many (69.2%) said they were highly influential.  Almost three quarters rated the emergency 
service as having medium (33.5%) or high (38.0%) responsibility for protecting them and their 
property. 
 
Householders who remained at their property more than those who evacuated (p <.05) rated 
their neighbours’ knowledge and understanding of bushfire as low while evacuees more than 
those who remained rated it highly. Those who remained more than those who evacuated rated 
how well-informed neighbours were about what was happening during the bushfire as low. 
Householders who remained more than those who evacuated gave the media a low rating on 
all attributes measured. Those who evacuated, more than those who remained, gave the media 
a medium rating for knowledge and understanding of bushfire and how well informed they 
were about what was actually happening during the bushfire and a high rating for providing 
accurate, complete and impartial information and the extent media should be responsible for 
protecting household members and their property. Householders who remained, more than 
those who evacuated, rated the emergency services’ influence on their thinking and action 
during the bushfire and the extent to which the emergency services should be responsible for 
them, as low. Those who evacuated more than those who remained rated the emergency 
services’ highly on all measures (Appendix G8). 
 
Interviewees spontaneously commented on their perceptions of stakeholders involved in the 
bushfire especially the emergency services. There was some criticism of the emergency 
services, especially the CFS, by several interviewees while several praised their success in 
protecting lives and property.   A few interviewees believed the CFS failed to extinguish the 
Sampson Flat bushfire in its early stages by withdrawing fire bombers prematurely and 
considered that they were responsible for the destruction that resulted. Several interviewees 
were critical of the CFS’s perceived failure to fight the bushfire immediately in some cases, 
forcing private individuals to extinguish fires threatening homes and infrastructure. Some 
interviewees believed that the developing bushfire should have been extinguished immediately 
given its unpredictable behaviour. They saw the CFS’s strategic fire-fighting approach as 
inappropriate because the local topography supported gully winds and fires that were difficult 
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and dangerous to fight and could move rapidly in unpredictable directions. Some interviewees 
were also critical of the management of local CFS volunteers, by managers isolated from the 
fire ground with limited local knowledge resulting in bad decisions, major mistakes and 
inappropriate actions. A small number of interviewees commented on the authoritarian 
attitudes of some of the officers of the CFS who were involved in or overseeing fire-fighting 
and felt that consequently their information or views were not seriously listened to or 
considered. A few interviewees were critical of the management of roadblocks and access 
issues involving police who acted inconsistently or who had limited local knowledge needed 
to make decisions. 
  
…the fire was in heavy scrub and it got going again…We was listening to the frequency 
when they called off the fire bombers and we thought it was a bad decision ...they 
should have tread on that fire so there wasn't anything left… (Joshua, Inglewood). 
 
My doctor … is not one to bullshit to you. He actually spoke to them while they were 
sitting on the road and the fire was going through his place. They insisted that ‘we are 
not going to fight the fire. We are in the secondary fire-fighting position.’ No one I 
know in the fire service knows what that means (Joseph, Humbug Scrub). 
 
On Friday (CFS said) right, we won’t fight it there…instead of…stopping it at the top 
of the hill, we’ll stop it here, so we’ll let it burn down to here. And they were saying 
well it’s going to come that way. But it didn’t come that way. The fire decided to go 
(another) way. And then on the Saturday, it came back this way… (Brian, Kersbrook). 
 
And then the big fire trucks come in and there is the fire chief. And he has got his 
(plan)...So he is saying I’m going. (But) I kept saying there’s a fire…here. Tell the guy 
there is a fire over here...(and) they (finally) went, ‘oh maybe we fight this one first’ 
But the thing is that we weren’t being listened to… (Charlotte, Cudlee Creek). 
 
A few interviewees praised the emergency services, especially CFS volunteer firefighters for 
their courageous work protecting lives and property in difficult conditions. Some believed that 
without the CFS, they would have lost their homes especially without the accurate and highly 
effective water bombing.  
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…most of the CFS trucks did a marvellous job in defence, some homes including ours 
were pretty hard to defend. And they did an excellent job there…we would have 
probably lost everything had it not been for them… (Joshua, Inglewood). 
 
So, I watched the water bombers do it like bees around the honeypot. They were 
brilliant. If basically this one over here had caught we would have been stuffed and 
basically Elvis stopped it… (Kenneth, Forreston). 
 
Many evacuees described how their neighbours, in staying and defending their own properties, 
also defended the interviewee’s property and a few felt that neighbours provided property 
protection like the CFS. 
 
I think we were quite lucky that our neighbour…came over a couple of times…  
and…actually put out a couple of fires around our house… (Ella, Inglewood). 
 
On the Monday, there were a couple of people with units on the back of their ute’s and 
they were putting the fires out along Bagshaw Road. I think that they saved more houses 
(there)…than the CSF to be quite honest… (Brian, Kersbrook).  
 
Several neighbours cooperated with each other both in staying and defending and in advising 
and organising to evacuate from the bushfire. The considerable number of larger rural 
properties in the fire zone meant that it was more difficult for neighbours to cooperatively 
defend their properties although some worked together in monitoring and preparing for the 
arrival of the bushfire. In the towns and villages within the fire zone neighbours shared 
information, views and advice by visiting and telephoning each other. In some cases, 
neighbours met informally to discuss information and advice provided by ‘expert’ neighbours 
perceived as knowledgeable or experienced with bushfire.   
 
our neighbours … down the road took it in turns of sleeping and then sort of one team 
would watch for the bushfire (Richard, Humbug Scrub). 
 
We didn’t expect it to come from Jeff. But Jeff knows what we’re like (old and 
vulnerable) and he must’ve thought ‘give them the warning to get out straightaway’… 
(Jasmine, Sampson Flat). 
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We went to the bottom of or driveway…and most of the neighbours were there asking 
Janet, and Janet was saying we’re expecting it because we’re in the valley, we’re 
expecting this wild wind sort of a fire, and they had both been in the fire brigade a fair 
time… (Kenneth, Forreston). 
 
A few interviewees felt that some of their neighbours were unprepared for and complacent 
about bushfire or had unrealistic expectations that the fire services would defend their property. 
Some saw this complacency reflected in the overgrown and unmaintained state of neighbours’ 
properties placing both the neighbour’s and their own properties at risk. 
 
…there's one of the local couples. They weren't at home for the fire this time. And they 
said 'we'll just ring the CFS if we have to. Do they expect in a general bushfire 
emergency that they will get their own individual fire unit?... (Anthony, Paracombe) 
 
…they can get cocky like Michael and Dianne...He gave all the reasons. Oh, it was 
never a problem, there's always a northerly comes through, waffle, waffle, waffle. And 
I thought "You are the sort of stupid prick that's going to get burnt alive." You know 
you get so complacent… (Arthur, Forreston). 
 
Many interviewees emphasised the responsibility they felt for protecting their property, and in 
some cases, even though they had evacuated. Some evacuees also had a strong sense of 
responsibility to support neighbours who were staying to defend their property and because 
they were not doing so, felt a sense of guilt.  
 
I had a real sense of guilt of leaving, because the people that I was talking to, are long-
term …they were all very strong 'no, you stay, you fight’, And so, I had a sense of guilt, 
and so (I had) … that feeling like I’m letting people down by going… (Katie, 
Houghton). 
 
Some interviewees felt that they were both mentally and physically capable of dealing with the 
bushfire while others said they lacked experience and confidence when directly confronted by 
the bushfire. Family members who lacked confidence about remaining and fighting but 
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remained in support of the rest of their household experienced major stress which could still be 
evident some months later. 
 
So, we thought it wouldn’t be coming fast, so we would, with the hoses and we got a 
fire pump we should be able to ...that was more my mentality, that we were able to... 
(Edward, Cudlee Creek) 
 
No, no. I felt that I didn’t really understand what more we could do and even to this 
point I don’t know what more we could have done …but no I didn’t really feel confident 
that we were going to address it once I saw it… (Erin, Kersbrook). 
 
A few interviewees felt they were not well informed about the bushfire but could wait and see 
how circumstances developed. 
 
We ourselves just thought, oh it’s the night. It will be okay. Tomorrow is when we 
really need to really worry about it and so part of that was our own lack of awareness… 
(John, Houghton) 
 
Very few interviewees commented on the role of the media but those who did felt information 
provided on commercial television was largely unhelpful because it was incomplete and 
focused on newsworthy stories rather than facts. ABC 24 was perceived positively including 
the news tickertape that ran continuously at the bottom of the screen. Information on radio was 
helpful but limited because further elaboration or examination of information did not occur. 
 
…commercial television…I discarded it as a useless source of information because it 
was...so patchy and sporadic and they were interested in the angle not the bush fire. The 
news ticker tape (on ABC 24) …was much more up to date and useful… (Carl, Lower 
Hermitage) 
 
5.5. Protective Action Decision Making 
 
The protective action decision making process is informed by environmental and social cues, 
information and warnings and householders’ perceptions of threat, hazard adjustment options 
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and the stakeholders involved, influencing their awareness and assessment of risk; search for 
and assessment of feasible protective actions; and the implementation of those actions.  
 
5.5.1.  Risk awareness. 
 
The previous discussion of environmental and social cues and warnings established that 
householders first became aware of the bushfire primarily through environmental and social 
cues. Many interviewees first became aware of the bushfire threat when they saw smoke or the 
change of light and by contact from family, friends, or neighbours.  
 
I was actually watching TV here and just glanced out the window and there was a 
column of smoke off to the north…I thought, "Well, okay better keep an eye on that… 
(Carl, Lower Hermitage). 
 
Well I wasn’t aware that there was a fire to start with. One of my sons rang me up and 
he said "Go outside and have look Mom, can you see smoke? There’s a fire up your 
way."  He's got a gadget on (his) phone…. (Jade, Kersbrook) 
 
5.5.2.  Risk assessment. 
 
Householders’ perception of the extent and relevance of the potential threat influenced their 
assessment of the need for protective action. The expected impact of the bushfire on personal 
safety and property and the likelihood of death or injury to household members or animals or 
damage or destruction of homes or property indicated the extent of the threat.  
 
A majority of householders expected that the impact of the bushfire on household members 
(56.7%) and many expected the impact on their property (72.3%) to be large (Appendix G9). 
Those who evacuated, more than those who remained, expected a large impact on their property 
while those who remained expected the opposite. Many householders felt that the bushfire was 
unlikely to cause death (79.0%) or injury (76.5%) to household members (Appendix G10). 
However, many thought it was likely to damage or destroy their home (70.2%) or other 
property (73.2%).  Of those householders with pets, many thought it was unlikely that the 
bushfire would cause their death or injury while a majority of those with livestock believed 
that it was likely to cause death or injury to livestock. Householders who evacuated, more than 
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those who remained believed the bushfire was likely to damage or destroy their home or to kill 
or injure pets or livestock while those who remained more than those who evacuated believed 
the opposite. 
  
Face-to face interviews established that after identifying the threat, four main factors influenced 
interviewees’ perception that they needed to take protective action.  Many, including those who 
lived close to the bushfire, or could see it in the distance or were informed through the media 
decided that the bushfire required a protective response because it was serious or threatening. 
Many interviewees also decided that the bushfire required a protective response because of the 
warning messages from the emergency service or informal warnings from family, friends and 
neighbours that indicated the seriousness of the situation. Prevailing weather conditions and 
forecasts especially the strength, direction and perceived unpredictable behaviour of the wind 
convinced many of the need for protective action. A forecast of 100 kilometres an hour winds 
was a very important consideration for many to prepare to evacuate because the severity of the 
bushfire was expected to make defending extremely hazardous. Some interviewees identified 
the combination of high, temperature, low humidity and very strong winds as the makings of 
an extremely dangerous, if not catastrophic, fire danger day 
 
…later in the afternoon (it was) starting to roll up the hill and to look a bit serious. You 
could see the flames right across the ridge there… (Jerry, Upper Hermitage). 
 
It was getting closer and we knew that properties had been lost already… (Katie, Lower 
Hermitage). 
 
…the next morning when there were the warnings…we got the text messages on the 
phone that really heightened it up for everybody…the text messages …were like little 
alarm bells… (Belinda, Gumeracha). 
 
…she phoned again and said the CFS are putting Gumeracha, Inglewood, Birdwood 
and several townships on evacuation notice. And she said, ‘Mum you better start 
packing your personal papers and one or two things…just in case… (Abbey, 
Gumeracha). 
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When we could see the wind-change had affected the movement of the fire, heading it 
this way, and I said to Helen ‘it doesn’t look good’… (Raymond, Kersbrook) 
 
…my fire plan was on a catastrophic day I was going to leave and that is what the 
warning was at that stage, catastrophic… (Matthew, Kersbrook) 
 
Some interviewees also decided that they needed to take protective action because of the 
amount and colour of the smoke; the proximity of the bushfire; the activity of fire-bombing 
aircraft or the presence of falling embers or ash. 
 
5.5.3.  Protective action search and assessment. 
 
Having decided that the threat required a protective response, householders had the option to 
evacuate, to remain and defend or to shelter in place. They considered factors relevant to 
weighing up whether they would remain at their property or evacuate.  
 
 
Table 5.3. 
 
Protective action decision making process- Adelaide Hills 
 
Before bushfire During bushfire Did not do 
 
N % N % N % 
Thought of different ways to respond 
to the bushfire  
220 92.4 13 5.5 5 2.1 
Weighed up the best ways of 
responding 
197 82.8 37 15.5 4 1.7 
Decided on the way I would respond 
to the bushfire 
159 66.8 79 32.8 0 0.0 
 
 
Almost unanimously, householders identified the range of protective options open to them 
before the bushfire, while very few did so during the bushfire or failed to do so. An 
overwhelming number weighed up these options before the bushfire, while a small number did 
this during the fire or not at all. Almost two thirds had decided on their best protective option 
(whether to evacuate or remain) prior to the bushfire, while the remaining one-third decided 
during the bushfire Two-thirds had developed a clear plan of how they would respond to a 
bushfire before the event while 30% developed a plan during the fire. Householders who 
remained at their property, more than those who evacuated (p<.05), weighed up their protective 
options before the bushfire (Appendix G11). 
 
 
125 
 
 
All householders who had developed a clear plan before the bushfire, had thought of different 
ways to respond, weighed up the best ways to respond and decided on the way they would 
respond before the bushfire occurred. Most of those who said that they developed a plan during 
the bushfire had considered different ways of responding before the bushfire, approximately 
half had weighed up the best ways to respond before and half during the bushfire, and all 
decided on whether to evacuate or remain, during the bushfire. A very small number of 
householders at no stage developed a clear plan all of whom decided to evacuate or remain, 
during the bushfire. (Appendix G12). 
 
In contemplating evacuating, interviewees were influenced by the perceived bushfire threat 
including proximity to the bush and limited escape options available; lack of mental or physical 
capability or preparedness; lack of fire-fighting capacity including inadequate firefighting 
equipment and water and/or power sources; and hot and dry weather conditions. Many 
interviewees who felt that they could consider remaining had well prepared fire-fighting 
equipment and a reliable water source; and a well-prepared property cleared of flammable 
vegetation around structures. A small number believed the bushfire was not severe or they had 
safe escape options. The reasons for considering evacuating or remaining were like those that 
influenced the choice of preferred action and are discussed in the following paragraphs.  
 
Evacuation was the best option for many interviewees primarily because of concern for the 
personal safety of their household; and the imminent threat of the out of control bushfire. 
Limited physical and/or mental capability or preparedness of household members including 
their health and their lack of firefighting capability due to inadequate equipment or inadequate 
and unreliable water or power sources were also influential.  
 
The safety of the people who were at home, including dependents and guests was a key factor 
in the decision of many interviewees that evacuation was the best protective option. Some 
women did not want their male partners to remain to defend their home because of the risk of 
death or injury and mostly women specifically declared that the lives of their family members 
were more important than property. Bushfire was dangerous, seriously threatening personal 
safety especially for those living close to bushland or with limited escape options. Evacuation 
was the best option for many because the bushfire was dangerous, out of control or an imminent 
threat due to its proximity, intensity or the advice and warnings of influential others including 
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family, neighbours, and emergency services. Others were influential in a wide range of settings 
including in discussions between neighbours in the bush, orders from a senior nurse in a 
hospital and phone calls from a worried and persistent daughter to her parents. Physical and 
mental limitations and health problems including obesity, old age and indecision made 
evacuation the best option for some interviewees. The physical and emotional demands and 
stresses of preparing for and fighting the bushfire were too much for many. Most of these 
interviewees pragmatically assessed their lack of capability to fight a bushfire and were 
determined to evacuate. A small number of interviewees decided that evacuation was their best 
option because they did not have adequate firefighting equipment or a reliable water or power 
source to effectively defend their property.  
 
I just thought the smoke…and the flames were a bit close for comfort and the girls and 
three cats needed to evacuate… (Richard, Kenton Valley). 
 
I thought "I'm just not prepared to die for a bushfire." I don't like the thought of losing 
the house but it's better than being burnt alive… (Isabella, Forreston). 
 
…so, the boys come home and they say 'mum we've got to leave' and I was like 'why?' 
Because we saw the flames…just over the hill… (Ella, Inglewood) 
 
I was more blasé…laid back thinking we are in a built-up area. But it was my daughter's 
incessant ringing...all the time saying, come get out, come up. And I think that was the 
main thing for me… (Samantha, Gumeracha). 
 
But I’m fairly overweight and I think that I would have been more of a hindrance to 
Steven… (Belinda, Gumeracha).  
 
Given my knee it was a bit limiting to move around the place and knock off…if 
anything happened to me it’s better off out of it… (Matthew, Kersbrook). 
 
We weren’t prepared enough in the sense that you know we didn’t have the right fire-
fighting equipment… (Ella, Inglewood). 
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In such a dangerous environment, a small number of interviewees said that they wanted to 
leave so that they wouldn’t be in the way of the emergency services fighting the bushfire or 
have fire-fighters put their lives at risk to save them if the bushfire threatened.   
 
A few interviewees were strongly committed to remain so that they could defend their property, 
especially from ember attack. Their commitment arose from an emotional connection with their 
home that they had built themselves or lived in and the gardens they had planted and tendered 
over many years. Some were highly committed because of the financial investment they had 
made in their property, and in two cases, because they were uninsured against bushfire. Some 
interviewees believed that moderating or favourable winds reduced the severity or immediacy 
of the bushfire threat. Readily available safe escape options, including cutting fences, driving 
across paddocks and sheltering in culverts, ditches and holes in the earth, also reduced 
perceived threat. 
 
I was busting my ass not to let my house burn…because I built the bloody thing, it’s 
my house. It isn’t much, but its mine… (Joseph. Humbug Scrub). 
 
But I thought there was more I could do to protect the house and I didn't want to be 
away from it wondering what was going on when there was still a whole lot more I 
could do to…I could keep an eye on things and put out ember attack fires… (Richard, 
Kenton Valley). 
 
…a few minutes and it died again but it still carried on down the hill because there was 
so much heat. Then it started burning down towards us…And it slowed right down 
some more. Virtually it was creeping down the hill… (Joseph, Humbug Scrub). 
 
To me I wasn’t taking that much of a risk because I knew where the fire was coming 
and I knew…I can get through a paddock up here to get out...worst come to worst I 
would have dug a hole and bloody got in it… (Edward, Cudlee Creek). 
 
A few said that they opted to remain primarily because their property was prepared or 
defendable and they had adequate and reliable water and/or power sources even though many 
had said these factors were important in their consideration of remaining suggesting that other 
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factors such as emotional or financial commitment to their property encouraged this 
preparation and equipping.  
 
…we have a couple of fire-fighting pumps...an overhead sprinkler on the roof and 
couple of fire hoses as well … (Joshua, Inglewood). 
 
5.5.4.  Protective action implementation. 
 
From the telephone survey data, the implementation of householders’ protective decision 
(Appendix G12A), or the factors that triggered their decision to act immediately to leave were:  
 
• perception of the bushfire as extremely dangerous, a certain threat and moving toward 
their property (35.3%)  
• incapacity to prepare or defend the property against the bushfire including physical or 
emotional constraints (7.8%), sickness and old age (6.5%) and inadequate property 
preparation (7.8%) 
• receipt of advice or requests from family (5.9%) or neighbours (5.9%) 
• receipt of an official warning to evacuate (11.1%) 
• concern for the safety of household members, family (5.9%) and animals (3.3%). 
 
The factors that were most influential in householders’ decision to remain were their; 
 
• perception that their property was well prepared (21.2%), resourced and equipped 
(4.4%) to be defended  
• perception that they were experienced (5.1%) and physically and mentally capable 
(10.9%) 
• commitment to protect their house and property by defending and putting out spot fires 
(15.3%) 
• perception that the bushfire was not a threat because it was slow and sedate and not 
moving in their direction (10.2%) 
• intention to remain as part of their Bushfire Plan (8.0%) 
 
Face-to-face interviews highlighted three main triggers to evacuate. Like the Perth Hills 
bushfire, householders responded to an ‘imminent threat’ although the factors are described 
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slightly differently. Imminent threat comprised: the proximity of the bushfire; seeing flames; 
seeing increasing amounts of smoke; forecast high winds; having embers dropping on their 
property; and the operation of helitacs and/or aircraft in their area. These factors demonstrated 
the threat had reached a crucial intolerable level. For some the decision to leave immediately 
was prompted by a conceptual imminent threat trigger - the bushfire crossing a road or a 
proximate point. For others, the trigger was more physical – being surrounded by volumes of 
black smoke or having embers raining down on them. And for others the trigger was a 
recognition that circumstances had become unacceptably dangerous such as was created by the 
forecast of 100 kilometres an hour winds that formed in their minds images of the ‘Black 
Saturday’ bushfire in Victoria and associated death and destruction. Persistent formal warning 
messages from the emergency services and unofficially from family conveyed a strong sense 
of urgency and immediate threat that motivated immediate evacuation. For some it was a matter 
of avoiding late evacuation when the threat became critical. For some it was the last chance to 
escape before the bushfire front moved through. Others who saw CFS evacuating realized the 
bushfire was beyond their defence capability. Stress, exhaustion or fear and loss of power or 
water also triggered the evacuation of a small number of interviewees. 
 
Then the wind changed, started to head south east and Range Road North was the trigger 
for me. The moment it crossed Range Road North… (Caitlin, Houghton). 
 
At midnight was when we actually decided to go, because we could then see looking 
straight down the road from here … about three kilometres away… we could actually 
see flames… (Jeffrey, Kersbrook).  
 
I think the real catalyst was when both phones went and I thought gee this is an 
emergency, and I really felt alarmed at that stage… (Samantha, Gumeracha). 
 
They were saying our road on the radio and that was when I said to Arthur "we have to 
get out of here"… (Isabella, Forreston). 
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5.6. Information Needs and Communication Action Assessment and Implementation 
 
During the bushfire householders found that the information available to them was inadequate 
to adequately inform protective action decision-making and sought to identify the information 
they required and the available sources. 
 
5.6.1.  Type of information required by householders. 
 
Householders sought to assess the likelihood of threat primarily by getting information on the 
bushfire’s location (79.0%) and direction (76.9%). They wanted to judge the immediacy and 
extent of the threat using information on proximity to their home (40.8%), speed of the fire 
(20.6%) and its severity (13.0%) (Appendix G13). Information on weather conditions including 
wind strength, direction, and likely wind changes; the extent of the risk that the bushfire posed 
to them, whether the fire was controlled and the extent of fire-fighting resources; and road 
closures was also sought (Appendix G14).  
 
Many interviewees wanted to know the location of the bushfire relative to their property. The 
volume of smoke combined with strong, wildly fluctuating winds made reading smoke cues 
difficult and unreliable so accurate location information was vital. Sampson Flat was unknown 
to many, also making location information important.  Many interviewees also wanted to know 
the direction or progress of the bushfire so that they could judge whether and at what speed it 
was moving toward them, to judge the likelihood and immediacy of the threat. Some saw area 
or town based threat information as too general to determine their specific threat level and 
appropriate protective response. Interviewees wanted detailed, visually confirmed, time 
stamped directional information so they could make much more fine-tuned decisions than the 
crude, generic emergency service information and warnings would allow. Some interviewees 
wanted the proximity and severity of the bushfire and wind strength and direction so they could 
judge the immediacy and level of the potential threat. They could use their knowledge of local 
topography and the behaviour of winds to assess the likelihood of the bushfire becoming a 
threat and to calculate the time they had to make decisions and act. 
 
Well we…wanted to know…where the fire was exactly on a map and which way it's 
heading… (Paul, Inglewood) 
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With the thick smoke, we really had no idea where the fire was because it was a very 
swirly windy day and the wind was carrying it in all different directions… (Amelia, 
Gumeracha). 
 
(They) said its threatening Gumeracha. But which way is it coming from? … (Edward, 
Cudlee Creek). 
 
(An) historical graphic or something like that so as they plot it you could just run it … 
because otherwise everything you see is just a point in time. And trying to think what 
direction was it going?... (Andrew, Houghton). 
 
… what you want to do, is…to be able to visualize where it’s tracking (John, 
Houghton). 
 
My concern was what's coming at me from that direction. So, I went down Tippett Road 
then to see if I could find out where the fire front was so I could have an idea where it 
was and what danger it posed… (Steven, Chain of Ponds). 
 
… (tell me) actually this is what’s going on and the fire is there, is spreading there, it’s 
out of control there or whatever…if you understand the wind it is the most important 
thing, more important than heat or temperature… (Richard, Kenton Valley). 
 
5.6.2.  Where information was sourced. 
 
Householders sourced information during the bushfire primarily through radio and the Internet, 
in particular, emergency services websites. Environmental and social cues, initially important 
in identifying the bushfire threat, also provided vital, ongoing information throughout the 
bushfire (cf. Table 5.2). 
 
Environmental cues revealed the existence of the bushfire. Many interviewees used visual and 
audile observations from their property to provide ongoing information about its 
characteristics. They judged its direction, speed and severity based on flame height and 
movement, the amount and colour of smoke, the roar of the fire and the activity of the fire 
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services in the area. Many interviewees listened to the radio for bushfire information and 
warnings, constantly monitoring it in the background as they went about daily life or prepared 
for evacuation. For many ABC was the major radio source as the emergency broadcaster was 
seen as dedicated to the task, and up to date and accurate.  Listening to the radio was more 
difficult, when interviewees were working outside either completing their daily chores or 
preparing for evacuation or defence. Many interviewees got their information through 
 
Table 5.3. 
Sources of Information While at Home- Adelaide Hills 
 
Source 
 
N % 
Information 
 
357 52.4 
Radio 167 
  
Websites 127 
  
Scanners (Internet and radio) 25 
  
TV 38 
  
Environmental Cues 
 
137 20.1 
Social Cues 
 
146 21.4 
Family/friends 54 
  
Neighbours 48 
  
Facebook 41 
  
Twitter 1 
  
Telephone tree 2 
  
Warnings 
 
  
Telephone hotline 2 37 5.4 
Local brigade/ES 11 
  
SMS/ text message 1 
  
Mobile App 23 
  
Other 
 
5 0.7 
 
 
family members, friends and neighbours either through direct sharing or indirectly through 
third parties with insights generally from people within the fire ground. Some interviewees, 
lacking computer skills or access to the Internet, had adult children access and provide Internet 
based information.  In some cases, sharing of information on the nature and behaviour of the 
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bushfire and the household’s protective actions, reassured concerned relatives away from fire 
ground. Some interviewees used the Internet to access bushfire websites including CFS, South 
Australian Police, and the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) for weather information, especially 
wind speed and direction. Some however felt power loss and the unreliability of their wireless 
network made Internet information inaccessible.  Some interviewees went to vantage points 
beyond their property to get information about the bushfire, especially its exact location, 
direction of movement, severity and the threat it posed. In some cases, this decision to ‘go and 
have a look’ was motivated by environmental cues that were incomplete or difficult to decipher 
that left interviewees needing more specific information about what was going on ‘over the 
hill’. 
 
…watching it from here…we can see it out the window, the smoke...and as you go up 
our hill, not even too far up…you got a view across to the hills… (Erin, Paracombe) 
 
…in the morning…standing out (in front of the house).…it actually sounded like going 
…down through the valley…like a freight train. There was just one hell of a roar of 
fire… (Steven, Chain of Ponds). 
 
…we’ve got a radio and when there is a fire in the hills and it’s reasonably close we 
start monitoring it and listening… (Frank, Paracombe). 
 
So, I came back up here and put the radio on and listened to the fire warning thing. And 
so, I started thinking "Oh, it’s not so good", and I was just listening to it and keeping 
an eye on it… (Mia, Houghton). 
 
… we hadn’t got a computer. But my daughter was ringing up and telling us…what 
they were saying on this Facebook thing… (Edward, Cudlee Creek). 
 
…we have a friend who is a firie over at Lobethal and he was keeping in contact with 
us and…he said, it’s going to be big and…he virtually said to us get out...don’t stay… 
(Chelsea, Inglewood). 
 
The thing I was looking at most was the CFS alerts and every now and again they would 
publish a fire map …which was interesting data… (Carl, Lower Hermitage). 
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…fortunately, with the fire, being able to get internet on the phone, I think I was able 
to…keep up with it. I checked it constantly for any updates and it said when the next 
update was going to be, so I was pretty much on top of that… (Isabella, Forreston). 
 
…I drove up to the end of the road and then hiked out…And then I could see it was 
…coming up a ridge…only about two kilometres away. So, that's when we decided it's 
too close… (Stephanie, Humbug Scrub). 
 
I went with her over to the top to Checkers Hill and we stopped at the top. There were 
a lot of people there. That’s when I realized where I thought the smoke was here it was 
a good 10 to 15, kilometres further over… (Kenneth, Forreston). 
 
Interviewees also obtained information from watching television, face-to-face from emergency 
services personnel; by accessing Facebook or Twitter; through SMS or the landline warnings 
received from the fire authorities; a telephone hotline; by using a computer or radio scanner; 
or using the CFS App. 
 
5.6.3.  Timing of information. 
 
Many interviewees preferred to get information ‘live ‘or rapidly updated. Information that they 
received, especially warning related information, was slow or out-of-date and for a few, this 
resulted in information being misleading.  
 
Many interviewees said that they needed live information to make informed choices accurately 
reflecting current circumstances. They wanted to actively monitor the bushfire and make 
decisions about appropriate protective response reflecting the prevailing circumstances rather 
than reacting to generalised warnings or to stale and misleading information. Some more 
technically perceptive interviewees knew ‘live’ information was available to emergency 
service decision-makers and that the technology, systems and software were available to allow 
the public to access it. Some felt that the public provision of live information should be a 
priority. 
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I figured that in their situation room they must have (information) up on a screen in real 
time, I would have liked to see that. And the more I can be looking at what people are 
already looking at the less effort has to go into preparing stuff just for me… (Carl, 
Lower Hermitage). 
 
...it just struck me…what has changed in the last half an hour. So, the fire has now 
spread to such and such a road or this area has been controlled…on the ground, it would 
have been handy to know in the last half an hour, this is what's happened… (Richard, 
Kenton Valley). 
 
However, many interviewees said information that was critical to their decision-making was 
not timely, and was not updated enough. This was a criticism of all media including websites, 
radio and TV. Interviewees wanted information about the behaviour of the bushfire, whether 
to evacuate or remain and safe escape routes but many felt that such information was partial or 
not helpful. Some also felt that repetitiveness caused people to turn off and overlook new 
information added at the margins of the message. There was frustration that the opportunity for 
new and helpful information was wasted by the ‘mindless repetition’. A small number of 
interviewees concluded that some information was so out of date that it was misleading and 
unhelpful. 
 
And then I woke at the six o'clock and decided it was fairly calm and listened to the 
ABC emergency line and they were very repetitive...And they went through their spiel 
of ‘there is a fire raging -- there is a fire which is out of control affecting the towns of 
blah, blah, blah’. So, every update…went through this big spiel which was very 
frustrating when you're listening for hours and hours and people already know about 
the bushfire… (Richard, Kenton Valley).  
 
The structure of the messages coming...from CFS…they should change…it looks the 
same in the statement and you just get complacent…same words, okay I just stop 
reading now. And then all issues and the fact that the town that you in is under threat is 
the last sentence… (John, Houghton). 
 
…once that wind went around the west that took the danger away from all the towns 
south of here...and this was at midday…five o'clock at night they were still putting 
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warnings out to evacuate. And the problem with that was that it gridlocked the main 
road…How there wasn’t serious accidents…because people were then getting 
desperate. And this was because warnings were going out that they should definitely no 
longer have been going out… (Steven, Chain of Ponds).  
 
However, a very small number said that information was up to date on the radio and the CFS 
live feed. 
 
They were talking with people from the CFS, they’re getting information that you can 
feel as reasonably reliable and they’re providing information which isn’t written down 
on the website… (Jerry, Upper Hermitage). 
 
5.7. Situational Impediments  
 
Numerous impediments delayed householders’ self-evacuation (Appendix G16), most 
commonly: 
 
• Need to care for domestic (20.0%) and non-domestic (17.9%) pets  
• Separation of household members (19.0%) 
• Traffic conditions on the escape route including dangerous driving and large numbers 
of sightseers (7.7%) 
• Emotional reactions to the bushfire by the householder and family members including 
stressed and crying children (5.4%) 
• Concern roadblocks would prevent the householders from returning (4.8%) Many 
householders did not perceive a problem when they left but because they were unable 
to return when they wanted they said they would not evacuate from a bushfire again 
 
Interviewees identified three important situational impediments to evacuation. Many prepared 
their property before they evacuated, watering to drench the lawn and areas around their 
property, putting sprinklers on the roof, clearing fine fuels, moving combustible materials like 
mats, wooden furniture and gas bottles and closing the windows and curtains for protection 
from radiant heat. They believed that this would help protect their home and other property 
even though they left. Many interviewees delayed their evacuation to find, contain and load 
pets into vehicles, to organise for the transport of livestock, especially horses, and to open gates 
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to provide escape for livestock that were in threatened paddocks. A small number of 
interviewees were reluctant to leave because they knew they would not be able to return at a 
time of their choosing. 
 
…we might have been here for another half an hour we just thought we’d check the 
downpipes and all that gear… (Steven, Gumeracha). 
 
…before the fire came over the hill, I put a sprinkler around the caravan and one on the 
roof of the house down there, and then I came up here and did the same here. And I 
thought well it would help save the house… (Brian, Paracombe) 
 
I was up here with mom and Justin and 13 horses and 40-something cats...and two dogs 
and one less vehicle…And so, we…started getting animals loaded up and crated and 
horses…we didn't finish actually getting animals out of the property until what was it? 
It took us nine hours… (Belinda and Stephanie, Humbug Scrub). 
 
I got them (the dogs) in the car and I had 3 horses down here. A stallion and a mare and 
a foal so then I rang the girl who owns them and I said "You might have to move them. 
So, she came in at midnight...took the stallion and was going to come back for the mare 
and the foal… (Mia, Houghton). 
 
…my thoughts were once you leave that's it…you won't get back in. No, I thought, 
"well it hasn’t really got here, and we can only pack and wait... (Arthur, Forreston). 
 
5.8. Conclusions 
 
The Sampson Flat bushfire was much larger and more prolonged than the fire in the Perth Hills. 
It was set within a more predominantly rural landscape and affected a more diverse peri-urban 
and rural population. Consequently, there were some minor differences in emphasis within the 
results of the two bushfires but their overall consistency highlights the robustness of the 
analytical framework of the study based on the PADM. There were considerable similarities in 
the factors that influenced householders’ self-evacuation decisions in the two fires. 
Environmental and social cues played a major role in awareness raising and providing on-going 
information throughout the fire. Official warnings were also extensively broadcast by 
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telephone and in the media. Householders had more time to contemplate this bushfire. Many 
waited to see if it would burn in their direction from locations that appeared to be distant from 
their properties. Residents of the large number of separate townships reacted to their immediate 
circumstances which in many cases did not involve major emergency service activity or large 
scale movement of the resident population.  The cues were fragmented and the official 
warnings diffuse and unable to be closely focused to specific areas of fire activity.  
 
Environmental and social cues and warnings still provided key inputs into householders’ 
protective decision-making. They judged the extent and immediacy of the threat, assessed the 
activities of the emergency services and their neighbours, and evaluated their preparedness 
against their appraisal of the fire. Unlike the Perth Hills fire there was less immediate, pack-up 
and evacuate and more information and media monitoring and consideration of options. 
Immediacy of the threat, warnings and an honest assessment of their firefighting capacity, like 
the Perth Hills, triggered householder evacuation. Some situational impediments were similar 
to Perth such as care for pets, traffic hazards and emotional reactions. But because the 
/Sampson Flat fire started on a week day, separation of household members was a much greater 
impediment than in Perth where the fire ignited on a Sunday. 
 
The Sampson Flat bushfire, although of a different size and duration, involved factors 
influencing self-evacuation decision-making that were like the Perth Hills fire. These 
influencers are discussed in aggregate in the next chapter which reports the findings of the 
research. Findings are also reported in the context of a model of factors that predict evacuation 
and an analysis of the characteristics of self-evacuators. 
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Chapter 6 Findings 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Using the Protective Action Decision Model as an analytical framework, this chapter 
synthesizes the results presented in Chapters 4 and 5 the Perth and Adelaide Hills bushfires. It 
draws on this aggregate data to systematically address the research questions posed by this 
study: 
 
 What are the factors that influence householders’ decisions to self-evacuate? 
i. What factors predict self-evacuation? 
ii. What are the characteristics of self-evacuators? 
iii. What improvements can be made to the PADM to enable better analysis of 
householder self-evacuation decision-making?  
 
The first section of the chapter addresses the first research question by establishing the factors 
influencing self-evacuation decision-making by examining the role that environmental and 
social cues and warnings; threat, hazard adjustment and stakeholder perceptions; protective 
action processes; information search and assessment; and situational factors, play in the 
decision to self-evacuate.  The second research question is addressed by identifying the key 
factors in bushfire self-evacuation by developing a model of the factors that predict self-
evacuation comprising hazard adjustment perceptions, likelihood of property impact and the 
receipt of official warnings. The third question is then tackled through the development of a 
model of seven self-evacuation archetypes, that characterize householders’ decisions to 
evacuate or remain and identifies similarities and differences between them. 
 
6.2. Factors Influencing Self-Evacuation Decision-Making 
 
Three key elements influence householders’ decision to evacuate or remain when threatened 
by bushfire: environmental and social cues and warnings; perceptions of threat, hazard 
adjustment and stakeholders; and information. These elements influence the process of 
protective action decision-making culminating in a decision to evacuate or remain. Situational 
factors may play a part in preventing or delaying the implementation but do not determine the 
ultimate protective decision.  
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Table 6. 1. 
Sources of First Awareness of Bushfire- Aggregate 
Source Evacuate Remain Total of all 
households 
 N % N % N % 
Environmental Cues       
See smoke 108a 30 61a 32 169 30.5 
Smell smoke 20a 5 12a 6 32 5.9 
See fire 16a 5 6a 3 20 3.9 
Ash/burnt leaves from sky 3a 1 0a 0 3 0.5 
See/hear water bombers/ helicopters 26a 7 15a 8 41 7.5 
Hear sirens 4a 17 10a 5 27 4.8 
See ES vehicles 8a 2 1a 0 9 1.6 
     301 54.5 
Social Cues       
Contacted by family 47a 13 26a 14 73 13.0 
Contacted by neighbours/ friends 27a 7 17a 9 44 7.8 
     117 20.8 
Warnings       
Get warning message on mobile 16a 5 7a 4 23 4.1 
Get warning message on landline 9a 3 1a 0 10 1.8 
Message on pager (ES connection) 4a 1 8b 4 12 2.2 
     31 8.1 
Information Sources       
Radio 26a 7 18a 10 44 7.8 
Facebook   4a 4 3a 2 7 1.2 
ES Website 14a 4 2a 1 16 2.9 
TV 12a 3 2a 1 14 2.5 
CFS App 10a 3 1a 0 11 2.0 
     94 16.4 
       
Overall Total     543 100 
 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Evacuate or Remain at home throughout categories whose column 
proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
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6.2.1.  Environmental and social cues and warnings. 
 
Many householders, both in the Perth and Adelaide Hills first became aware of the bushfire 
primarily through environmental cues (cf. Table 6.1). Seeing smoke was by far the most 
important cue in both bushfires. In Perth, the sight and sound of firebombing aircraft was a 
much more important initial cue than in Adelaide because of the small scale of the Perth fire 
and concentration of aerial firefighting activities. Some householders with experience of 
bushfire gleaned a great deal of information about the nature of the fire and its progress from 
the volume of smoke, its growth, colour, and direction. Even the less experienced knew that if 
smoke blew toward them and they could smell it, the bushfire was moving in their direction. 
The activity of local firefighting brigades and firebombing aircraft provided clues about where 
and how close the bushfire was, and as the number of aircraft and on the ground activity 
increased, most householders concluded the fire had become an increased threat that the 
emergency authorities were addressing with more resources.  
 
Social cues including contact from family, neighbours and friends was the most important 
source of first awareness of the bushfire after environmental cues. Many family members who 
used mobile and landline telephones to make contact were well away from the bushfire threat, 
but highly aware of it through media reports or Internet information. Some adult children 
worried about their parents. Internet literate family members and neighbours commonly 
assisted the less computer literate with access to bushfire information. There was considerable 
contact between family members, neighbours and friends in the local area to ensure that 
individuals within their social networks were aware of the potential threat. Neighbours played 
a central role in providing a first alert of the bushfire because of their proximity to one other 
and as trusted individuals. Neighbours shared information and advice in many ways including 
by visiting one another at home or in groups in their local street, discussing on the telephone 
and through telephone trees. Those perceived as having superior local knowledge or 
firefighting experience were sought out for information and advice. Actions taken by 
neighbours seen as competent, thoughtful, or well prepared also influenced others’ decisions 
to prepare property or to evacuate. 
 
Official emergency services warnings provided an initial source of awareness for few 
householders. These warnings, designed to escalate as the threat increased, were received by 
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most householders during the bushfire (Appendix G1). Many received the highest level, 
Emergency Warning to leave or defend (77%). These warnings were an integral part of the 
emergency service’s systems of community information and advice. 16% of householders did 
not receive them. Text messages on mobile phones (85.8%) and recorded messages on 
landlines (43.9%) were ubiquitous in the process of bushfire warnings. There was no significant 
difference in the major sources of warning for evacuees and remainers (Appendix G2). 
Problems with timing, content, information reliability and perceived purpose of these warnings 
are discussed in a later section on householder information seeking.  
 
Information sources including radio, television and Internet websites were less important in 
providing a first indication of an emergency.  However, the Adelaide Hills fire burnt a large 
area over a long period so householders not immediately threatened were more likely to first 
hear about it through radio or television or on the Internet. As discussed later in this chapter, 
information sources became increasingly important as the bushfires developed and 
householders sought further information on which to base protective actions. 
 
Both environmental and social cues enabled householders to extract information, assess the 
situation from their viewpoint and formulate their response. Most householders perceived 
official warnings as limited to advising of the existence of the fire and how they should respond 
rather than providing information that they could use to decide for themselves. 
 
6.2.2.  Perceptions of threat, hazard adjustment and stakeholders. 
 
Most householders actively engaged with the information environment paying close attention 
to and understanding cues, information, and warnings about the bushfire.  This informed their 
perceptions of the threat, of other stakeholders involved and of appropriate adjustments to the 
fire. 
 
6.2.2.1. Pre-decision processes. 
 
While still at their property most householders checked their information sources frequently 
(86.4%), considered this information very carefully (90.3%) and found it easy to understand 
(81.2%). In Adelaide, the naming of the bushfire based on a location that was not well known 
created confusion for a few. (Appendix G3). 
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6.2.2.2. Perceptions of threat and impact. 
 
Many householders believed that the bushfire posed a large threat to property (73.0%) and 
personal safety (60.0%). Evacuees, more than those who remained, perceived a large threat to 
their property from the bushfire while remainers thought it would have little or no property 
impact (Appendix G4), possibly reflecting their confidence in defending it.  
 
Five factors were central to  the perception of large threat: the intrusiveness of bushfire threat 
into householders’ thoughts, discussions and information seeking; experience of bushfire, 
especially through previous evacuation or training by people with bushfire experience; the 
extent of long-run hazard adjustment undertaken - property preparation and equipping for 
firefighting; the bushfire’s proximity, severity, and progress toward the householder’s 
property; and the activity and noise associated with fire-fighting including the operation of 
aerial fire bombers.  
 
Householders perceived a small or medium threat because: the bushfire was moving away or 
burning parallel to their property; their property was clear of bushfire fuels; the fire was not 
severe or dangerous; and they believed the fire services would protect them. Distance of the 
fire from property and early evacuation also contributed to a perception of minor threat.  
 
Research on a range of hazards discussed in Chapter 2 Deciding to Evacuate from a Natural 
Hazard, found hazard adjustment perception (Davis, 1989; Kunreuther et al., 1978; Mulilis & 
Duval, 1995; Russell et al., 1995), threat intrusiveness (Blanchard-Boehm & Cook, 2004; 
Lindell & Perry, 2000; Weinstein et al., 2000) and hazard experience (Heller et al., 2005; 
Lindell & Prater, 2000; Mulilis et al., 2003; Nguyen et al., 2006) influenced decision-making. 
Statistically significant relationships between bushfire threat and these factors and between 
each other are discussed to enable their incorporation into the models predicting evacuation 
and characterising self-evacuation archetypes developed later in this chapter.   
 
6.2.2.2.1.  Threat perceptions and hazard adjustments. 
 
Some groups of long-run hazard adjustments strongly correlated with one another (Appendix 
F2). Long-run hazard adjustments that had utility for other purposes including home and 
property maintenance such as clearing gutters and cleaning up leaves and twigs on the property, 
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correlated significantly with each other and most other long-run adjustments.  Property defence 
focused adjustments such as having fire-fighting equipment, having sprinklers on the roof and 
around the grounds, having a mop and bucket for spot fires and personal protective clothing 
were highly correlated with one another. Adjustments aimed at property maintenance that were 
more complex than simply raking leaves and cleaning gutters, such as covering gaps and vents 
against embers and removing bushes and branches, were also highly correlated with each other 
and with property defence adjustments.  
 
As detailed in Appendix F3 and F5, perceptions of threat to personal safety and the likelihood 
of death or injury to householders and their families significantly negatively correlated (p < 
.05) with many property defence focused adjustments undertaken primarily by those who 
intended to remain at their property. Adjustments to support householders in remaining and 
defending were therefore associated with perception of increased threat to and impact on 
personal safety.  
 
Three long-run hazard adjustments, covering gaps and vents, having equipment to extinguish 
embers and having sprinklers on the property, related specifically to perceptions of the 
likelihood of property damage (Appendix F3 and F5) suggesting actions to protect property 
against embers.  
 
Perceptions of threat to property and the likelihood that the home and other property would be 
damaged or destroyed, significantly negatively correlated (p < .05) with evacuating, suggesting 
that householders saw undefended property as vulnerable to bushfire attack (Appendix F4 and 
F6). 
 
6.2.2.2.2.  Threat perceptions and intrusiveness. 
 
All measures of threat intrusiveness, the extent to which householders had considered bushfire 
threat before the bushfire event significantly positively correlated with: perceived threat to 
personal safety; the likelihood of death or injury of household members; impact on property; 
and the likelihood of damage or destruction of home, property, and livestock (Appendix F7 
and F8).  Householders’ thoughts, discussion and reading about bushfire threat heightened their 
perception of the threat both to personal safety and to property. 
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6.2.2.2.3.  Threat perceptions and experience of bushfire. 
 
The type and extent of householders’ experience with bushfire was related to the extent that 
bushfire posed a threat. The significant negative correlation (p < .05) between threat perception 
and several measures of experience with bushfire suggested this relationship (Appendix F9 and 
F10). Previous evacuation experience was related to perception of threat to and destruction of 
property and animals. Receipt of training from people with bushfire experience correlated with 
perceptions of threat and impact on personal safety suggesting that insights from trainers may 
have alerted recipients to these threats. Experience as a volunteer firefighter correlated with 
perceptions of threat to and impact on property.  
 
Short-run hazard adjustments significantly negatively correlated (p < .05) with many measures 
of bushfire experience suggesting that householders with experience of bushfire were more 
likely to remain at their property while those without experience, evacuated (Appendix F11). 
 
6.2.2.2.4.  Effects of intrusiveness and experience on long-run hazard adjustments. 
 
Householders acted to protect their property and prepare for evacuation because of the 
intrusiveness of the threat of bushfire (Appendix F12) as reflected in significant negative 
correlations (p < .05) between intrusiveness and property defence focused adjustments but not 
routine property maintenance, and positive correlations with undertaking evacuation focused 
adjustments.  
 
Bushfire experience was closely related to property preparation and equipping for bushfire and 
spot firefighting, and remaining to defend. This was reflected in the significant positive 
correlation (p < .05) between experience and long-run hazard adjustments, (Appendix F13). 
General personal bushfire experience positively correlated with having a mop and bucket to 
extinguish spot fires, personal protective clothing, moving combustibles away from the house, 
and positioning a vehicle for quick evacuation. General, non-specific, experience was related 
to adjustments that could be for other purposes and were easily undertaken. Experience gained 
through training correlated with property defence focused, complex property maintenance 
focused and evacuation focused adjustments. Training appeared to encourage a wide range of 
complex hazard adjustments.  Experience fighting fires as a volunteer or civilian significantly 
positively correlated with property defence focused and complex property maintenance 
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focused adjustments. Table 6.2 details these significant relationships between bushfire 
experience and long-run hazard adjustments undertaken by householders.  
 
Greater bushfire experience correlated with greater preparedness to undertake certain long-run 
hazard adjustments, specifically: preparing a kit of personal protective clothing (7 experience 
measures); a mop, bucket, and ladder for spot fires (7); firefighting equipment (5); locating 
combustible materials away from buildings (4); preparing personal items and important papers 
(4); and covering gaps and vents to reduce ember attack (4).  
 
6.2.2.3. Hazard adjustment perceptions.  
 
A householder’s view of the hazard and resource related attributes of their short-run hazard 
adjustment, evacuating or remaining, influenced the adoption of that protective response more 
than their perceptions of the bushfire itself (Appendix G7). 
 
Most evacuees (91.5%) and many remainers (63.8%) saw their short-run hazard adjustment as 
the best way to protect themselves and household members. Most remainers (86.3%) saw 
remaining as the best way to protect property while few evacuees (13.9%) believed evacuating 
was best for property protection. Many evacuees (79.4%) and remainers (78.8%) saw their 
protective action as inexpensive. Most remainers believed that remaining required knowledge 
and skill (88.8%), time and effort to organise (92.5%) and cooperation (83.0%) from family or 
friends.  Many evacuees thought evacuating required time and effort (74.0%) and cooperation 
(74.6%) while 59.5% thought it needed knowledge and skill. 
 
Personal safety primarily drove the decision to evacuate, overriding concerns about damage or 
destruction of property. Most evacuees perceived evacuation as the best way to protect their 
personal safety believing that it was their responsibility to protect others within the household 
especially children and dependents (Appendix F14). This was particularly the case for those 
who failed to undertake long-run hazard adjustments, especially basic firefighting gear and 
protective clothing (Appendix F15). Personal safety was ensured by leaving, and most efforts 
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Table 6.2. 
 
Experience of bushfire and long-run hazard adjustment 
 
 
Experience of bushfire 
 
Long-run hazard adjustments 
 
  Moved combustible 
materials from house 
Covered gaps/ vents 
to reduce risk embers 
entering 
Obtained/ prepared 
fire-fighting 
equipment 
Obtained/ prepared 
equipment (ladder, 
bucket, mop) for 
spot fires 
Prepared 
personal items/ 
memorabilia for 
evacuation 
Prepared kit of 
personal 
protective 
clothing 
Past personal experience with 
bushfire 
.099*   .156**  .166** 
Previous you/household seen/smelt 
smoke 
   .121** 
 
.131** 
Previous you/household 
experienced property damage 
  .141** .112* 
 
.210** 
Previous you/household evacuated 
from bushfire 
    .132** 
 
Experience - Current/previous 
member fire brigade 
.144** .141** .164** .171** .100* .218** 
Formal/informal training from 
people with bushfire experience 
.150** .135** .278** .363** .121* .404** 
Personal experience fighting 
bushfire 
.094* .194** .220** .231** 
 
.363** 
Other bushfire experience .102* .175** .271** .268** .093* .389** 
 
Pearson correlation. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two tailed). * Correlation is significant to the 0.05 level (two tailed) 
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to protect their property would provide ineffective without their presence. Most perceived 
evacuating as inexpensive because insurance covered the potential cost of property damage.  
While some felt evacuating did not require extensive knowledge or high skill levels many 
recognized the need to identify and negotiate safe escape routes including reading a map and 
driving a vehicle. While some evacuees felt that they could leave at a moment’s notice many 
spent considerable time and effort packing clothes, important items, and memorabilia; 
preparing their property for their absence; and organising pets and other animals for evacuation. 
Many felt the cooperation of members of the household was essential to effectively organise 
to evacuate. Evacuees overwhelmingly perceived remaining as risking personal safety but most 
conceded that property would be better protected if they stayed. Most evacuees saw remaining 
as involving considerable equipment and preparation costs, requiring specialist knowledge and 
firefighting skills, substantial time and effort in organising for bushfire defence and extensive 
cooperation from family, neighbours, and friends to stage a successful defence.  
 
Householders who remained to defend, especially those who had carefully prepared and 
equipped, saw it as the most effective way of protecting property (Appendix F15), especially 
by extinguishing spot fires. For many, remaining and defending their property was also the best 
way to protect household members by being in a well-prepared, known, defendable 
environment with adequate personal protections. Many recognised remaining required 
considerable knowledge of bushfire and skill in firefighting but believed that they were capable 
of success. The purchase of firefighting equipment and property preparation and maintenance 
was perceived as necessary to successful property defence and relatively inexpensive, possibly 
compared with the cost of losing their home and property. Most also recognised the 
considerable time and effort required to prepare their property, set up and organise equipment 
to fight the bushfire, remove combustibles and organise family members, pets, and livestock, 
and to fight the bushfire. Most of those who remained to defend also recognised that success 
required cooperation from family members or friends both in maintaining the property in 
advance, preparing it for an imminent bushfire and in bushfire defence. Most saw evacuating 
as placing property at risk, and as inexpensive and not requiring knowledge and skills but time 
and effort to organise and cooperation from family members to implement.  
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Perceptions of the effectiveness of short-run hazard adjustments in protecting life and property 
and the influence of long-run hazard adjustments on those perceptions are central to a model 
predicting evacuation later in this chapter. 
 
6.2.2.4. Perceptions of stakeholders. 
 
Householder perceptions of how knowledgeable, well-informed, and responsible stakeholders 
were, including themselves, their neighbours, the media, and emergency services, influenced 
their behaviour and decision-making during the bushfire (Appendix G8).  Two thirds of 
householders believed that they had knowledge of bushfire behaviour (64.5%) and were well 
informed during the fire (66.7%). Most felt responsible for themselves and household members 
(93.1%) and this influenced their decisions and actions during the fire (94.0%). Less than half 
of householders saw their neighbours as knowledgeable (42.5%), well informed (46.7%) and 
providing reliable information during the fire (40.9%). Few (22.4%) felt neighbours were 
influential or had a responsibility for them or their property (28.3%). Over one-third of 
householders said that the media was influential (34.6%), knowledgeable (35.7%), well 
informed (40.9%) and provided reliable information and advice (42.0%). Some (26.7%) felt 
the media had a responsibility for them. Most householders saw the emergency services as 
knowledgeable (93.5%), well informed (88.5%), providing reliable information and advice 
(82.0%) and as influencing their decisions and actions (72.8%) during the fire. A majority 
(53.5%) believed the emergency services had a responsibility to protect their household and 
property.  
 
Most householders believed that they and household members primarily determined the 
decisions and actions that they took during the bushfire and that they were responsible for their 
personal safety. Self-determination and responsibility was characteristic of many evacuees and 
remainers. While most felt well informed about the bushfire situation and best placed to make 
decisions reflecting their priorities and circumstances, some felt they lacked the necessary 
knowledge of bushfire behaviour and the requisite physical and mental capabilities to fight it. 
However, as discussed in detail in 6.4.3.2 Responsibility Deniers, some rejected the need for 
self-reliance or responsibility and expected the emergency services to protect them. Others saw 
their incapability, unpreparedness, and ignorance of the bushfire as leaving them vulnerable 
and dependent on the support of others (6.4.3.6 Dependent Evacuators).    
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Most householders perceived neighbours as having no better knowledge of or information 
about the bushfire than they did (Appendix G8A). Neighbours who had firefighting experience 
or were members of voluntary fire brigades were an exception. Those who had experience 
firefighting or were current or past brigade members saw their neighbours as being less 
knowledgeable and well informed about the bushfire than they were. Many neighbours shared 
information and advice, which was less influential than the householder’s own assessments, 
although some less experienced and vulnerable householders highly valued the views of 
neighbours with bushfire experience or training. Evacuees rated their neighbours’ knowledge 
of bushfire more highly than remainers. Many householders felt that neighbours had some 
responsibility for each other’s safety both in preparing their property to minimise the risk to 
their neighbours’ properties and in lending a hand in a bushfire if needed. A few householders 
felt guilty about evacuating while their neighbours remained to defend their own property and 
the evacuee’s property as well. Some felt their neighbours were openly or subtly critical of 
their decision to leave and decided they had a responsibility to remain and support mutual 
firefighting efforts in a future bushfire.  
Perceptions of the media were mixed. Many householders recognised the ABC, as the official 
emergency broadcaster, and some commercial media as communicating and interpreting 
information about the bushfire in the community interest.  Many, especially evacuees, 
perceived these media as a reliable, well informed, and knowledgeable conduit of information 
from the emergency services. For many householders, the media’s role as an expert interpreter 
of information meant that it had an important responsibility for the safety of their household. 
Some held a neutral attitude to the media including those who perceived a significant threat 
and actively monitored, but critically assessed media information and reports; those who 
dismissed the threat and the need for media input at all; and those who expected others to 
protect them and did not require information from the media. Some, including experienced 
bushfire fighters and members of local volunteer brigades, many who were remainers, saw the 
media as lacking knowledge, and as uninformed and sensationalising reports. They were not 
influenced by media and saw it as having no responsibility for their safety. 
The information and advice of the emergency services strongly influenced many householders 
because they believed firefighters had local knowledge of bushfire behaviour, information 
about the local circumstances and provided reliable and comprehensive information. Because 
of the perceived expertise and community leadership of the emergency services some 
householders relied heavily on their advice and direction. Some believed the emergency 
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services had a responsibility to protect their households and property. Just as many 
householders however, felt that their own responsibility far outweighed that of the emergency 
services. Many of these perceived a large threat but accepted the need to be self-reliant even 
though they lacked firefighting experience or training, had limited knowledge and were unclear 
about how the emergency services might help them. There was widespread recognition of and 
praise for the work done by the volunteer fire-fighters. Some experienced individuals in the 
Adelaide hills bushfire, several who were ex-volunteer fire-fighters, were critical of the 
emergency service authorities because they saw local brigades as poorly managed, badly 
informed during the fire and failing to provide useful information and advice to the public.  
Householders’ perceptions of stakeholders were complicated and mixed but could be 
generalised as follows. Householders typically saw themselves as having adequate knowledge 
of bushfire behaviour and as sufficiently well informed about what was happening that they 
could make their own decisions about their protective action and take responsibility for their 
household rather than feeling the emergency services were responsible for them.  The 
emergency services did not influence their actions but provided knowledge and insights that 
strengthened their capacity to make decisions for themselves.  Neighbours were no more 
knowledgeable or well informed than them and not influential in their protective decisions.  
 
Householders felt well informed about what was happening during the bushfire because other 
stakeholders were knowledgeable, informed, and reliably communicated information to them. 
They were sufficiently knowledgeable about bushfire and motivated by responsibility for their 
household to assimilate the insights of other stakeholders. Information provided by the media 
was perceived as accurate and reliable mainly where it was sourced from the emergency 
services. The sharing of unique insights and perspectives with neighbours complemented and 
enriched media information.  
 
There were major variations in the way different stakeholders perceived the threat they faced, 
their responsibilities, their capabilities and the characteristics of other stakeholders. Discussion 
of self-evacuation archetypes later in the chapter explores these variations. 
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6.2.3.  Protective action decision-making. 
 
The process of deciding on a protective response to the bushfire involved initial awareness of 
its existence, assessment of whether it represented a threat requiring a response, consideration 
of the range and effectiveness of response options, decision on which option to take and 
implementation of the preferred option.   
 
6.2.3.1. Risk awareness. 
 
As detailed in Table 6.1 householders’ first awareness of the bushfire was primarily through 
environmental and social cues, specifically by seeing and smelling smoke, activity of 
firefighting aircraft (Perth) and contact by neighbours, friends, and family. The longer duration 
and large geographic coverage of the Adelaide Hills bushfire, meant many more than in the 
Perth first became aware of the fire through information sources such as radio, television, and 
the Internet. Official emergency authority’s warnings provided first indication for very few. 
 
6.2.3.2. Risk assessment. 
 
Householders established that they needed to respond to the bushfire primarily based on their 
assessment of its potential impact on personal safety through death (16.5%) or injury (20.3%) 
and the likelihood it would destroy (73.8%) or damage (76.9%) their property. (Appendix 
G10).   The bushfire was a serious threat because of its severity, evidenced by the amount of 
smoke and emergency service activity; the receipt of an official warning; and, advice and 
warnings from family, friends, and neighbours.  
 
6.2.3.3. Protective action search and assessment. 
 
Many householders completed the protective action decision process well in advance of the 
bushfire, including formulating a bushfire plan (Appendix G11). Many householders had 
identified their response options (82.2%) and weighed up those options (72.7%) before the 
bushfire started. While many had also decided on the option they would take well before the 
bushfire (61.9%), for a significant minority (35.9%), the bushfire event was a catalyst for 
deciding to evacuate or remain. A small group of householders did not have a plan to respond 
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(6.6%) and some of these did not decide on their protective response (2.2%), mostly because 
emergency services or family members decided for them. 
 
Evacuation was the best option for householders who saw the bushfire as an extremely 
dangerous and certain threat. Their property was unprepared, they were physically and 
mentally incapable of dealing with it and they lacked firefighting equipment and water 
resources. Evacuation would ensure the personal safety of all members of the household 
including evacuated pets. Remaining was the best option for others because of their strong 
commitment to property protection; their considerable defence capability including firefighting 
equipment, water sources and physical and mental capacity; and because the bushfire was non-
threatening. A large minority of remainers also believed remaining in a known, well defended 
space was the safest option.  
 
6.2.3.4.  Protective action implementation. 
 
Evacuation was triggered primarily by five factors (Appendix G15): the threat to personal 
safety (17.7%) of the imminent bushfire moving toward them (18.8%); the perceived danger, 
severity and unpredictability of the fire (10.9%) because of its proximity and the volume of 
smoke and falling embers; receipt of official (10.5%) or unofficial warnings from family 
(7.4%) or neighbours (4.1%); the recognition that they were physically or mentally incapable 
of remaining (6.1%), sick or disabled (5.4%); and perceptions that available safe evacuation 
options were of limited duration so late evacuation would be extremely dangerous. A lack of 
property preparation and equipping reinforced these triggers.  
 
Remaining was based on: a commitment to protect property from the fire, especially spot fires 
(17.0%); a belief that property was soundly prepared (14.5%) and equipped (5.2%); that they 
were physically and mentally capable (9.3%) and skilled (5.2%); and for some, that the fire 
was not threatening because it was not moving toward them (10.4%), was blown away by a 
wind change (5.2%) or slow-moving (2.8%). If any of these beliefs changed during the fire, 
remainers could become self-evacuators.   
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6.2.4.  Information needs and communication action assessment and implementation. 
 
As the bushfire developed many householders considered whether they required additional 
information to inform their decision on an appropriate protective response, the type of 
information needed, potential sources and when it was needed. 
  
6.2.4.1. Type of information needed. 
 
Householders most urgently needed information on the location (71.8%) of the bushfire and 
the direction of travel (73.4%). Information on proximity (39.2%), speed (19.5%) and the 
severity (15.7%) of the bushfire supplemented this base information and provided a picture of 
its nature and behaviour (Appendix G13). Mostly householders wanted answers to limited and 
straightforward questions. Where is the bushfire? Where is it going? Is it a threat to me or when 
is it likely to be a threat?  The longer that it took to get answers to these questions the longer 
they were likely to remain uncertain and unable to take informed protective action.   
 
6.2.4.2. Sources of information. 
 
Table 6.3 details how householders got information as the bushfire progressed. Almost one-
half of all sources used by householders at home during the bushfire were traditional media 
including radio and television and new media, most notably the Internet and particularly 
emergency service websites. In Adelaide, this included a CFS Facebook site. Environmental 
cues represented almost one-quarter of sources and social cues, primarily information from 
family and neighbours but also Facebook, was one-fifth of all information sources. A small 
number of householders used radio or Internet-based scanners for information gathering but 
this source was well known by many more with its use likely to grow. Those who remained, 
more than evacuees, derived information from environmental cues reflecting both a capability 
to extract information and a determination to collect immediate and reliable information about 
their circumstances.  
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Table 6.3. 
Sources of Information While at Home (Aggregate) by Evacuate or Remain\ 
Sources of information Evacuate Remain throughout All households 
 
N % N % N % 
Information       
Radio 183a 62 99a 61  62.0 
Websites 150a 51 73a 45  49.0 
Scanners (Internet and 
radio) 
24a 33 18a 45  35.0 
TV 41a 14 14a 9  12 
Total information 398  208  606 49.0 
Environmental cues 167a 56 128b 75  63.6 
Total environmental cues     295 23.9 
Social cues       
Family and/or friends 66a 23 37a 23  22.5 
Neighbours 52a 18 36a 22  19.5 
Facebook  50a 17 21a 13  15.5 
Twitter  1a 1 1a 1  0.4 
Telephone Tree 3a 4 1a 3  3. 
Total social cues 172  96  268 21.7 
Warnings       
Telephone hotline 8a 11 2a 5  8 
Local brigade/ES 15a 20 4a 10  15.8 
SMS/ text message 4a 5 3a 8  5.8 
Mobile App 21a 28 4a 10  20.8 
Total warnings 48  13  61 4.9 
Other 3a 3 3a 8  5 
Total Other     6 0.5 
 
Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Evacuate or Remain at home throughout categories 
whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
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6.2.4.3. Timing of information. 
 
Householders considered the timing of information vital to informing their decisions on 
protective action. The location and the general immediacy of the threat was known by most 
householders. The expected timing of the impact varied considerably, especially in the 
Adelaide Hills due to its large size and long duration compared to the Perth Hills fire. 
Currency of information was therefore of major concern. Householders wanted information 
to be live or rapidly updated so that they could make accurate assessments of the current 
location, progress, and speed of the bushfire as a basis for informed and sound decisions. 
Generally, information from all public sources was seen as outdated and insufficiently 
detailed for making finely balanced decisions. Many householders expected that the 
technologies used by the emergency services should provide high quality and current web 
based information directly to them. There was considerable disappointment, frustration, and 
some anger that access was to what they believed to be, generic, out of date and repetitive 
formal communications, directly or indirectly provided by the emergency services. 
 
Many face-to-face interviewees saw official radio and television warnings as repetitive and 
unreflective of the current situation although some live interviews provided up-to-date 
information. Emergency services websites were generally seen as not up-to-date and not useful 
for decision-making. Useful and timely information was available through informal contacts 
with local fire brigades, social media such as Facebook and local community information 
websites, and by scanning the radio communications of fire services and police. 
 
6.2.5.  Situational impediments. 
 
Several householders experienced some moderate to large situational impediments to their 
evacuation, but none was so serious as to prevent evacuation (Appendix G16).  
 
Fear and stress reactions, experienced by both adults and children, diverted attention and 
resources away from preparations to leave (16.7%). In many cases, children impeded 
preparations, cried, or attached themselves to a parent rather than packing their belongings or 
helping others. Some anxious adults played no part in preparing to leave, unintentionally 
obstructed the process or were incapable of normal helping functions such as driving a vehicle. 
Once on the public road network, major traffic congestion created by evacuating residents and 
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remainers travelling to vantage points to assess the bushfire, obstructed evacuation (10.5%). 
Householders understood the reason for this additional local traffic but expressed anger and 
frustration at the many sightseers driving around the fire area or parking on the sides of escape 
roads and wanted the emergency services to manage it. 
 
The management and care of animals was a major task that caused delay. Domestic pets 
(13.6%) had to be found, caught, crated and then loaded into vehicles. The time required varied 
significantly, but frightened, semi-wild cats proved a considerable challenge to some. Pets were 
loaded directly into vehicles without crating, in some cases displacing bags and other 
belongings. Non-domestic pets (13.7%) such as chickens were sometimes loaded into a caravan 
or a car boot. Many owners (12.3%) made considerable efforts rounding up, loading, and 
removing stressed horses. Livestock that could not be evacuated were herded to safer areas and 
gates opened so they could move themselves to safety. Householders also delayed their 
evacuation because of a concern they would be prevented from returning at a time of their own 
choosing (15.1%). Some wanted to return after the passing of the fire front to extinguish spot 
fires, others to care for cherished pets or valuable livestock that could not be evacuated. Some 
needed to start generators and other equipment to protect their property and livelihood. The 
experience of being ‘locked out’ of their property galvanised the attitude of several (9.1%) 
householders who said that in a future bushfire they would not leave unless they absolutely had 
to, increasing the numbers who would ‘wait and see’, increasing the potential for late, 
dangerous evacuations.    
 
6.3. A Model of Factors Predicting Self-Evacuation 
 
The previous section discussed the factors that influenced householders’ decisions to self-
evacuate during a bushfire. This section identifies specific factors from this larger group that 
predict whether a householder will self-evacuate. 
 
6.3.1.  Generating the model. 
 
Binary logistics regression identified nine variables that were significant predictors of 
evacuation.  Five of the 20 variables included in the self-evacuation decision model are latent 
variables reflecting underlying constructs that were not measured directly and were created by 
averaging some measured variables. Their unidimensional factor structure and internal 
consistency was confirmed as discussed in 3.5.1 Quantitative Analysis. The details of each 
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latent factor are summarized in Appendix G17. Results of the logistics analysis indicated that 
this model comprising 16 independent variables provided a statistically significant prediction 
of householders’ decisions to evacuate χ2 (16 N=429) = 393.381, p< .001 (Omnibus Test of 
Model Coefficients).  The Nagelkerke pseudo R2 was .822 suggesting that the model accounted 
for more than 80% of total variance of the dependent variable. The Hosmer and Lemeshow 
Test was not significant at .503 suggesting an acceptable model fit. Based on a classification 
cut-off value of .500 the model successfully predicted evacuation 93.4% of the time while 
remaining was successfully predicted 91.0% of the time with overall successful prediction of 
92.5%. Table 6.3 presents a summary of independent variable statistics including the partial 
regression coefficients (B), the Wald test, odds ratio (Exp[B]) and the 95% confidence limits 
(CI) for the odds ratio. The Wald test indicated that the following variables and their associated  
odds, were statistically significant predictors of evacuation - the house or other property would 
be damaged or destroyed (LikelyImpProperty, Exp[B] = 1.800), receipt of warnings from the 
fire authorities (WarnRec1, Exp[B] = 4.865), the best way to protect myself and my family 
(Q35C1, Exp[B] = 10.686), the best way to protect my property (Q35C2, Exp[B] = .048), it’s 
not expensive to take protective action (Q35C3, Exp[B] = 2.308),  I need knowledge to take 
protective action (Q35C4, Exp[B] = .435), the media has a responsibility to protect me, family 
and property against the bushfire (MediaRespB5, Exp[B] = 1.239) and the media has 
knowledge, is informed and gives good advice about the bushfire (MediaSpecialKnow, Exp[B] 
= .760 and neighbours have responsibility for protecting me, family and property 
(NeighRespB5, Exp[B] = .840).  
 
The final three variables relating to the media and neighbours, although significant, have small 
odds ratios that do not allow them to be included in the analysis.  All remaining variables were 
not significant predictors of evacuation but were important in contributing to the overall model 
outcome, explaining some of the variance of the dependent variable and to the odds that a 
householder would decide to evacuate.  To cross-validate the findings of the model with the 
analysis of correlated variables presented earlier in this chapter, the six variables predicting 
evacuation were subject to bi-variate correlation with the same variables discussed earlier. 
Outcomes, which were consistent with the earlier analysis, are reported in Appendix F20.   
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Table 6.4 
Variables in the Equation 
Step 
1a 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
 Q14_1(1) -.699 .459 2.319 1 .128 .497 .202 1.222 
WarnRec1(1) 1.582 .560 7.977 1 .005 4.865 1.623 14.586 
SocialsourceSum -.350 .310 1.276 1 .259 .704 .384 1.294 
InformationsourceSum -.346 .280 1.523 1 .217 .708 .409 1.226 
ThreatImpProperty .307 .238 1.660 1 .198 1.359 .852 2.166 
LikelyImpProperty .588 .242 5.888 1 .015 1.800 1.120 2.895 
Q35C1 2.369 .369 41.102 1 .000 10.686 5.179 22.045 
Q35C2 -3.027 .357 71.808 1 .000 .048 .024 .098 
Q35C4 -.833 .235 12.615 1 .000 .435 .274 .688 
Q35C3 .836 .307 7.415 1 .006 2.308 1.264 4.214 
SelfInfB1 .261 .144 3.257 1 .071 1.298 .978 1.722 
NeighRespB5 -.174 .088 3.934 1 .047 .840 .708 .998 
NeighSpecialKnow .028 .091 .097 1 .755 1.029 .861 1.229 
MediaRespB5 .218 .083 6.859 1 .009 1.244 1.056 1.465 
MediaSpecialKnow -.328 .114 8.303 1 .004 .720 .576 .900 
ESRespB5 .087 .089 .943 1 .331 1.091 .915 1.300 
Constant -4.101 2.208 3.448 1 .063 .017     
 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Q14_1, WarnRec1, SocialsourceSum, InformationsourceSum, 
ThreatImpProperty, LikelyImpProperty, Q35C1, Q35C2, Q35C4, Q35C3, SelfInfB1, NeighRespB5, 
NeighSpecialKnow, MediaRespB5, MediaSpecialKnow, ESRespB5. 
 
 
6.3.2.  Factors in the model.  
 
Five factors, represented by nine variables, predicted self-evacuating or not evacuating – 
hazard adjustment perceptions, receipt of official warnings, impact on property, perceptions of 
the media and perceptions of neighbours. Discussion of significant correlations between these 
predictor factors and long-run hazard adjustment, bushfire experience and intrusiveness of 
bushfire threat, identified in the literature as important factors influencing decision-making, 
deepens the analysis of the factors. 
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6.3.2.1. Hazard adjustment perceptions. 
 
Perceptions of the effectiveness of protective action were by far the main predictors of 
evacuation. The extent of required resources such as the cost, and knowledge and skills 
required in taking protective actions, were also significant.  
 
6.3.2.1.1.  Best way to protect myself/family. 
 
Householders who felt that their protective action was the best way to protect themselves and 
their family from the bushfire were significantly more likely to evacuate [Exp (B) = 10.7] 
 
Householders who had not undertaken hazard adjustments such as property maintenance, 
property defence focused or personal protection adjustments but had made evacuation focused 
adjustments, believed that evacuation was best for personal safety. Failure to prepare their 
property or establish a capacity to fight the fire meant that their home was vulnerable, putting 
their personal safety at risk unless they could make a quick escape. Those without experience 
of or training in bushfire, also believed that evacuation was best for their personal safety. They 
lacked insight into what might happen in a bushfire and felt leaving was the safest option. A 
lack of threat intrusion on householders’ thoughts resulted in the perception of evacuating and 
not remaining as best for personal safety possibly because they recognised they had failed to 
consider the risk.  
 
6.3.2.1.2.  Best way to protect property. 
 
The perception that protective action was the best way to protect property from the bushfire 
predicted not evacuating [Exp (B) = .05]. Those who undertook complex property maintenance 
or property defence focused adjustments or had personal experience fighting bushfire saw 
remaining as best for protecting their property because their preparations and skills provided a 
basis for effectively fighting the bushfire.  
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6.3.2.1.3.  Need knowledge and skill.  
 
The perception that knowledge and skills were needed to carry out protective action predicted 
not evacuating [Exp (B) = .44].  Householders who undertook basic property maintenance and 
property defence focused adjustments, had bushfire training and who had bushfire threat 
intrude through the media believed that remaining required knowledge and skills.  
 
6.3.2.1.4.  It is not expensive. 
 
Householders who felt that their protective action was not expensive to implement were more 
likely to evacuate [Exp (B) = 2.3].  
 
6.3.2.2. Warnings. 
 
Both quantitative and qualitative data collected in this research confirmed that householders 
received environmental and social cues and warnings about the bushfire. They also accessed 
various information sources throughout the duration of the bushfire. Of these factors, only the 
receipt of official warning messages from the fire authorities was a statistically significant 
predictor of evacuation [Exp (B) = 4.9].  
 
6.3.2.3. Impact of the bushfire on property. 
 
Threat perception, reflected in the likelihood of the bushfire impacting property (defined as 
home, other property, and livestock), was also a significant predictor of evacuation [Exp (B) = 
1.80]. Threat to property appeared to act as a proxy for threat to personal safety based on the 
logic that if a person was at their property when a bushfire threatened, their personal safety 
would also be threatened. Householders may have evacuated in response to the threat to their 
personal safety but this was not a significant predictor of evacuation in the model. 
 
Householders who had not undertaken basic or more complex property maintenance but who 
had prepared personal items for evacuation or positioned their car for a quick exit believed the 
bushfire was likely to damage or destroy their home and other property. They recognised that 
leaving an unprepared property meant it was vulnerable to bushfire damage. Those who had 
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previous experience evacuating thought damage to their property was likely, possibly through 
previous personal or vicarious experience with property damage. Those who had the threat of 
bushfire intrude on their thinking, discussions, media monitoring or reading, believed that the 
bushfire was likely to damage or destroy their property.  
 
6.3.2.4. Media bushfire knowledge and media and neighbour responsibility 
 
Householders perception of the media as knowledgeable about bushfire and that the media and 
neighbours had some responsibility for their personal safety and property were significant 
predictors of evacuating or not evacuating. However, all three variables could not be included 
in the model predicting evacuation due to its small odds ratio 
 
Householders’ perceptions that the media had a responsibility to protect them, their family and 
their property predicted evacuation [Exp (B) = 1.2], suggesting that providing evacuation 
advice was how householders, especially those who had no bushfire experience, saw the media 
take responsibility. Their perceptions that the media had knowledge of bushfire behaviour, 
were informed about the fire, and gave good advice about it, predicted not evacuating [Exp (B) 
= .72]. Householders who had no personal protective clothing, who were not organised or ready 
to evacuate, lacked bushfire experience or had the threat of bushfire intrude only through the 
media perceived the media as knowledgeable, informed, and providing reliable advice about 
the bushfire. 
 
Householders’ perceptions that their neighbours had a responsibility to protect them predicted 
not evacuating [Exp (B) = .84].  
 
6.3.3.  Effect of undertaking long-run hazard adjustments on hazard adjustment 
perceptions. 
 
As previously discussed, whether householders undertook or failed to undertake certain long-
run hazard adjustments reflected significant differences in their perception of the effectiveness 
of protective actions. Remainers who had maintained their property, equipped to fight fire or 
spot fires, had personal protective clothing, or filled gutters with water had a more positive 
perception of remaining as best for protecting property than those remainers who had not 
undertaken these adjustments. Having fire-fighting equipment or protective clothing also 
 
 
163 
 
meant these remainers more positively assessed remaining in protecting personal safety than 
remainers who were not so equipped. Evacuees who had not undertaken property defence 
adjustments or did not have personal protective clothing had a more positive perception of 
evacuating as best for personal safety, than those who had implemented these adjustments.  
 
6.3.4.  Factors predicting evacuation–conclusions. 
 
Perceptions of the effectiveness of protective actions in protecting personal safety or property 
were central to predicting evacuating or not evacuating. The perception that a protective action 
is best for personal safety or for protecting property predicted evacuating and not evacuating 
respectively. Perceptions of the effectiveness of protective actions were significantly correlated 
with undertaking long-run hazard adjustments which therefore also indirectly influenced 
evacuating or not evacuating. Resource related hazard adjustment perceptions, the expense of 
an action or the knowledge and skills required to take the action had a significant but lesser 
role in predicting evacuating or not evacuating.  
 
The receipt of official bushfire warnings was also an important predictor of evacuation that 
was secondary only to hazard adjustment perceptions. Perceived likelihood of bushfire 
damaging or destroying property was the least influential significant predictor of evacuation.  
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates factors predicting evacuation. Green coloured boxes indicate the factors 
predicting evacuating while red boxes indicate those that predict not evacuating. 
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Figure 6.1. Factors Predicting Evacuation. 
  
 
 
165 
 
6.4. A Model of Self–Evacuation Archetypes 
 
6.4.1.  Introduction. 
 
The policy of emergency authorities in Australia implies that household decision-making 
within a bushfire event is binary. Householders either evacuate, preferably at a time and manner 
recommended by the authorities, or they remain to defend their property. Once the decision is 
made, evacuees leave and remain outside the threat area and the defenders stay and defend their 
property. This implicit assumption about behaviour is questionable.  Householders evacuate at 
a time and in a manner determined by their unique circumstances and state of mind. Some 
evacuate and return soon after without ever leaving the threat area. Others leave then return, 
avoiding road blocks and emergency services in the fire ground by using back roads, access 
through neighbour’s properties and other means. A few come and go numerous times. Some 
householders who remain and defend evacuate for a myriad of reasons including failure of 
equipment, loss of access to water, injury, or incapacity of the defenders, emotional or 
psychological reactions to the threat, a reassessment of the severity or level of bushfire threat 
or a change of mind about their willingness to fight the bushfire. Any remainer, depending on 
the circumstances, could decide to evacuate and in that sense all householders are potential 
self-evacuators. This diversity of self-evacuation behaviour can be better understood by 
partitioning this heterogenous group into smaller homogenous sub-groups or archetypes which 
reflect systematic differences between self-evacuators. These differences are manifest in the 
factors influencing self-evacuation and point to potential levers for social policy interventions 
to improve bushfire safety. Bushfire safety policy can be better focused and targeted by 
understanding how different self-evacuator archetypes might respond to different approaches 
or program interventions. 
 
The aim of this section is to identify the factors that define households’ self-evacuation 
behaviour and describe the different types of self-evacuators to better understand what 
influences how and why they reach their protective decisions. Specifically, it: 
 
• identifies the characteristics that best describes each type of self-evacuator and discriminate 
between them 
• profiles, or draws a ‘pen portrait’ of each type of self-evacuator to demonstrate how and 
why their characteristics find expression in their protective actions 
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This is achieved by first explaining how cluster analysis (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2013) is 
used to generate the archetypal groups followed with a detailed description of each group and 
an analysis of their similarities and differences. 
 
6.4.2.  Generating the archetypes using K-means cluster analysis. 
 
Householders were questioned about a broad range of factors, identified within the Protective 
Action Decision model (PADM), as central to protective action decision-making. Scores from 
continuous variables including questions on: the intrusiveness of the bushfire threat; checking 
and consideration of information sources; experience of bushfire; perceptions of self-efficacy 
and responsibility; threat and impact of the bushfire on household members and property; and 
stakeholders’ perceptions, many reflecting the role of social cues, were converted to Z scores 
and analysed using the K-means cluster procedure of IBM SPSS 23 (Appendix F17). To 
identify the most appropriate number of clusters, the K-means analysis was run for 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7 and 8 clusters. Seven clusters provided the greatest level of stability to the analysis. 
Convergence was reached in 13 iterations. Final cluster centres were generated and univariate 
ANOVAs indicated that the clustered groups differed significantly (p < .05) on all variables 
except ease of understanding information, time and effort required to organise protective 
action, neighbours influenced thinking during the bushfire and neighbours were responsible for 
protecting household/ property during the bushfire. The number of cases in each cluster ranged 
from 31 to 93, representing a broad, but acceptable, range. 
 
The groups of householders identified through the cluster analysis were subject to an 
explanatory discriminant function analysis (Meyers et al., 2013) to demonstrate the statistical 
validity of the clusters (Appendix F18). A set of weighted linear combinations (variates) of the 
quantitative variables that best differentiated the householder groups was generated. The 
discriminant functions that resulted in combination accounted for a statistically significant 
percentage of the between-group differences, Wilks’ λ = .008, χ2 (336, N = 457) = 2068.148, 
p< .001, overall R2c = .992. 93.4% of original grouped cases were correctly classified and using 
a leave-one-out cross-validation strategy, 79.0% of the cases were correctly classified. Press’ 
Q = 3258.41, p < .001 indicated that the clusters better classified the cases than did chance. All 
six functions were statistically significant although only the first three generated eigenvalues 
greater than 1. The first function accounted for 36.3% of the explained variance, while the 
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second function accounted for 21.2% with Wilks’ λ = .031, χ2 (275, N = 457) = 1469.306, p< 
.001, overall R2c = .969. The third function accounted for 20.4% of explained variance with 
Wilks’ λ = .088, χ2 (216, N = 457) = 1030.302, p< .001, overall R2c = .912.  Functions four, 
five and six accounted for 22.0% of explained variance.   
 
A multiple comparison test of the variables describing the clusters was undertaken to draw out 
similarities and differences between them. The Tukey procedure was used to compare each 
cluster with every other cluster (family-wise comparison) for each variable using the standard 
error of the mean and Studentized Range distribution. The overall (family–wise) error rate was 
controlled at the rate for the entire set of all pairwise comparisons. Appendix F19 details the 
similarities and differences between the clusters.  
 
Crosstabulation of the clusters by categorical variables further characterised them (Appendix 
F20). Chi –square, expected count and standardized residual statistics were generated and the 
data examined to ensure that they met the assumptions of the chi-square test. In cases where 
the expected count was 5 or less, similar categories were collapsed to overcome this 
shortcoming. This procedure established the importance of some measures of experience with 
bushfire, bushfire training and long-run hazard adjustments.  
 
6.4.3.  Archetypal self-evacuators. 
 
The self-evacuation archetypes that were identified through the K-means procedure provide 
insights into factors that influence householders’ protective decisions, suggest ways 
householders reach those decisions, and provide some guidance in the improvement and 
development of bushfire safety programs. The existence of archetypal groups suggests that 
information, advice, and warnings provided by the emergency authorities before and after a 
bushfire, is received and processed by a heterogeneity of householders as described in the 
following, not by a simple dualism of evacuators or remainers. Archetypal bushfire self-
evacuators represent subsets of typical household attitudes, behaviour and protective responses 
that are captured within the factors that are central to the theory of protective action expressed 
in the PADM. 
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6.4.3.1. Threat Deniers (n = 62). 
 
Threat Deniers (TD) did not believe that that their personal safety or property was threatened, 
nor would it be threatened by a bushfire in the future. They strongly believed that the bushfire 
would not threaten them or household members and would not have an impact on their home, 
property, livestock, or pets.  Their rationale varied according to their general beliefs and 
circumstances. Most recognized that they lived in a bushfire prone area but believed that their 
home was in a safe position, or constructed in a manner that protected it and its inhabitants, or 
that the house and grounds had been well prepared and cleared or that the topography and 
vegetation favoured them. During the bushfire, many TD established that the fire was heading 
away or parallel to them, or predicted a wind change would blow the fire away from them or 
felt the lack of dry fuels around their home would not carry a fire. They did not allow bushfire 
threat to intrude on their thoughts, in conversations with neighbours, in their media use or by 
reading bushfire pamphlets, emails, or on-line. If the bushfire defied their logic and 
expectations and became an imminent threat they were committed to remain for as long as 
possible based on their underlying belief that a fire was not a threat, that remaining rather than 
evacuating was the best way to protect their personal safety, and required little knowledge or 
skill, time and effort or cooperation from others. These TD had little or no bushfire experience 
through personally fighting a fire or being a brigade member but had some training from people 
with bushfire experience. They did not make specific efforts to protect their home by watering 
down the property; did not have equipment to fight the bushfire or put out spot fires, saw jeans 
and a woollen jumper as their personal protective clothing and did not position their car for a 
quick evacuation.  
 
6.4.3.2. Responsibility Deniers (n = 47). 
 
Responsibility Deniers [RD] believed that they were not fundamentally responsible for their 
personal safety or the safety of household members, or for the protection of their home and 
property. They felt they did not need to be self-reliant in a bushfire. They considered that the 
emergency services had a responsibility to protect the personal safety of their household and 
their property. Bushfire threat did not intrude into their lives in any way. During the bushfire, 
they did not actively seek out information or carefully consider the information that they 
received.  They saw evacuating and not remaining as the best way to protect their personal 
safety but felt this required knowledge and skills. Remaining was seen as the best way to protect 
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their property but they felt it involved expense. Neither the emergency services nor the media 
influenced their decision making during the bushfire but expected the emergency services to 
defend them. They felt they had little knowledge of bushfire, almost no experience in bushfire 
fighting, nor any training from people with bushfire experience. They had not prepared their 
property against spot fires, did not have firefighting or spot fire equipment, or protective 
clothing. This extreme lack of preparation, preparedness and equipping reflected this group’s 
unwillingness to accept responsibility for addressing the bushfire threat. RD included older 
and/or less able single people or couples who felt that it was unreasonable to be expected to 
look after themselves. Others believed it was reasonable to expect the emergency authorities 
to be responsible for them as it was their role and because public funds (their taxes, emergency 
levy) were paid to establish and support the emergency organizations.  
 
6.4.3.3. Experienced Independents (n = 93). 
 
Experienced Independents [EI]) were experienced bushfire fighters, including some who were 
or had been members of volunteer bushfire brigades, who had practical experience of fighting 
fires, or had been trained by people with bushfire experience. They felt they had extensive 
knowledge of bushfire, more than other stakeholders.  They were aware of the bushfire threat, 
recognised threat to their property but did not feel their personal safety or the safety of 
household members was threatened. They believed that they needed to be self-reliant and saw 
themselves, rather than the emergency services, as responsible for their personal safety and for 
the protection of their property. They believed remaining was the best way to protect the 
personal safety of the household and to safeguard their property and that evacuation did not 
protect personal safety or property. They extensively prepared their property by removing 
vegetation close to their home, covering gaps and vents to prevent embers entering, and moving 
combustible materials away from structures. They had fire-fighting and spot fire equipment, 
protective fire-fighting clothing, had filled their gutters with water and had wet the area around 
their house. This group was highly independent and had a negative or neutral view of other 
bushfire stakeholders. They believed that their neighbours, the media, and the emergency 
services were not knowledgeable about bushfire and were not as well informed about what was 
happening during the fire as they were. They believed that both the media and the emergency 
services did not provide useful information and advice to the community about the bushfire. 
Neither the media nor the emergency services influenced their decisions during the bushfire.  
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6.4.3.4. Community Guided (n = 84). 
 
The Community Guided [CG] were characterised primarily by their positive perceptions of the 
bushfire knowledge and expertise of their neighbours, the media and the emergency services 
and the guidance that they took from them. They saw other stakeholders as knowledgeable 
about bushfire, well informed about what was occurring and as providing good information 
and advice. Both the media and the emergency services were influential in their decisions. 
However, they had not allowed the threat of bushfire to intrude into their lives in any way. 
They did not believe that they needed to be self-reliant or accept responsibility for themselves 
or their property during the bushfire. They had little direct experience with bushfire or bushfire 
fighting but had some training from people with bushfire experience. Consistent with listening 
to the advice of other stakeholders, they made some preparations against the bushfire such as 
covering gaps and vents and watering around their house. They also had some fire-fighting and 
spot fire equipment. They were concerned about the likelihood of threat to their personal safety 
and believed that evacuating was the best way to protect household members. CG felt well 
informed about what was happening during the bushfire because of the information, 
clarification and advice provided by other stakeholders. During the bushfire members of this 
group stayed in close contact with their neighbours. They watched television, listened to the 
radio and accessed web based information. They shared their information, discussed its 
meaning, and sought advice from neighbours. In some cases, neighbours came to a shared 
understanding and common decisions about what protective action they would jointly take 
while some took their cues from neighbours’ actions.  
 
6.4.3.5. Worried Waverers (n = 61). 
 
Worried Waverers [WW] were characterised by: their concern about the high level of bushfire 
threat and likely impact on their personal safety and property; their broad-based efforts to 
address this; and their concern their lack of bushfire experience put them at risk. The threat of 
bushfire was part of their discussions with neighbours and reading. They believed that the 
bushfire was a major threat to personal safety of their household and to their property.  
Evacuating was the best way to protect personal safety and remaining was not. They felt 
knowledgeable about bushfire, well informed about what was happening and had planned how 
they would respond to the bushfire. The media was perceived as well informed and provided 
information that was influential in the decision making of this group. Their current or past 
 
 
171 
 
involvement in volunteer fire brigades and some training from people with bushfire experience, 
although limited, made them feel able to take protective decisions. They had prepared their 
property by cleaning gutters, moving combustible material away from structures and watering 
around their house. They had fire and spot fire-fighting equipment and personal protective 
clothing. They had placed a vehicle in position for a quick exit. However, few had actual 
experience fighting bushfire. WW were bushfire aware, had trained for and prepared their 
property for bushfire and did not want to simply evacuate in the face of the threat but 
recognized that they were inexperienced and were worried that remaining would threaten their 
personal safety. The tension between feeling that their property was prepared and they were 
bushfire trained, and their lack of experience, created potential for a breakdown of their 
decision-making resulting in late evacuation due to their wavering.  
 
6.4.3.6. Dependent Evacuators (n = 31). 
 
The threat of bushfire had not intruded on the lives of Dependent Evacuators [DE] in any way. 
They did not perceive a current of future bushfire threat to their household or to their property 
because they intended to evacuate and believed that the emergency services had a responsibility 
to, and would protect them and their property. The emergency services strongly influenced 
their decisions. They believed they lacked knowledge of and information about the bushfire, 
were unable to decide what they should do and were incapable of taking responsibility for 
themselves. They had no personal experience fighting bushfire or training but some had 
evacuated from a bushfire in the past. Their property was unprepared and unprotected. They 
had no fire or spot firefighting equipment or personal protective clothing. They were committed 
to evacuating as both the best way to protect their personal safety and to protect their property 
because once they were gone the fire services would defend their home.  
 
6.4.3.7. Considered Evacuators (n = 79). 
 
Bushfire threat intruded extensively into the lives of Considered Evacuators [CE]. Bushfire 
was a current and future threat and likely to damage or destroy their home and property. They 
had no personal experience fighting bushfire although some had evacuated in the past and some 
had some training. They attempted to protect their property in their absence by covering gaps 
and vents against embers but were not equipped to fight fire or extinguish spot fires and lacked 
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protective clothing. They were strongly committed to evacuating as soon as they became aware 
of the potential threat as the best way to protect the personal safety of household members.  
 
6.4.4.  Comparison of the archetypes. 
 
The seven archetypes can be further characterised by comparing their similarities and 
differences as detailed in Appendix G18 and discussed below.  
 
6.4.4.1. Perceptions of threat. 
 
Experienced Independents and Worried Waverers perceived a major threat and impact to 
personal safety and property from the bushfire while Considered Evacuators discounted the 
threat to personal safety but not property because they intended to leave. These three groups 
also expected bushfire in the future to be a threat.  Responsibility Deniers discounted the threat 
to personal safety because they would leave and believed that others would take responsibility 
for them. The bushfire did not pose a threat to Threat Deniers because they believed there was 
no threat. By working with others Community Guided would mitigate the threat and Dependent 
Evacuators expected others to protect them from the threat. For similar reasons Responsibility 
Deniers, Threat Deniers, Dependent Evacuators, and Community Guided believed a bushfire 
in the future would not threaten their property or disrupt their lives. No group thought a bushfire 
in the future would cause personal injury except Worried Waverers.  
 
6.4.4.2. Perceptions of intrusiveness. 
 
Responsibility Deniers, Threat Deniers, and Dependent Evacuators did not have bushfire threat 
intrude on their lives because for them either the threat did not exist or they expected that others 
would deal with it for them. Worried Waverers, Experienced Independents and Considered 
Evacuators had the threat of bushfire intrude extensively on their daily lives.  
 
6.4.4.3. Responsibility and self -reliance. 
 
Responsibility Deniers, Threat Deniers, Dependent Evacuators, and Community Guided did 
not believe they needed to be self-reliant in a bushfire or to take responsibility for their home 
and property because a bushfire was not a threat, or others would take responsibility or in the 
case of Community Guided, members of the community would help each other.  Experienced 
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Independents, Worried Waverers, Considered Evacuators and Community Guided did not 
believe the emergency services were responsible for protecting them or their property because 
they were self-reliant or intended to cooperate with the community. While Threat Deniers 
didn’t need protection from a threat that didn’t exist, if there was a threat they expected the 
emergency services to protect their home. 
 
6.4.4.4. Perceptions of other stakeholders. 
 
Community Guided and Worried Waverers perceived other stakeholders as knowledgeable, 
well informed and providing good advice about the bushfire. Neighbours and media were seen 
as having a responsibility for protecting them. Media and the emergency services were 
influential but neighbours were not. Other stakeholders were a large part of the Community 
Guided and Worried Waverers’ decision-making process.  On the other hand, Experienced 
Independents had a negative view of the capabilities, influence and responsibility of other 
stakeholders who consequently had little part in their decision making. Threat Deniers and 
Responsibility Deniers had similarly negative perceptions of other stakeholders but believed 
that the media and the emergency services (and neighbours in the case of Threat Deniers) were 
responsible for protecting them. While Responsibility Deniers believed the media had 
specialist knowledge of bushfire, Threat Deniers thought the emergency services were the 
specialists, providing good advice about the bushfire. Both Threat Deniers and Responsibility 
Deniers primarily saw the emergency services as responsible for protecting them. Considered 
Evacuators and Dependent Evacuators also viewed neighbours’ capability negatively although 
they were influential in Dependent Evacuators’ decision-making while Considered Evacuators 
felt neighbours had a responsibility to protect them. Dependent Evacuators focused their 
dependence primarily on the emergency services whose knowledge and advice they viewed 
positively and expected them to take responsibility for them. They also expected the media to 
take responsibility even though they viewed their knowledge and advice negatively. On the 
other hand, Considered Evacuators were influenced primarily by the media which they saw as 
knowledgeable, well informed and providing good advice and by the emergency services who 
they expected to take responsibility for their safety.  
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6.4.4.5. Perceptions of themselves/ family. 
 
Responsibility Deniers, Dependent Evacuators, and Considered Evacuators felt that their 
knowledge of the bushfire and their information about it was lacking. Responsibility Deniers 
and Dependent Evacuators felt that they were not responsible for protecting themselves. On 
the other hand, Experienced Independents, Community Guided and Worried Waverers saw 
themselves as bushfire capable and responsible although Experienced Independents, did not 
feel sufficiently well informed about the bushfire. Threat Deniers were a unique case because 
they ignored inputs from others, including family members. Threat Deniers believed that they 
were well informed and responsible for themselves because they perceived no threat and had 
nothing for which to take responsibility. On the other hand, their family, who were removed 
from the bushfire, were perceived as lacking bushfire knowledge and incapable of 
understanding that it did not pose a threat, did not influence Threat Deniers’ actions. 
 
6.4.4.6. Perceptions of protective action. 
 
Community Guided, Worried Waverers, Dependent Evacuators, and Considered Evacuators 
all believed that evacuating was the best way to both protect personal safety and property and 
believed the opposite about remaining. Evacuating removed householders from a dangerous 
situation for which they believed they were inadequately prepared. On the other hand, 
Experienced Independents believed that remaining was the best way to protect personal safety 
and property because they had prepared their home to make it defendable and a safe 
environment in which to remain. Responsibility Deniers saw evacuating as best for personal 
safety but not for property protection and remaining as the opposite. Threat Deniers had a 
unique perspective. They saw evacuating as not appropriate for personal safety or property 
protection, probably because if there was no threat, there was no need to evacuate.  So, 
remaining was the best option for personal safety because they would avoid areas that might 
be threatened by fire. On the other hand, if a threat became imminent, remaining was not the 
best for property protection because they were unprepared and inexperienced and they expected 
the emergency services to protect their property if they were not there.  
 
Community Guided, Worried Waverers, and Dependent Evacuators believed that they did not 
need knowledge or skill to remain because they would rely on the advice and support of other 
stakeholders, while Threat Deniers did not need skills to deal with a threat that they believed 
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didn’t exist. Considered Evacuators, Experienced Independents and Responsibility Deniers all 
believed that they needed knowledge and skills for a bushfire threat although Responsibility 
Deniers expected others to use their skills to protect them, Considered Evacuators intended to 
apply their skills to evacuating and Experienced Independents believed they had the skills 
necessary to address the threat. 
 
Threat Deniers, Community Guided, and Dependent Evacuators believed that organising to 
remain did not require time and effort. For Threat Deniers this was because there was no threat 
to organise for; Dependent Evacuators because they expected others to do it for them; and 
Community Guided because they would work together with neighbours and the emergency 
services. Responsibility Deniers, Experienced Independents, Worried Waverers and 
Considered Evacuators knew that organising to remain took time and effort although 
Responsibility Deniers relied on others to make the effort for them. Experienced Independents 
knew that the effort was necessary to successfully defend their property, Worried Waverers 
knew it was necessary but wasn’t sure they had organised adequately and Considered 
Evacuators knew, as part of their consideration of options, that effort was required to remain 
but they had decided to evacuate.   
 
6.4.4.7. Evacuate or remain. 
 
Responsibility Deniers and Dependent Evacuators were the most committed to evacuating, due 
to their unpreparedness and lack of experience of bushfire. Community Guided and Considered 
Evacuators were also committed to evacuating because of the high risk to their personal safety 
and the advice of others. Worried Waverers were the least committed to evacuating because 
they had considered the threat, taken responsibility and prepared and equipped themselves but 
were worried that they lacked experience of fighting bushfire. Experienced Independents were 
the most committed to remaining because they felt highly experienced and well prepared while 
Threat Deniers were very committed to remain because they did not believe there was a threat 
from which to evacuate. 
 
6.5. Conclusions 
 
This research finds that factors suggested by the PADM were influential in householders’ 
decisions to evacuate from bushfire. Environmental and social cues provided both initial 
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awareness of and ongoing information on the bushfire threat and official warnings 
communicated throughout the duration of the bushfire elevated perceptions of the level of 
threat and the need for protective action. Perceptions of bushfire threat, of the stakeholders 
involved in the event and of protective actions that could be taken in response to the threat, as 
both psychological preconditions and dynamically evolving assessments during the bushfire, 
informed householders’ interpretations of the circumstances that they faced. Householders 
sought additional information needed to further inform their decision-making, primarily 
through radio and emergency services websites but found much of it to be not sufficiently up 
to date or detailed to significantly contribute to their protective decision-making. Organising 
pets and animals, the stress reactions of household members and accessing safe escape routes 
slowed but did not prevent the safe evacuation of many householders. 
 
Of these factors that were influential in self-evacuation decision-making, fewer played a key 
role by predicting evacuation. The perception that the bushfire was likely to damage or destroy 
property, the receipt of official warnings and, most importantly, perceptions of hazard 
adjustments predicted evacuating or not evacuating. Perceptions of evacuation as the best way 
to protect personal safety and remaining as the best way to protect property were the most 
important hazard adjustment perceptions that predicted evacuating or not evacuating 
respectively. Hazard adjustment perceptions, as incorporated in the PADM, play a central role 
in predicting evacuation. Their significant interaction with long-run hazard adjustments, 
suggests that householders’ actions to maintain, prepare and equip for bushfire were indirectly 
influential in self-evacuation decision-making and should be incorporated into the PADM.   
 
Self-evacuation archetypes representing the characteristics and behavioural patterns of seven 
typical groups of householders were developed using quantitative and qualitative data to 
provide insights into how various factors influenced their protective decision and the way they 
came to that decision. The archetypes characterised a heterogeneity of self-evacuators into 
homogenous sub groups. The implications of these archetypes for community bushfire safety 
policy and programs will be discussed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 7 Discussion 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The objective of this thesis is to identify the factors influencing householder self-evacuation 
decision-making in an Australian bushfire. The Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) 
provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of householders’ attitudes and behaviours 
that influence their protective decisions.  
 
In Chapter 2 the review of the literature detailed the PADM as a judgement and decision model 
in which environmental and social cues, warnings and ongoing information inputs interact with 
perceptions of threat, hazard adjustments and stakeholders to produce a protective response.  
Chapter 3 presented a mixed methods approach to data collection including the development 
of the telephone survey and the face-to face interview, the administration of data collection, 
the quantitative analysis of 457 cases including binary logistics regression and cluster analysis 
and thematic analysis of 60 face-to-face interviews.    Chapters 4 and 5 presented these 
quantitative and qualitative data from the Perth and Adelaide Hills bushfires. Chapter 6 
reported the findings of the research including the range of factors influencing self-evacuation, 
a model of factors predicting evacuation and a characterisation of self-evacuators. 
 
This chapter discusses the thesis’ central findings on self-evacuation in an Australian bushfire 
by addressing the research questions:  
 
iv. What are the factors that influence householders’ decisions to self-evacuate? 
v. What factors predict self-evacuation? 
vi. What are the characteristics of self-evacuators? 
vii. What improvements can be made to the PADM to enable better analysis of 
householder self-evacuation decision-making?  
 
It also contemplates the meaning, implications, and usefulness of the research in the 
development of community bushfire safety policy. 
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7.2. What are the Factors that Influence Householders’ Decisions to Self-evacuate? 
 
The PADM developed by Lindell and Perry (2012) suggests that the factors influencing 
protective decision-making during a hazard event are both embodied in the threat landscape 
and intrinsic to the householder who is the decision-maker. The factors embodied in the threat 
landscape are: environmental and social cues and warnings received by the householder; the 
pre-decisional processes of the householder including careful attention to and understanding of 
information about the hazard; and the information sought and received by the householder 
during the duration of the hazard.  
 
Perceptions of threat, hazard-adjustment and stakeholders are key psychological factors that 
are inherent to the decision-makers’ beliefs and values that are influenced by the circumstances 
of a bushfire and play a critical role in explaining protective action decision-making within the 
model. Situational factors that can impede protective actions are not discussed in this context 
because they are not within the householder’s decision-making control.  
 
The factors embodied in the threat landscape and those inherent to the decision-maker act as 
inputs to the protective action decision-making process.  This process involves the householder 
becoming aware of a potential threat; establishing whether it is an actual threat that requires 
attention; identifying the range of protective responses available; deciding on one protective 
response that is most appropriate in the circumstances; and deciding the timing of this response. 
It is a dynamic process in which cues, warnings and information are sought, received, and 
interpreted within the existing and evolving psychological perceptions of the decision-maker, 
producing a decision on a preferred protective action. Changes in physical conditions within 
the threat landscape and/or the decision-maker’s perceptions may change their protective 
decisions (Tibbits & Whittaker, 2007). 
 
7.2.1.  Environmental and social cues and warnings. 
 
Environmental cues are central to providing both initial and on-going information about the 
existence of a bushfire and its development as a threat. In the bushfires studied householders 
who interacted with the physical environment and were not isolated inside their home were 
highly likely to receive some form of environmental cue that alerted them to the existence of 
the bushfire. Householders passively received or actively sought physical information on the 
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bushfire. Some cues, such as those associated with the activity of firebombing aircraft, 
provided readily seen and interpreted signs resulting from the proximity and intensity of their 
activity. Other cues such as seeing smoke, including its proximity, colour and density were 
harder to interpret and use in deciding whether, what, and when to implement a protective 
response.  
 
Social cues were extremely important in providing initial and ongoing information about the 
bushfire and advice about how householders might respond to it. Social cues were different 
from environmental cues in that those who were interacting with the householder were likely 
to be well known, influential and, in most cases communicating information, interpreting its 
meaning and importance, and providing advice about appropriate responses. While 
environmental cues required the householder to interpret their meaning, direct social cues 
involved information, advice, and influence. For some householders, social cues lightened the 
burden of decision-making as they acquiesced to the advice of family or neighbours to evacuate 
as in the case of the Community Guided and Dependent Evacuator archetypes.  For others, 
such as Threat Deniers, the interference of family members, especially when they were not 
located in or near the threat area and were mostly responding to media reports rather than the 
actual circumstances of the bushfire, was seen as unhelpful. This was particularly the case when 
householders perceived family members as lacking an understanding of bushfire, reacting to 
limited, and in some cases, sensationalised media reports, and applying emotional pressure on 
them to take actions that they believed were unwarranted in the circumstances.  Many 
neighbours visited one another’s homes, met informally on the roadside or were in telephone 
contact to share information, discuss their options, give advice, and indicate their likely 
protective response. Indirect social cues, involving householders noting and responding to the 
actions of their neighbours were also important although less prevalent. 
 
Official bushfire warnings from the emergency services were not interrogatable by the 
householder, of limited and fixed content depending on the channel, quickly became outdated 
and were generally not location specific. Text and voice messages provided little information 
except to establish the level of threat and advise evacuation or preparation to defend. These 
messages were broadcast across large geographic areas in which the immediacy of the threat 
in specific locations varied enormously, so their timeliness and accuracy was also variable. 
Many householders received messages that were too late to be useful for making protective 
decisions while many others received warnings that were not relevant to their location or 
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circumstances and in some cases, were wrong. Many of the small number of householders who 
received warnings that it was too late to leave said that they could have safely evacuated if 
needed.  For most householders, official warnings from emergency services were not the first 
indication of a bushfire. Environmental and social cues were more important than official 
warnings as a first alert. Householders used environmental and social cues, warnings, and 
information, in unique combinations, to decide how to respond, depending on the stage of the 
bushfire and their circumstances and experience. 
 
As suggested in the PADM, environmental and social cues and warnings played a key role in 
the protective action decision-making process. They made householders aware of the existence 
of the potential bushfire threat that required attention; provided on going information about the 
nature of the bushfire including its development, direction, and severity; and updated, 
reinforced or changed householders’ perceptions of other stakeholders, appropriate hazard 
adjustments and the level of threat. Notwithstanding their clear shortcomings and the 
importance of environmental and social cues and informal warnings, formal warnings from the 
emergency authorities were the only factor in this group that significantly predicted 
householder evacuation. The receipt of formal warnings resulted in householders being almost 
five times more likely to evacuate than to remain. As reported in several face-to-face 
interviews, the receipt of a formal warning was the ‘last straw’, the thing that finally motivated 
them to evacuate. In this context, environmental and social cues, including informal warnings, 
were key inputs into the decision-making process rather than key determinants of the decision 
to evacuate. 
 
While the literature recognises environmental and social cues and warnings as important in 
householders’ awareness of a potential threat there has been limited quantification of these for 
bushfire. Studies of residents affected by the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires established that 
32% of respondents first became aware of the bushfire through environmental cues such as 
smoke, flames or  embers and 21% through social contact with family friends or neighbours 
(Handmer et al., 2011, p. 38). These findings are similar to those of this study. McLennan et al 
(2012, p. 918) reported residents’ were ‘aware of bushfire because smoke was visible and 
through telephone discussions with family members and neighbours’. Research on the Black 
Saturday bushfires highlighted the importance of unofficial warnings reporting that  63% of 
respondents were warned by family and neighbours (Whittaker et al., 2013) while 62% did not 
receive an official warning. The relatively greater prevalence of official warnings reported in 
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the current study is likely to reflect the widespread implementation of telephone based official 
warning messages following the recommendations of the VBRC. Research also suggests that 
the nature of the network of organisations and individuals that comprise the warning network 
has an impact on householders protective actions because multiple sources may deliver 
conflicting messages that must then be resolved (Lindell & Perry, 2012).  Recent research 
(Morss et al., 2016) reinforced  concerns that ‘information interactions’ can confuse evacuation 
intentions and suggested that perceived source reliability and the extremity of the threat 
communicated by the message influenced hurricane evacuation intentions. However, the 
resolution of conflicting messages arising from differences between the rate that key sources 
updated information, had only limited effect during these bushfires. Many householders 
accessed a range of sources but only a few were confused by mixed and conflicting messages 
caused by uncoordinated information. 
 
7.2.2.  Perceptions of bushfire threat, hazard adjustments and stakeholders 
 
7.2.2.1. Threat perception. 
 
Householders assessed the threat the bushfire posed to their household and their property based 
on three objective factors: proximity, severity, and the bushfire’s movement toward their 
property. However, householders interpreted these objective measures differently so that the 
opposite conclusion could be drawn from the same information. This research found that more 
householders perceived a threat to their property than to their personal safety. This is supported 
by Perry and Lindell (2008, p. 173) who explained it in terms of householder’s awareness of 
bushfire warning systems that created a belief they could escape safely ‘while the property left 
behind was exposed to higher risk’. This research supports that conclusion but also suggests 
that a greater complexity of factors influenced the perception of threat to person or property as 
established in the analysis of self-evacuation archetypes in Chapter 6. Householders who 
intended to evacuate, such as Considered Evacuators and Dependent Evacuators, perceived 
threat primarily in terms of their property because they were leaving it vulnerable to bushfire 
or ember attack. Others believed that the emergency services had a responsibility to protect 
their personal safety and their property, and neither would consequently, be threatened by the 
bushfire (Responsibility Deniers). Worried Waverers, recognised the threat but believed that 
they could address it through preparation, equipping, training and careful media monitoring. 
The Threat Deniers denied that a threat existed even in the face of an imminent bushfire 
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because topography, vegetation type, the prevalence of relieving winds or the fact that their 
home had stood through a century of bushfires meant that they were not threatened. 
 
Perceptions of the likely impact on the householder’s property was a significant predictor of 
evacuation while threat to or impact on personal safety was not. Householders who evacuated 
believed that evacuating reduced or removed the threat to personal safety. Many who remained 
recognised remaining put their personal safety at risk, consistent with the view that remaining 
is an asset protection strategy rather than a survival option (McCaffrey & Rhodes, 2009; 
McLennan, Cowlishaw, et al., 2014; Tibbits & Whittaker, 2007; Whittaker et al., 2013). The 
householder’s presence at their property influenced their perception of the existence or absence 
of threat to personal safety. The householder’s perception of a threat to their property acted as 
a proxy for threat to their personal safety while they remained at their property. This conclusion 
is, in part, consistent with that of Perry and Lindell (2008) who did not find a significant 
relationship between risk to person and risk to property. Whatever the cause, in this study threat 
perception played a lesser role in predicting evacuation than other variables such as warnings 
and hazard adjustment perceptions.  
 
Householders’ perceptions of the extent of the threat posed by the bushfire significantly 
correlated with the extent to which they undertook long-run hazard adjustments. By preparing 
their property for the bushfire threat and mitigating its potential impact through adjustments 
such as clearing gutters, covering gaps against embers, having firefighting equipment and 
personal protective clothing, householders felt that they were reducing the threat of the 
bushfire. This is consistent with the findings of Weinstein et al (1993) in which the correlation 
between long-run hazard adjustments and the perception of threat tended toward zero because, 
as hazard adjustments were made and sustained over time, risk beliefs declined as protections 
accrued. This may go some way in providing another explanation of why perception of threat 
to property rather than to personal safety is more important in predicting evacuation. This is 
because evacuees, knowing they intended to evacuate, undertook fewer long-run hazard 
adjustments even though they recognised this placed their property at greater risk. At the same 
time those who remained overwhelmingly saw remaining as best for the protection of their 
property partly because they had undertaken long-run hazard adjustments to prepare for and 
support their decision to remain. These findings are consistent with McLennan et al (2015) who 
found that intended evacuators from bushfire were concerned about danger, didn’t believe that 
they would be threatened, worried their home would be destroyed in their absence but failed to 
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prepare their property to be left undefended. It is also consistent with Penman et al (2016) who 
found that intended evacuees were less likely than remainers, to prepare their property for 
bushfire defence. 
 
A review of the hazard warning literature by Sorenson (2000) reporting a moderate level of 
empirical support for significant co-variance between perceived risk and evacuation, is 
supported here. Specifically, this study found significant relationships between evacuating or 
remaining and the perceived bushfire threat to or impact on the home and the likelihood of 
injury or death of pets or livestock. No comparable research or data were found in the literature. 
These correlations suggest that those who were planning to evacuate believed that they would 
be safe but their home and other property, and pets and livestock left behind, would be 
vulnerable to the bushfire. On the other hand, those who planned to remain believed that their 
actions would ensure the safety of members of the household, pets, livestock, and property. 
This conclusion is consistent with the literature in which responsibility for pets and livestock 
influenced protective action decisions (Tibbits & Whittaker, 2007), pet ownership was a risk 
factor for evacuation failure (Brackenridge, Zottarelli, Rider, & Carlsen-Landy, 2012; 
Thompson, 2013), and pet and livestock owners ‘wait and see’ (McLennan & Elliott, 2012) or 
refuse to evacuate without their pets (Taylor et al., 2015).  
 
Perceptions of threat and impact of the bushfire and expectations of future bushfire impact were 
significantly related to the intrusiveness of bushfire threat. The extent householders thought 
about the threat of bushfire or talked to friends and neighbours about it prior to the bushfire 
event, were associated with heightened perceptions of threat and impact.  This is consistent 
with findings on intrusiveness and risk perception relating to earthquake and hurricane reported 
in the literature (Bourque et al., 2013; Ge et al., 2011; Lindell & Prater, 2000; Lindell & 
Whitney, 2000). In this study, greater intrusiveness of the bushfire threat was also related to 
householders undertaking property defence focused long-run hazard adjustments.  
 
Researchers have reported mixed evidence of  a relationship between hazard experience and 
hazard adjustments for a range of hazards (McGee, McFarlane, & Varghese, 2009) and there 
are few accounts of significant relationships between wildfire experience and risk-mitigation 
activities (Brenkert-Smith et al., 2012). This research however, identified significant 
relationships between experience and hazard adjustments. Significant relationships between a 
wide range of bushfire experience measures and short-run hazard adjustment suggested that 
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those who had no, or limited bushfire experience tended to evacuate. Significant relations 
between long-run hazard adjustments and experience suggested that the extent of these hazard 
adjustments increased with greater bushfire experience. For example, basic experience such as 
seeing or smelling smoke was related to easily achieved adjustments because they have utility 
for other purposes (Lindell & Perry, 2012)  such as having a mop and bucket to put out spot 
fires (Bushnell, Balcombe, & Cottrell, 2007). Receiving training from people with bushfire 
experience correlated with property defence focused and complex property maintenance 
adjustments.  Personal experience fighting fires and membership of a fire brigade, were 
associated with extensive protective actions including property defence, comprehensive, 
complex property maintenance and intensive property protection efforts such as filling gutters 
with water during the bushfire. This study therefore suggests that the extent of long-run hazard 
adjustments increases with higher levels of experience and training. The relationship between 
hazard experience and long-run hazard adjustment is reported in an extensive literature relating 
a wide range of measures of experience with the physical manifestation of the hazard including 
injury, property damage and financial impact, to a broad range of actions. The hazards included 
earthquake (Heller et al., 2005; Lindell & Perry, 2000; Lindell & Prater, 2000; Nguyen et al., 
2006), flood (Blanchard–Boehm et al., 2001; Laska, 1990; Lindell & Hwang, 2008), tornado 
and hurricane (Blanchard-Boehm & Cook, 2004; Mulilis et al., 2003; Peacock, 2003), volcano 
(Perry & Lindell, 1990) and wildfire (Perry & Lindell, 2008). In their 2008 wildfire article 
Perry and Lindell found a significant relationship between adopting protective measures and 
property experience, but not personal experience, with bushfire. Other wildfire research, using 
different measures, found experience did not influence risk mitigation through risk perception 
(Martin et al., 2009) or had mixed effects on mitigation (McGee et al., 2009). The findings of 
this study considerably extend the very limited research on, and understanding of the 
relationship between bushfire experience and undertaking long-run adjustments.  
 
7.2.2.2. Stakeholder perceptions. 
 
Householders held a range of views about themselves and family members, neighbours, the 
media, and the emergency services. Generally, they saw themselves and family members as 
deciding the protective actions they should take during a bushfire because of responsibility for 
the personal safety of household members (Tibbits & Whittaker, 2007) and for the protection 
of their property. Many felt very well informed about the bushfire, some through media reports, 
others by accessing information from neighbours, while others needed to establish the facts for 
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themselves by collecting and analysing information from the physical environment and the 
media. Many householders including Community Guided, Worried Waverers and Experienced 
Independents felt that they were knowledgeable about bushfire behaviour. Experienced 
Independents saw themselves as highly experienced, knowledgeable, well prepared and 
equipped to fight the bushfire. They felt that other stakeholders, including the emergency 
services and the media were unreliable and incapable of providing the accurate and up-to-date 
information that they required to make decisions about their bushfire response. Many had their 
own well developed, and sometimes sophisticated, strategies for information gathering. They 
used scanners to monitor emergency services frequencies, networked with volunteers involved 
directly in fighting the bushfire, travelled to high points in the area to observe the fire and used 
other sophisticated technologies to gather information. Their neighbours offered them little in 
terms of advice or insight but sought advice and assistance from them. This group appears to 
be an important but estranged source of community expertise and assistance that has the 
potential to play a more positive role in local bushfire safety. 
 
Many householders who had neighbours perceived them as playing a neutral role in the 
bushfire event. However, some, who felt they were incapable of choosing safe protective 
responses because of their inexperience or ignorance of bushfire (Dependent Evacuators), saw 
neighbours, especially volunteer firefighters or long-term residents, as an extremely important 
source of information, advice, and assistance. Most householders willingly shared information 
and perspectives on the bushfire and declared their intended response. Information from a 
variety of sources and their judgement of their specific circumstances informed their decision 
on a protective response. Some neighbours consulted with one another, drew common 
conclusions, and took protective actions together (Community Guided). This included 
neighbours who decided to evacuate, helped each other in preparing to leave and evacuated at 
the same time, ensuring that less able and more vulnerable neighbours had safely departed. 
Where they decided to remain, and defend their homes, neighbours helped each other in 
preparing their property, in monitoring the progress of the fire, and fighting it, including sharing 
equipment and water. This is consistent with the significant but tentative finding of this study 
that householders who believed neighbours had a responsibility to protect them were 1.2 times 
less likely to evacuate. This may be because the support provided by neighbours to intended 
evacuees reduced the pressure to leave, while neighbours’ support for householders who were 
remaining made remaining easier. The importance of social context, including the influence of 
social groups and ongoing social routines in creating purpose and order and shaping 
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perceptions and behaviour are consistent with findings from other hazards (Erickson, 1976; 
Tierney et al., 2001)  
 
A very small number of neighbours who failed to keep their property clear of fine fuels or 
allowed flammable vegetation to grow uncontrolled and unmanaged, especially near 
neighbours’ properties were seen as contributing to the bushfire threat. Tibbits and Whittaker 
(2007) reported a participant’s concern that a neighbour’s unprepared property could increase 
fire risk to his property. Face-to face interviews confirmed this finding but also found that these 
‘bad’ neighbours included local and state governments that were perceived to have failed to 
maintain fire breaks or properly manage roadsides, applied burn-off policies preventing 
householders from clearing up their property or failed to undertake controlled burns on crown 
land and state forest making it more susceptible to fire and less accessible for bushfire fighting 
vehicles. The perceived failure of governments to facilitate householders efforts to protect their 
property through prescribed burning, similar to these findings has been reported in the literature 
(Altangerel & Kull, 2013). Whittaker and Mercer (2004) in their discourse analysis of the 
apportioning of blame for the 2002-03 Victorian bushfires identified and explained the basis 
for attitudes toward local and state governments that were similar to those reported here based 
on what they called the ‘wise use’ environmental discourse in which bushfire prone land was 
perceived as ’locked up’ and mismanaged by government.  
 
Defining neighbours more broadly as members of the local community, this research 
documented bushfire-fighting groups comprising locals using their private vehicles. These 
vehicles included utilities equipped with water tanks and pumps, tractors and earth moving 
equipment. Some Experienced Independents were involved in groups that formed in response 
to an immediate local need, disbanded once that need had been met, but could re-form with 
modified membership and resources depending on the need. Herbst (1976) referred to this type 
of phenomena as ‘matrix organisation’ and suggested that it had the advantage of flexibility 
and capacity to reconfigure around different objectives and problems. The capacity of private 
individuals, especially farmers , to use, modify and repair their equipment and access social 
networks for fire-fighting has been noted in the literature (Whittaker, Handmer, & Mercer, 
2012). The activities of private fire-fighting groups reported in this study may be an emerging 
trend reflecting dissatisfaction with the State emergency authorities consistent with similar 
dissatisfaction with unfulfilled expectations of fire-fighting support previously reported by 
Whittaker et al (2012).  
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Most householders viewed the fire services favourably.  Many reflected on the fire services of 
the past, comprising  members who were dedicated, community oriented and bravely served 
their communities during bushfire (Whittaker et al., 2012). Some householders, including 
many Experienced Independents, saw less community service and greater self- interested 
orientation of members. Local fire services were seen to be hamstrung by unnecessary 
operating procedures and rules, controlled by an emergency services bureaucracy removed 
from the local community, and with values and priorities out of step with that community. 
Some householders perceived the fire services in a positive light, as a government service that 
was more highly trained, better equipped, protected by health and safety requirements and 
procedures and subject to greater formal organisation, management, and control. Some 
expected the fire services to protect them because they paid their taxes. Some householders 
expected local brigades would protect them and their property because they were not capable 
of doing it themselves (Dependent Evacuator) or because it was not their responsibility 
(Responsibility Denier). Some, especially those who did not have a current or previous 
connection, saw the fire services as distinct from, rather than at the heart of the local 
community. 
 
Individual volunteer firefighters were respected and valued by most householders (Whittaker 
et al., 2012) for their service to the community. There was however, a diversity of attitudes 
toward them, including the traditional belief that they were heroes dedicated to the local 
community. Others perceived them as competent public servants providing a service to which 
they are entitled. At the extreme, a few viewed volunteers as lacking experience, competence, 
and leadership due to their bureaucratisation. This study suggests that community attitudes 
toward volunteer bushfire-fighters has become more complex.  Community acceptance and 
support for volunteer fire-fighters appears to rely increasingly on greater perceived 
professionalism and effectiveness without compromising responsiveness to local needs. This 
trend is likely to strengthen as the number of rural-urban interface communities grows and 
residents perceive fire-fighters as public servants providing an important service for which they 
pay their taxes. If brigades are perceived as failing to effectively protect the local community 
and to respond to its needs and priorities, greater dissatisfaction and criticism may follow and 
more private fire-fighting groups, as described earlier, may be established. 
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This study identified householders’ perceptions of the media as a significant predictor of 
evacuation although the size of the sample provided insufficient power for its inclusion in the 
model. Community Guided, Worried Waverers and Considered Evacuators, who were 
significantly more likely to evacuate, perceived the media as knowledgeable, well-informed 
and providing reliable information and advice about the bushfire and having a responsibility to 
protect their personal safety. For many their regard for the media derived from an 
understanding that the ABC, as the official emergency broadcaster, was acting as a conduit for 
information and advice provided by the emergency services. Greater community trust of 
‘official’ information and the positive reputation of the ABC as an independent public 
broadcaster resulted in a high level of acceptance of information and advice provided by the 
media in general. This is consistent with international studies that found government and 
emergency authorities were expected to provide accurate information (Steelman et al. 2015) 
and  householders relied on information from local authorities and peers to inform evacuation 
decisions (Lindell et al., 2005).  The strong reputation of the ABC and its status as official 
emergency broadcaster may explain, at least in part, why perceptions of the media predicted 
evacuation. The literature does not discuss the close relationship between the media and the 
emergency services, perhaps because of the unique circumstances of bushfire in Australia 
where householders must make protective action decisions requiring complex and timely 
information, that are critical to personal safety. An official emergency broadcaster that is highly 
responsible and credible is required in this context.  Some householders perceived commercial 
radio and television stations as inadequately informed and commercially driven to 
sensationalise reports rather than to inform the public. For some, extremely negative personal 
interactions with the media or experiences of media reporting confirmed these beliefs. This is 
consistent with international research in which disaster information from the commercial mass 
media was seen by North Americans as inaccurate and sensational (Taylor et al., 2007).  Some 
householders were critical of the media because the threat was exaggerated (Threat Deniers), 
information was not sufficiently well based or reliable to reassure them (Dependent 
Evacuators) or was not accurate and detailed enough to support fine judgements for property 
defence (Experienced Independents).  
 
Research establishing how media information and advice can better influence behaviour in 
bushfire might begin with an examination of the effectiveness of the relationship between the 
ABC and the emergency services which has been identified in this study.   
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7.2.2.3. Hazard adjustment perceptions. 
 
The crucial factor influencing a householder’s choice of protective response to bushfire, 
whether they evacuated or remained, was their perception of the effectiveness of their response 
in protecting personal safety or property. Concern for personal safety was the most important 
factor predicting evacuation while property protection was the most important predicting that 
evacuation would not occur. This is consistent with findings reported in the literature on flood 
and earthquake in which effectiveness (Mulilis & Duval, 1995) in protecting personal safety 
and property significantly correlated with intended and actual long-run hazard adjustment 
(Lindell & Prater, 2002; Lindell & Whitney, 2000; Terpstra & Lindell, 2009). These 
international findings do not however, address the relationship between perceptions of 
effectiveness in protecting personal safety and property and short-run hazard adjustment.   
Consistent with the finding reported here, one Australian paper (McLennan, Cowlishaw, et al., 
2014) found that householders’ belief that evacuating would be a safe option to ensure survival, 
predicted evacuation. However, the study was limited by: self-selection bias inherent in the on-
line sampling methodology; the use of single item measures; and the exclusion of situational 
factors due to the application of the extended Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB–E) and 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT). The crucial importance of householders’ perceptions of 
the effectiveness of evacuating or remaining in protecting personal safety or property in an 
Australian bushfire is therefore a key finding of this research.  It is likely that the perception of 
the effectiveness of protective actions is central to householders’ decision-making because of 
the survival critical choices that they must make in a bushfire event in Australia. 
 
Most evacuators, and some of those who remained, believed that evacuating was most effective 
in protecting personal safety. Some felt that remaining better protected their personal safety 
because they were in a known environment (McLennan, Cowlishaw, et al., 2014), which they 
had made as safe as possible, rather than in potentially unsafe areas away from their property. 
Many who perceived remaining as best for property protection evacuated but their concern for 
their property may have influenced them to wait and see how the bushfire developed.  This 
study found that significantly more wait and seers than evacuators, believed remaining was 
best for property protection suggesting that future research should examine in greater depth the 
perceived effectiveness of short-run hazard adjustments on intended and actual waiting and 
seeing.  
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The extent that householders maintained their property, equipped to fight bushfire or extinguish 
spot fires, and prepared their defences against the imminent arrival of the fire, influenced their 
hazard adjustment perceptions and their decision to evacuate or remain. Those who had not 
undertaken or had undertaken limited long-run hazard adjustments were more likely to see 
evacuation as the best option to protect their personal safety, while those who made substantial 
long-run adjustments saw remaining as the best way to protect their property. The PADM does 
not incorporate either directly or indirectly, long-run hazard adjustments as a factor influencing 
short-run protective responses. This appears to be because the model design incorporates both 
short, and long-run protective responses as behavioural outputs in the last stage. This may be 
appropriate in jurisdictions in which public policy dictates mandatory evacuation from hazards, 
including wildfire. Long-run hazard adjustments reduce the potential impact of a wildfire on 
an undefended property and facilitate evacuation but are not aimed at defence. In Australia, 
long-run hazard adjustments include actions to facilitate active property defence, so 
adjustments to prepare for defence or to protect personal safety while defending, influence 
perceptions of the effectiveness of protective actions and consequently, the decision to evacuate 
or to remain. The PADM therefore cannot fully reflect householder behaviour in an Australian 
bushfire. It needs to incorporate the influence of long-run hazard adjustment on hazard 
adjustment perceptions and consequently on short-run hazard adjustment. Long-run hazard 
adjustments influence two key elements of the PADM: hazard adjustment perceptions as part 
of the trilogy of core psychological factors; and the protective action decision making process 
at the points of protective action search and assessment, where the householder must identify 
feasible protective actions and decide on the one most suitable in the circumstances. These 
areas where redesign of the model is necessary to improve its relevance for the Australian 
bushfire context are further discussed later in this chapter.  
 
7.2.3.  Protective action decision-making. 
 
For many householders, the protective action decision-making process was extremely 
complicated. It involved processing information, negotiating with family members, neighbours 
and the authorities, and making critical judgements in a stressful, complex, and potentially 
dangerous environment. It required conscious and unconscious synthesis of multiple inputs to 
decide on the best protective response. Environmental and social cues and warnings, 
information, and psychological perceptions of the threat, of stakeholders and of hazard 
adjustments were key inputs to the process. Given that these psychologically based perceptions 
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were pre-existing, the process of decision-making began immediately the householder became 
aware of the bushfire threat through cues, warnings, or other sources of information.  
 
This research suggests, through its identification of self-evacuation archetypes, that 
householders made protective decisions based on a personal standpoint or attitude toward the 
bushfire, applying rules of thumb consistent with that standpoint, as a guide through the 
process. They identified the threat, assessed it, searched for protective response options, and 
decided on the most appropriate option based on their rules of thumb. For example, Considered 
Evacuators would typically, once aware of a bushfire, pack their vehicle, load household 
members and pets and leave immediately based on their rule of thumb of leaving well before 
the bushfire threatened.  Other householders minimized or dismissed the threat (Threat 
Deniers), or recognised their inability to do anything other than have someone help them 
evacuate (Dependent Evacuators), while others believed strongly in their capability to deal with 
the threat (Experienced Independents). Some refused to take responsibility for themselves 
(Responsibility Deniers) and some incorporated their decision-making in with neighbours and 
other community members (Community Guided). Everyone approached their protective 
decision-making based on their rule of thumb. The protective action decision process discussed 
in the following, assumed different forms, colour, and complexity depending on the rule of 
thumb applied by the householder. 
 
7.2.3.1. Identifying and assessing the risk. 
 
This research suggests that householders identified the existence of bushfire through many 
common sources although they often came to different conclusions about whether a protective 
response was required.  Most could see smoke, note the activity of the emergency services, had 
neighbours or family alert them, and saw and heard information and warnings on the traditional 
electronic media. The large volume of official emergency services text warning messages on 
mobile telephones and recorded messages on landline telephones also made this form of 
information, advice, and warning highly accessible to most householders. However, the rules 
of thumb they applied to information and advice resulted in different conclusions about whether 
protective action was required.  Some householders, even given strong evidence to the contrary, 
did not perceive the bushfire as a threat that required protective action. The Threat Denier relied 
on topological, meteorological, historical, or other factors to rationalise their belief. The best 
option was to continue with their normal daily routine.  Believing that there was not a threat 
 
 
192 
 
meant that they had not organised personal belongings, pets or transportation for a quick exit 
and had not made an evacuation plan. If the bushfire had become an imminent threat, they were 
unprepared to evacuate and were more likely to do so at the last moment. Those who expected 
the emergency services to protect their personal safety and their property (Responsibility 
Deniers) may have been passively aware of the bushfire but did not actively seek out 
information. They did not consider whether protective action was necessary because they 
expected the emergency services to assess and deal with the threat for them.  Considered 
Evacuators became aware of the fire through their own well-established sources which they 
monitored and assessed. Dependent Evacuators relied on family members, neighbours, or the 
emergency services to inform and advise them on the need to evacuate.  
 
The Community Guided householder engaged in a bushfire ‘community of interest’ (Marsh 
and Buckle 2001) involving neighbours and people or organisations with bushfire knowledge 
or information, in a manner similar to that reported in the literature (Kim & Kang, 2010; Marsh 
& Buckle, 2001; Sorenson & Vogt Sorenson, 2007) both in advance of and during the bushfire. 
They interacted closely with their community network to identify and assess the risk. This 
interaction included talking to neighbours, consulting informed individuals and monitoring 
media. Information was shared and assessed, guidance sought and given and often a shared 
viewpoint on the bushfire threat and appropriate responses was established.  
 
Worried Waverers carefully monitored media and Internet information and were trained to 
interpret environmental cues, establish whether a bushfire threat existed and whether a 
protective response was required. However, their inexperience with bushfire fighting fed their 
concern that they might be exaggerating or underestimating the threat. Their knowledge and 
experience meant Experienced Independents were highly aware of and able to identify and 
assess the bushfire risk, to identify and assess environmental cues, information, and warnings 
to establish the existence of a bushfire and to assess whether they needed to respond to it. 
 
7.2.3.2. Identifying and choosing an option for protective response. 
 
There were major differences in the protective options considered by householders and the 
manner of their choice. Those who rejected the existence of a bushfire threat did not consider 
protective options or make a choice. Those who believed that they were not responsible left 
identifying, weighing, and choosing the best protective response to the emergency services. 
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Considered Evacuators simplified their protective action decision by identifying evacuation in 
advance of the bushfire, as their only acceptable protective option. Dependent Evacuators 
identified and weighed protective options during the bushfire assisted or influenced by others. 
In many cases evacuation emerged by default as their only option as concerned relatives or the 
emergency services influenced or directed them to evacuate. 
 
Experienced Independents drew on their memories of previous bushfires, understood the 
meaning and importance of various environmental cues, knew where to go to observe the fire 
and the safe evacuation routes that were available to them. Consequently, they could more 
immediately and dynamically assess the protective options open to them. They could remain 
to defend their property but evacuate if they were unable to defend. They could wait to see how 
the fire developed without intending to defend and if it they judged the threat to be too great, 
could evacuate safely. They could decide to evacuate after extensively preparing their property 
intending to covertly return once the fire front had passed to extinguish spot fire and tend to 
animals (Wilkinson, Eriksen, & Penman, 2016). Less experienced, prepared, and equipped 
individuals, well connected with their neighbourhood or community network, including 
Community Guided, accessed protective options through networking. The characteristics of 
these householders and the dynamics between them, their neighbours and friends, the 
emergency services, and the media, pervasively influenced their protective decision-making. 
These dynamics varied between dependency, guidance, and mutual assistance. Protective 
action choices, informed by direct or indirect sources of reliable information and advice, were 
developed in consultation with key sources in the network. As part of, and influenced by a 
community network, householders monitored the bushfire, collected information, interpreted 
their circumstances, and made protective action decisions. The network also offered a range of 
alternatives to immediate evacuation including safer sheltering in a neighbour’s house or 
assistance with defence. Consequently, householders modified their decision-making process 
and possibly the decisions taken, because of their interactions with their network.  
 
Householders responded to the bushfire in ways that were inconsistent with the advice 
warnings, fire-fighting strategies, and fire ground management of the emergency services. The 
short-run options for protective action available to householders did not simply involve a binary 
decision to stay and defend or to evacuate. At the very least householders who remained could 
decide that they would leave and those who evacuated could return. Some members of the 
household could evacuate while others remained to defend the property alone or with 
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neighbours working as a team. A household could evacuate together, wait until the fire front 
had passed then return to put out spot fires.  The protective actions that many householders 
chose during the bushfire were not clear-cut. Some planned to stay and defend but evacuated 
instead because of illness, injury, or failure of equipment or simply because they felt the danger 
was too great. Some who were committed to evacuating, were convinced to remain by a 
neighbour or relative or by the bushfire’s failure to develop as a threat. Some evacuated but 
returned believing the fire front had passed or that the bushfire would not approach their 
property. Others waited to see how the fire developed before they took a decision and delayed 
their decision until the fire had passed. Some others waited for direction from the emergency 
services. Householders’ decisions about protective actions were consistent with their 
assessment of their unique circumstances within the bushfire event and the personal rules of 
thumb that they applied in making their protective action decisions. 
 
7.2.3.3. Implementing a protective response. 
 
A multiplicity of triggers activated householders’ protective actions. Their interpretations of 
environmental and social cues and warnings, combined with their psychological perceptions, 
triggered their evacuation, or confirmed the decision to remain. The process of deciding when 
to evacuate was therefore not simple or predictable. Many householders decided to evacuate at 
a particular time because of the colour, volume and direction of bushfire smoke  (McLennan et 
al., 2013) or because a respected neighbour advised them to or emergency services personnel 
visited and told them to leave immediately (Handmer & Tibbits, 2005; Whittaker et al., 2016). 
In many cases an official text evacuation message prompted action.  In some cases, adult 
children rang and pleaded with their parents to leave immediately. In a few instances, a wife 
absolutely refused to leave if her husband failed to come with her or a couple felt the stress was 
upsetting their young children so they left. This is consistent with the findings of Whittaker et 
al (2016) on gender related aspects of how risk and response was negotiated within households 
affected by the Black Saturday bushfires. Men wanted to stay and defend while women wanted 
to leave immediately they were aware a fire was threatening resulting in some cases in 
disagreement. Responsibility for children and dependents influenced the decision to evacuate 
and men who intended to remain and defend, left with their partner. Remainers left following 
the failure of equipment or water sources, or injury or emotional incapacity of a team member 
fighting the fire.  
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Close analysis of the protective action decision-making process suggests that the interpretation 
of protective action behaviour that has been described in the literature as ‘wait and see’ 
(McLennan, Cowlishaw, et al., 2014; McLennan & Elliott, 2012; McLennan et al., 2012; 
McLennan et al., 2013) may be better understood from the perspective of householders’ 
decision-making rules of thumb. While there were some householders whose decision was 
specifically to wait and see, others whose behaviour could be interpreted as such, in fact made 
a purposeful decision based on their rule of thumb and acted consistently with it. Some 
householders failed to perceive a threat and continued with their normal activities. Some 
expected that others would look after them and waited for this to happen. Some sought guidance 
from influential voices in their community network and needed time to receive and process 
those inputs. Others were simply inexperienced but felt that they had made reasonable 
preparations for the bushfire and needed some time to assess whether they could safely remain. 
In the simple world of evacuate or remain these householders would be categorised as ‘waiting 
to see’ before they made a protective action decision.  In fact, they were making decisions and 
taking actions consistent with their decision-making rule of thumb rather than existing in an 
indeterminate state of irresponsible indecision. Others have similarly observed that significant 
numbers of householders in bushfire risk areas would ‘wait and see’ (McLennan, Paton, & 
Wright, 2015) before taking protective action ‘and do so for what seem (to them) very sound 
and sensible reasons’ (McLennan & Elliott, 2012, p. 7). Different self-evacuation archetypes 
displayed considerable differences in perception of threat, willingness to take responsibility, 
experience of bushfire, connectedness with others and a range of other factors. However, there 
was no significant difference between self-evacuators in their propensity to wait and see.  Those 
who wait and see were not a separate group defined by unique characteristics but were 
represented equally across all self-evacuator groups. Findings in the literature that 
householders’ planning of their response to a bushfire involves some form of ‘waiting and 
seeing’ (McLennan et al., 2012) is consistent with this conclusion. This suggests that the 
problems created for the emergency authorities by householders ‘waiting and seeing’ during a 
bushfire are likely to be best addressed through targeted programs for each archetypal group as 
discussed in a later section of this chapter.    
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7.2.4.  Information and communications. 
 
For many householders, available information was inadequate to properly inform their 
protective response. Some simply needed to confirm the existence of the bushfire but most 
required additional information to inform their decision to remain at their property or leave. 
Clear, accurate, and current information was not available or accessible to many householders 
although they used a broad range of sources including radio, the Internet and family/friends 
and neighbours to extract the most detailed, accurate, and up-to-date information available. 
Householders have reported similar problems with finding accurate and timely information on 
fire location (Tibbits & Whittaker, 2007) and level of threat and appropriate responses (Paton, 
2015). The sources of information used by householders were consistent with those reported 
in the literature (Steelman et al., 2015) although differences in Australian and North American 
wildfire contexts make strict comparisons difficult. Because of the transformation in 
communications technologies, especially due to the Internet, social media and the use of mobile 
devices (Bowser & Cutter, 2015, p. 32), the number of information channels open to 
householders has grown enormously. Because the content and timeliness of official 
information remained inadequate to the needs of many householders, some used alternative 
unofficial sources. They appear to be the forerunners of a change in the marshalling and use of 
bushfire information. Some householders who were experienced with bushfire used scanners 
to monitor emergency services frequencies; consulted paper and electronic maps to interpret 
information gathered from those and other sources; and a few flew drones to get a bird’s eye 
view of the conditions proximate to their property. Others exchanged information through 
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter (Sutton et al., 2014). Householders’ growing   expectations 
of emergency information, the development of sophisticated integrated information sourcing 
(Panteras et al., 2015) and householders’ willingness to collaborate and pursue innovative 
access to information (Skinner, 2013; Slavkovikj, Verstockt, Van Hoecke, & Van De Walle, 
2014; Sutton et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2016), suggests that information provision will be one 
of the most important issues influencing the successful future management of bushfire events 
by the emergency services.  
 
This research confirmed the importance of official warnings in influencing the decision to 
evacuate.  It is likely that for many householders, these warnings will remain a vital input into 
their protective action decision-making. However this study, consistent with the literature over 
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a decade and a half (Bowser & Cutter, 2015; Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000), identified a 
hardening of attitudes against acceding to emergency services directives. Many householders 
wanted to make their own decisions about the best actions for them during the bushfire event 
(Buckley, 2012) and felt they were better informed about their particular circumstances and 
how they should respond than were the emergency services. They felt they had sufficient 
knowledge of the situation to assess the risks and benefits of their response and to make their 
own judgements about what to do, rather than relying on the expert opinion of the emergency 
services. Warnings therefore need to provide information and advice to influence decision-
making rather than attempting to simply provide a directive on the protective action that should 
be taken. 
 
7.2.5.  Situational impediments. 
 
Within the PADM, situational impediments do not play a part in determining protective actions 
but constrain the decision once made. Householders experienced a variety of situational 
impediments that did not alter or prevent their evacuation but simply slowed the process.  
 
This study identified three major types of impediments to evacuation that confirm similar 
findings in the literature relating to hazards other than bushfire. These impediments were the 
‘logistics’ of evacuating including finding a safe escape route (Perry et al., 1981) and having 
transportation (Heath, Kass, et al., 2001); the care of animals (Bowser & Cutter, 2015; 
Brackenridge et al., 2012; Heath, Voeks, & Glickman, 2001a; Thompson, 2013); and emotional 
reactions to the bushfire, including stress and anxiety, and concern about not being able to 
return home at a time of the householders’ choice (Siebeneck & Cova, 2008; Siebeneck, 
Lindell, Prater, Wu, & Huang, 2013). 
 
The management of livestock during the bushfires impeded the evacuation of some 
householders. Because of the ‘unpredictable nature of fire’, decisions about moving livestock 
must be at the last minute and in highly unsafe circumstances. Some householders who 
preferred to evacuate, first took considerable time and effort to move livestock to safe areas 
with sufficient feed and water. Many took considerable risks to protect livestock in which they 
had a financial investment, an emotional attachment and ethical responsibility. This finding is 
consistent with Smith et al (2015) who reported that, given the difficulty of evacuating 
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livestock from a bushfire, a majority of livestock producers chose to stay and defend their 
property. 
 
7.3. What Factors Predict Self-Evacuation? 
 
The Protective Action Decision Model provided an analytical framework to identify and 
explore factors that affect the decision to evacuate in an Australian bushfire. Householders 
received environmental and social cues, information, and warnings early in the bushfire. They 
paid attention to these inputs and understood their relevance. Householders’ psychological 
perceptions influenced their interpretation of initial inputs and informed the process of deciding 
on their protective response. This decision-making process also generated a need for further 
information, incorporated in the model as a feedback loop. During the bushfire, the stages of 
the model occurred simultaneously. Once householders became aware of the bushfire they 
began protective action decision-making and sought further information. The dynamics of the 
process were complex and highly varied for each householder. The fundamental feature of the 
model was therefore its synthesis of the key factors influencing decision-making rather than its 
representation of the staging of the process which depended on the circumstances of the fire 
and the nature of the response of the householder.  
 
The two key factors that directly influenced the protective actions taken by householders in the 
Perth and Adelaide Hills bushfires were the perceived attributes of their protective responses 
and the receipt of an official warning message. Perception of the threat posed by the bushfire 
was of lesser importance. Undertaking long-run hazard adjustments indirectly influenced the 
decision to evacuate or remain through their effect on the perceived attributes of protective 
actions.    
 
7.3.1.  Hazard adjustment perceptions. 
 
Householders’ decisions to evacuate or not were predicted by the perception that this action 
protected personal safety or property or both (hazard-related attributes), required knowledge 
and skill, and was inexpensive (resource-related attributes). Consistent with Terpstra (2009) 
hazard-related rather than resource-related attributes were more powerful in predicting 
evacuation.    
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The perceived effectiveness of evacuating or remaining in protecting personal safety or 
property were the two nuclei around which householders’ decisions revolved. In the hazard 
literature personal safety was the best predictor of intended adoption of long-run hazard 
adjustments while protection of property was of lesser importance (Terpstra & Lindell, 2009). 
In this study, effectiveness in protecting personal safety was the key to predicting short-run 
adjustment, evacuation.  Protecting property was even more important in predicting not 
evacuating. This research also established that factors that influenced the perception of hazard-
related adjustments were themselves extremely important. The literature concludes that hazard-
related, more than resource-related, attributes influence hazard adjustment adoption. The focus 
of the literature is on survival and mitigation adjustments rather than those that are preparatory 
and defensive (Terpstra & Lindell, 2009). This may largely be due to much of the relevant 
literature canvassing hazards that are not defendable, and where they are (e.g. floods), 
defensive options are limited in number. The literature does not address the influence of the 
adoption of long-run hazard adjustments on the perception of short-run hazard adjustment. 
Because Australian householders may remain at their property and defend it from bushfire, 
long-run hazard adjustments, including property maintenance and preparation, and equipping 
for property defence, are, like areas affected by earthquake, part of the ‘way of life’ (Becker, 
Paton, Johnston, & Ronan, 2012; Becker, Paton, Johnston, & Ronan, 2013) in bushfire prone 
areas, involving the geographic longevity of close knit social networks of experienced and self-
reliant individuals (McGee & Russell, 2003). The close interaction between the perception of 
short-run hazard adjustment and undertaking long-run hazard adjustments may also derive 
from the strong associations identified in the literature (Becker et al., 2013) between protecting 
personal safety and an ideology of preparedness, reinforcing the need to be prepared in case of 
an emergency. The commitment to prepare to protect personal safety is even greater in an 
Australian bushfire where protective responses open to individuals can place personal safety at 
risk. The extent that long-run hazard adjustments are, or are not, undertaken, influences 
householders’ perceptions of the effectiveness of their protective responses in protecting 
personal safety and property.  The extent of ‘preparation’ for bushfire fundamentally influences 
a central psychological component of the PADM – short-run hazard adjustment perceptions. 
Preparing and equipping for bushfire, or not doing so, is so important in its effect on short-run 
hazard adjustment perceptions that long-run hazard adjustments should be a separate factor in 
the PADM to improve the analysis of householder perceptions and behaviour in an Australian 
bushfire event.          
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The two resource-related attributes – the need for knowledge and skill to implement and the 
expense of a protective action, are of lesser importance in this research but significantly predict 
the decision to evacuate or not to evacuate. Believing that knowledge and skills were required 
to evacuate or to remain predicted not evacuating. Both remainers and evacuators who applied 
knowledge and skill to identify, contemplate and plan aspects of their protective actions were 
less likely to evacuate. This suggests that evacuators who had thought through their evacuation 
may take more considered steps toward evacuation than others who more reactively evacuate. 
This is consistent with the finding that intended unprepared (reactive) evacuees perceived 
evacuation as a ‘simple matter’(McLennan, Elliott, et al., 2014).  
 
The perception of short-run hazard adjustments as inexpensive in predicting evacuation 
suggested that evacuees perceived small or no costs in evacuating but significant costs in 
remaining. Evacuees may have known they could avoid major costs by staying at the home of 
a family member or friend whereas remainers incurred costs in fireproofing structures, by 
removing vegetation, covering gaps, and installing watering systems. There were also 
considerable costs in the purchase of firefighting pumps, hoses, and generators and in 
establishing a reliable water source. The total cost over ten years of adequately preparing a 
property estimated at $10,000, was found to be ‘a predictor of whether residents would 
undertake wildfire specific preparatory actions’ (Penman et al., 2016, p. 94) confirming 
householders’ perceptions of the high cost associated with remaining to defend. The findings 
in the literature on resource related attributes and the adoption of long-run adjustments are not 
definitive and conclusions have not been drawn, although negative correlations between the 
two have been hypothesised (Lindell & Perry, 2012). Findings on the relationship between 
short-run hazard adjustment and resource related attributes are not reported in the literature.  
This study found that the lower cost of evacuating predicted evacuation.  
 
7.3.2.  Threat perceptions. 
 
Both evacuators and remainers perceived bushfire threat primarily in terms of its likely impact 
on their home and property rather than to their personal safety. This was based on the reasoning 
that, if their property was threatened, their personal safety would be under similar threat unless 
they evacuated. For this reason, likely impact on property deputised for threat to personal 
safety. Consequently, threat to personal safety was not a significant predictor of evacuating or 
not evacuating. Householders’ belief that the bushfire was likely to have an impact on their 
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home and property predicted evacuation. This study also found that failure to carry out long-
run hazard adjustments, specifically clearing fuels or combustibles or covering gaps allowing 
entry of embers, was significantly related to the perception of likely property impact.  These 
findings are consistent with reports in the literature of the influence of threat perception on long 
and short-run hazard adjustments (Bourque et al. 2012; Lindell 2013) including evacuation 
(Lindell et al., 2016; Sorenson, 2000). The findings are significant because of the limited 
attention given in the literature to the relationship between threat perceptions and short-run 
hazard adjustment and the extremely mixed results that have been reported in relation to threat 
perception and long-run adjustment to a range of different hazards. 
 
7.3.3.  Official warnings. 
 
The receipt of an official warning from the emergency authorities was an important factor in 
predicting evacuation. Most householders received multiple text warnings on their mobile 
telephone at heightening levels of urgency, culminating with advice to evacuate, or to prepare 
to remain and defend against an imminent bushfire threat. The influence of official warnings 
on evacuation may have had two key causes. Following the recommendations of the VBRC 
into the ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires, official text and landline warning messages, have been 
extensively used during emergencies and are now ubiquitous in bushfire events. Both text and 
landline warnings to alert and advise householders in the Perth and Adelaide Hills bushfires 
were widely employed. Heightened awareness of the impact of climate change on the 
frequency and severity of wildfires globally, and the evidence of this threat provided by media 
coverage of major wildfires in Australia, North America, and Europe, may have increased the 
seriousness of and authority with which official warnings were treated by those who were 
conscious of the extreme danger posed. The status of an official warning may provide it with 
the authority to influence both the decision to evacuate and when to evacuate. Its social 
authority separates an official warning from environmental and social cues and information 
that householders use as inputs to their decision-making process. 
 
The importance of official warnings in predicting householder evacuation is a key finding of 
this study that has not been reported elsewhere in the published literature. A major study of 
residents affected by the Black Saturday bushfires (Handmer et al., 2011) and considerable 
grey literature has reported substantial and growing community expectations that official 
telephone based warnings will always be provided. The role of official warnings as one of a 
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number of influential evacuation triggers reported in this study is consistent with the literature 
(McCaffrey & Winter, 2010). The continued effectiveness of official warnings in encouraging 
evacuation depends in part on their providing access to timely, credible, understandable, 
influential and relevant information and advice specifically aimed at enabling householders to 
make better informed protective action decisions as previously discussed in this chapter and 
supported in the literature (Cao et al., 2016) and in grey reports (Cube Group., 2014; Ipsos 
Social Research Institute., 2014). Improvements to official bushfire warnings in this way is an 
important matter for further research and adoption into public policy.  
 
7.4. What are the Characteristics of Self-Evacuators? 
 
Much of the considerable research over many years on evacuation during hazard events, in 
diverse geographic locations is not directly relevant to the analysis of an Australian bushfire. 
The nature of many hazards are not comparable with bushfire and public policy enabling 
householders to decide on their protective action (Australasian Fire and Emergency Services 
Authorities Council, 2012) is unique to Australia. Those in other jurisdictions who ignore 
mandatory evacuation orders are not of sufficient numbers to have been widely examined or 
reported.   For this reason, this discussion focuses on the Australian context and literature.  
 
The emergency authorities advise householders living in bushfire prone areas on issues that 
affect their safety. The key messages are: bushfires threaten personal safety; plan to remain or 
evacuate well before a bushfire occurs; evacuating from a bushfire is the safest response; and 
evacuate well in advance of a bushfire - do not ‘wait and see’. Householders are advised that 
on ‘maximum’ (Catastrophic and Extreme) fire danger days, proactive evacuation, even 
without a bushfire event, is preferred and defence of property should not be attempted no matter 
how well prepared (for Catastrophic forecasts). Acting in a manner consistent with this advice 
is part of householder’s shared responsibility for their safety (McLennan & Eburn, 2015; 
McLennan & Handmer, 2014; McLennan & Handmer, 2012). Practical implementation of 
community safety policies, practices and activities by the emergency authorities tends toward 
a degree of protective control over individual and community action.  
 
Many householders do not take this advice. They fail to recognise the risk from bushfire or to 
act in accordance with the advice of the emergency authorities (McLennan, Paton, & Wright, 
2015; Whittaker et al., 2013) or to prepare a bushfire plan (McLennan, Elliott, et al., 2014).  
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Many do not evacuate well in advance of a bushfire, preferring to ‘wait and see’ (McLennan 
& Elliott, 2012; McLennan, Paton, & Wright, 2015; Rhodes, 2005; Whittaker & Handmer, 
2010; Whittaker et al., 2013). The Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission into the ‘Black 
Saturday’ bushfires (Teague et al., 2010) presaged this ongoing problem by accepting that 
people would continue to ‘wait and see’ concluding that comprehensive bushfire policy needed 
to provide more options and different advice. The emergency services have provided improved 
and more extensive advice and options but householders’ attitudes and approach to bushfire 
threat has not changed (Gilbert, 2014; McLennan, Paton, & Wright, 2015; Rhodes, 2014). 
Whittaker’s (2013, p. 848) observation that “the binary approach to ‘Prepare, stay and defend 
or leave early’ does not adequately reflect the reality of what people do during bushfires…” is 
a clear statement of the central problem. The emergency services’ community bushfire-safety 
policy presents a binary choice to householders, to stay or to go. Householders are characterised 
and understood by their protective action orientation and not by their attitudes, life experiences 
or circumstances in which they live and must confront a bushfire. Bushfire safety programs, 
designed around limited protective action stereotypes are incapable of addressing the 
fundamental issues that shape householders’ protective action decisions during a bushfire.            
 
Bushfire programs require review to increase levels of active and effective householder 
management of bushfire risk by addressing the psychological makeup of remainers and 
evacuators (McLennan, Paton, & Beatson, 2015). To achieve this and consistent with Paton 
and Wright (2008), this research concludes that existing bushfire safety programs should take 
account of the diversity of householders, the circumstances they confront during a bushfire and 
the fundamentally different decisional paths that they take to a protective response. Bushfire 
experience and training; threat intrusiveness; perceptions of threat, stakeholder, and hazard 
adjustment; and other factors, informed by environmental and social cues and information and 
warnings, all contribute to the choice of a protective response. Householders negotiate various 
decisional routes, each involving different actions and risks, to reach a protective response. To 
understand what householders are likely to do and the reasons for their actions, seven self-
evacuation archetypes were modelled. These archetypes do not describe a particular individual 
but offer a broader perspective of householders’ attitudes, behaviour and actions during a 
bushfire than do the existing policy stereotypes (Paton et al., 2006). No directly comparable 
study exists in the published literature relating to householder archetypes. Paveglio (2015) 
developed ‘community archetypes’ based on a community’s approach to wildfire mitigation 
and planning to develop strategies for community collaboration and communication.  As 
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previously discussed, a report for the Fire Services Commissioner (nous Group., 2013) 
described research that identified seven archetypes reflecting the way people identified and 
responded to bushfire threat. There is some limited outward similarity between the archetypes 
identified by the nous Group and those produced through this study.  Such apparent similarity 
may be inevitable given the focus of both studies on householder behaviour during bushfire 
and the factors that are well recognised in the literature as influencing such behaviour. Both 
consider a number of common variables that influence behaviour but combine them in different 
ways. Nous archetypes were developed and described using a subjective, experienced based 
analysis of qualitatively generated data. The seven archetypes identified in this thesis were 
generated and confirmed using sophisticated quantitative tools and techniques reducing the 
influence of subjective judgements on the number and character of the archetypal groups. The 
variables included for analysis were extensively theoretically underpinned (using PADM).   
The nous archetypal typology is based on the antecedent 'stay and defend, 'wait and see' and 
'evacuate when aware', typology. Of the seven nous archetypes three are different types of 
defender while only the Experienced Independent was identified in this study primarily as a 
defender. The archetypes developed in this study encompass and elaborate the typology used 
to create the nous archetypes. For example, nous' Threat Monitor archetype is represented in 
five archetypal groups generated through this study including evacuators and remainers. 
Finally, similarities between the archetypes developed by nous and this study, support the 
strength of both approaches.  
 
The archetypes developed through this study appear to reflect Kahneman’s (2011, p. 97) 
proposition that people, when confronted with a complex question that they cannot 
satisfactorily answer, substitute an easier, related question that they answer instead. Instead of 
householders fully contemplating and deciding on the complexities of whether to remain and 
defend against, or evacuate from the bushfire, they do not address that question at all. Instead 
they address easier questions such as ‘Is there really a threat?’ (Threat Denier), ‘Is it my 
responsibility to deal with this?’ (Responsibility Denier), ‘Can I successfully defend?’ 
(Experienced Independent), ‘Can I safely evacuate?’ (Considered Evacuator), ‘Is it best to 
discuss what to do with my neighbours?’ (Community Guided) and ‘Am I experienced enough 
to successfully defend?’(Worried Waverer). 
 
The insights gained through the archetypes developed in this study provide a basis for the 
emergency authorities to productively interpret and respond to householders’ actions during a 
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bushfire. The central characteristics of the archetypes suggest features of bushfire safety 
programs that would more effectively promote community safety. Assessment of householders 
living in bushfire prone areas, based on these archetypes can facilitate the delivery of more 
targeted and effective community safety programs.  Australian emergency authorities have 
recognised that a major challenge in reaching diverse at-risk groups is identifying them ‘and 
how they might best be approached and influenced to behave safely’ (Cube Group., 2014, p. 
12). The discussion of self-evacuation archetypes that follows goes some way in establishing 
the characteristics of at risk groups and appropriate means of approaching and influencing 
them.   
 
7.4.1.  Converting Threat Deniers. 
 
It is irrational for someone who does not believe that a bushfire threat exists to prepare their 
property or themselves, to compose a bushfire plan or to waste time worrying about the 
possibility of a threat. They are unlikely to be involved in neighbourhood bushfire activities or 
to consider government communications about bushfire. When a bushfire occurs, they take 
little notice until the threat becomes imminent. However, the failure of the bushfire to become 
a threat is proof for the Threat Denier that there was no threat. The Threat Denier is an extreme 
case, but is likely to include those identified in the literature as not recognising that they are at 
risk (McLennan, Paton, & Wright, 2015; Whittaker et al., 2013). Passive communications 
strategies that rely on their active involvement are likely to fail to get the message through. An 
active bushfire safety program is required to forcefully demonstrate the reality of the bushfire 
threat. 
 
7.4.2.  Informing Responsibility Deniers of their responsibilities. 
 
Responsibility Deniers accept a bushfire threat exists but reject responsibility for protecting 
themselves or their property. They expect the emergency authorities to make decisions for 
them, to evacuate them if necessary and to fight the bushfire to protect their property, like the 
approach of North American emergency authorities. Because of this belief, they are unprepared 
for bushfire, not actively engaged in monitoring or preparing but expect the media or the fire 
authorities to advise and direct them. These individuals are in part represented in the literature 
as those who wait to be told what to do by the authorities (McLennan & Elliott, 2012). 
Engagement programs are required that clarify the specific role of the emergency services and 
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to graphically explicate the implications of the householders’ failure to take responsibility for 
their personal safety during a bushfire.          
 
7.4.3.  Identifying and supporting Dependent Evacuators. 
 
Dependent Evacuators accept that they should be responsible for themselves during the 
bushfire and are committed to evacuating to protect their personal safety but believe that they 
are incapable of doing so without assistance. They believe that they need the emergency 
services, relatives or friends to provide some form of evacuation advice and assistance to leave 
(Tibbits & Whittaker, 2007). Dependent Evacuators expect the emergency services to step in 
and protect their property when they evacuate expressing this as ‘getting out of the fire fighter’s 
way so they can do their job’. Individuals described in the literature as aged, disabled and 
vulnerable are representative of this archetype. This research suggests that the group extends 
beyond those who are elderly and disabled. A broader definition of dependence and 
vulnerability and strengthening programs for aged, disabled and vulnerable including the 
development of databases, coordination with local government services and logistical planning 
for evacuation is required.  
 
7.4.4.  Building on Community Guided networks. 
 
Householders who are well connected within their neighbourhood or local community and able 
to access information and advice through that network and the media exist in communities 
where ‘stories of bushfires and dealing with adversity are sustained… enhance(ing) knowledge 
about the local history of bushfires, about greater acceptance of the reality of bushfires…(Paton 
et al., 2006, p. 572). This Community Guided group are confident of and rely on the information 
and advice provided by influential and trusted people and organisations in their community and 
neighbourhood. They share the responsibility for deciding whether to remain or to evacuate. 
Decisions are based on the knowledge that they will assist one another. Access to high quality 
information from their neighbours and monitoring of the media and emergency services 
communications is essential to their protective decision-making. Community Guided 
householders tend to be involved in community and neighbourhood bushfire education and 
engagement programs.  Maintaining their involvement and continually improving and 
renewing the community engagement programs and systems is highly desirable (Fraser et al., 
2016) and a continuing challenge for the emergency services. This research’s independent 
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confirmation of the existence of this archetype reinforces the importance of neighbourhood/ 
community based bushfire education and engagement programs in both supporting and 
harnessing existing community capacity and action.  
 
7.4.5.  Facilitating Considered Evacuators. 
 
The threat of bushfire and its likely impact on their home and property is foremost in the minds 
of Considered Evacuators. They are committed to evacuating ahead of the threat, because they 
lack bushfire knowledge and experience and have made limited property preparations. They 
understand that by evacuating they put their property at risk but accept this as the cost of 
protecting their personal safety. As soon as they are aware of the bushfire threat they organise 
themselves and leave. Reports in the literature suggest that for longer duration fires such as that 
experienced in the Adelaide Hills, householders have more time to consider their options and 
prepare (Tibbits & Whittaker, 2007) and leave well in advance of the bushfire. These 
householders require timely, detailed, and accurate information and advice during the bushfire 
to identify the threat and make informed decisions on their evacuation. Since they are 
committed to evacuating, bushfire education programs can be pared-down to the essentials. 
Detailed information about other options is unnecessary. 
 
7.4.6.  Empowering Worried Waverers. 
 
Worried Waverers worry about potential injury or death if they remain and the destruction of 
their property if they leave. Their awareness of the bushfire threat, combined with a high degree 
of self-reliance and responsibility motivates their considerable efforts to organise against 
bushfire by maintaining and preparing their home and property and equipping it for property 
defence. During bushfire, they carefully monitor the media, analysing information in detail. 
They want to defend their property, have the training and equipment but lack fire ground 
experience and are unsure their information is up-to-date, accurate, and reliable. Wavering 
between remaining and evacuating places them in danger of attempting to defend against an 
extremely severe bushfire or deciding to evacuate at the last minute. Practical, intensive 
bushfire safety education programs during the bushfire season can raise experience and skills 
to a higher level and their confidence in making appropriate decisions.    
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7.4.7.  Harnessing the capabilities of Experienced Independents. 
 
Experienced Independents have considerable knowledge and experience with bushfire and 
many are, or have been, members of a volunteer bushfire brigade.  They are conscious of the 
bushfire threat but confident of minimizing the threat to household members and their property. 
They are self- reliant, responsible, and independent-minded. They believe that their extensive 
efforts to maintain their property, to remove vegetation and to secure structures, and the 
installation and deployment of equipment and water sources for property defence ensures their 
success without assistance from the authorities (McLennan, Paton, & Beatson, 2015). They 
have little confidence in the information and advice offered through the media or from the 
emergency services. They use their own information sources and those of close neighbours or 
friends and trust the evidence of their own eyes. Self-efficacy acts to reduce  intentions to seek 
information (Paton et al., 2006). They want access to accurate, detailed, and live information 
to allow effective defence preparations. Programs to improve quality and timeliness of 
information are required including access to live radio communication and investigating 
innovative means of information provision. Access to existing sources of information that are 
currently available, such as scanners, should not be removed without full consideration of the 
implications on all stakeholders.  Local emergency service leadership should consider if and 
how the expertise and knowledge of this group could be harnessed to the benefit of the 
community. 
 
7.5. Improvements that Can be Made to the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) 
 
This research suggests that the PADM is an effective theoretical framework for the description 
and analysis of protective action decision-making in an Australian bushfire event. However, 
generically designed for the analysis of all hazards, primarily for jurisdictions in which 
mandatory evacuation predominates, it is not a perfect fit for Australian bushfire. Proposed 
improvements are illustrated in Figures 7.1. and 7.2 with key modifications highlighted in pink.  
 
PADM encompasses protective response outputs that are both short-run and long-run in nature, 
that in Australian bushfire, model both evacuating and remaining (short-run hazard adjustment) 
and maintenance, preparation, and equipping actions (long-run hazard adjustment) aimed at 
property defence and personal protection while defending. This merging of response outputs is 
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inappropriate in an Australian bushfire context where the existence of a choice to defend means 
that the extent that long-run hazard adjustments are undertaken are related to decisions on 
short-run hazard adjustments. PADM would be more useful in the Australian bushfire context 
by the de-merging of short and long-run elements so that what is represented in the current 
model generically as ‘protective response’ is split to create two separate models – PADM I for 
short-run hazard adjustment as the protective response (Figure 7.1) and PADM II for long-run 
hazard adjustment as the protective response (Figure 7.2).  
 
To adequately represent and analyse an Australian bushfire context, long-run hazard 
adjustments such as property maintenance and preparation, equipping and self-protective 
actions need to be incorporated into the PADM as a factor determining evacuating or remaining 
(Figure 7.1). Incorporation of long-run hazard adjustments could be achieved in one of two 
ways. A factor placeholder could be created within the model as a variable acting directly on 
hazard adjustment perceptions as illustrated in Figure 7.1. Alternatively, long-run hazard 
adjustments could be incorporated as a variable influencing hazard adjustment perception in 
the same way that hazard intrusiveness, experience and proximity influence the core 
psychological elements of the PADM, by identifying significant interrelationships between the 
variables. Given the considerable influence that long-run hazard adjustments have on hazard  
adjustment perceptions in Australian bushfire the creation of a factor placeholder within the 
model, as illustrated in Figure 7.1, would be preferable.   
 
The official bushfire warnings systems within Australian States and Territories, following the 
recommendations of the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (VBRC), have been 
significantly extended and upgraded. They are now an integral part of the information and 
advice processes that begin early in a bushfire and extend right through its duration. Warnings 
are sent at the beginning of a bushfire to raise initial awareness and then continuously, 
throughout the duration of the bushfire reflecting heightening levels of danger. This study 
identified official warnings as a predictor of evacuation from bushfire. Because of the 
importance of official warnings in protective action decision-making in Australian bushfire the 
PADM requires amendment to incorporate warnings into the model as an ongoing input, in a 
manner like the way information-search is pervasive within the existing model. Warnings 
should be portrayed as an input into all stages (Figure 7.1) reinforcing its current role early in 
the first stage of the model. It is not a feedback loop like information-search since official 
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warnings are not able to be elaborated upon by the recipient without further input from the 
sender and are therefore unidirectional. 
 
The process of information-search is a feedback loop in the model.  Rather than representing 
information search as feeding-back only through the initial stage, the actual process is more 
accurately portrayed as feedback to all stages of the model simultaneously as illustrated in 
Figure 7.1. This reflects the importance of information search to the decision-making process 
and its extensive influence on all ‘stages’ of the model.  
 
Situational impediments in the model do not influence the decision to take a protective action 
but may cause delay, or in an extreme case, prevent, the implementation of a decision and 
therefore influence its timing once the decision is made. A more comprehensive definition of 
situational impediments is needed to take account of much broader socio-economic and cultural 
factors that may delay or prevent the implementation of a protective action such as evacuating 
from a hazard. For example, care and protection of livestock, upon which a householder is 
dependent for their livelihood, may delay their decision to evacuate to such an extent that the 
bushfire becomes an immediate threat that prevents safe evacuation and forces sheltering and 
property defence. In this case the situational impediment directly influences the protective 
action decision-making process as illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
 
The diagrammatic representation of PADM can also more clearly illustrate its key components 
and their relationships and the processes created through their interaction. Although this may 
offer only a marginal improvement, any enhancement of the model contributes to its theoretical 
and analytical weight. Environmental and social cues, information and warnings are 
appropriately grouped inputs at an early stage of a developing emergency. Channel access and 
preference relate specifically to information sources and warnings. Receiver characteristics 
separately relate to the cues, information, and warning. Repositioning of these factors would 
make their relationships clearer. 
 
 
 
211 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. PADM I for short run hazard adjustments - improved for Australian bushfire. Adapted from “The Protective Action Decision 
Model: theoretical modifications and additional evidence,” by. M.K. Lindell and R.W. Perry, 2012, Risk Analysis, 32(4), p. 617., 
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Figure 7.2. PADM II for long-run hazard adjustments - general improvements. Adapted from “The Protective Action Decision Model: 
theoretical modifications and additional evidence,” by. M.K. Lindell and R.W. Perry, 2012, Risk Analysis, 32(4), p. 617., 
 
 
213 
 
 
7.6. Conclusions 
This chapter has addressed the research questions by discussing the factors that influence self-
evacuation, the factors that predict self-evacuation and the characteristics of self-evacuators 
and linking them with relevant discussion and findings in the literature.  It has also discussed 
how the PADM can be improved as a theoretical and conceptual framework for the analysis of 
householder self-evacuation decision-making in Australian bushfire. 
 
This study has provided a detailed insight into the factors that influence and the processes 
involved in self -evacuation decision-making. On the first research question, it demonstrated 
that environmental and social cues and warnings and perceptions of threat, hazard adjustments 
and stakeholders, by providing inputs into the protective action decision-making process, 
influence householders’ decisions to self-evacuate. The location, behaviour and the severity of 
the bushfire, information and advice offered by neighbours and family members, and the 
official warnings received, dynamically influenced householders’ perceptions of the bushfire 
and their views about how best to respond. Understandings of the role of environmental and 
social cues in protective action decision-making that has been reported in the literature was 
confirmed and extended by this study. This study’s insights into the importance and impact of 
official warnings were consistent with the findings and directions outlined in Government 
reviews of ‘Emergency Alert’ and the national emergency warnings system. The findings of 
this study on the role of threat perceptions, perceptions of the effectiveness of hazard 
adjustments and perceptions of stakeholders in protective action decision-making were 
consistent with those reported in the literature. In addition, this study has highlighted the 
importance of hazard adjustments in influencing perceptions of hazard adjustments.  
 
In relation to the second research question, the study identified factors that predict self-
evacuation and as such play a key role in self-evacuation decision-making. Householders’ 
perceptions of the effectiveness of evacuating or remaining in protecting personal safety or 
property predict whether they will evacuate or not.  The receipt of an official warning and the 
perception that bushfire will damage or destroy property also predict evacuation. The literature 
contains some very limited discussion of factors predicting protective behaviour in bushfire. 
The findings of this study therefore contribute new and broader understandings of self-
evacuation in bushfire. 
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The existing picture that we have of householders making protective decisions in a bushfire is 
limited. The assumption of community bushfire safety programs that householders have a 
binary choice of evacuating or remaining to defend, is simplistic. By addressing the third 
research question this study has shown that the characteristics and circumstances of 
householders confronted by a bushfire threat are highly diverse and that they do not fit the 
stereotype of evacuator or remainer. Public policy needs to recognize and accommodate this 
diversity rather than attempting to force people into one of two unrealistic stereotypes. While 
there is no discussion in the literature on householder bushfire archetypes, the Victorian 
Government has made considerable efforts in characterising and understanding bushfire 
decision-makers that has been reported in the grey literature. This study has drawn a more 
comprehensive picture of the range of self-evacuation groups and coloured in some details of 
the characteristics of each of those groups.  
 
The Protective Action Decision Model, which has been tested and elaborated over many years 
in a wide range of studies of different hazards, is both a model and a theory of protective action 
decision-making. This study has concluded that it provides an appropriate analytical 
framework for the investigation and analysis of bushfire in Australia because it incorporates 
environmental and social cues and warnings as situational variables that inform and influence 
behaviour and decision-making.  Modifications to the PADM that separate long and short-run 
hazard adjustments as protective responses, incorporating long-run hazard adjustments as a 
factor influencing hazard adjustment perception and inserting the influence of information and 
warnings throughout all stages would improve the model for use in the analysis of decision-
making in Australian bushfire.   
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
The objectives of this thesis were to investigate the factors that influence householders’ 
decision to self-evacuate from an Australian bushfire, identify predictors of self-evacuation and 
specify the characteristics of self-evacuators.  The Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) 
provided a framework for this analysis of decision-making in Australian bushfire and was 
assessed for its usefulness and adequacy in this regard.  
 
Australian householders can choose their protective response to a bushfire threat by evacuating 
or remaining at their property because prevailing public policy does not require mandatory 
evacuation as generally practiced in North America and other jurisdictions. Bushfire safety 
policy educates the community to take decisions that will increase their safety in a bushfire, 
encouraging them to leave early and not ‘wait and see’ how a bushfire develops 
 
Bushfires are likely to become more frequent and severe in Australia due to global warming. 
In the past, major bushfires throughout Australia have resulted in fatalities, injury, extensive 
property damage, loss of livestock and crops and damage to infrastructure. The Black Saturday 
bushfire in February 2009, which killed 173 people and destroyed more than 2000 homes, 
resulted in the VBRC that brought about changes to bushfire safety policy throughout 
Australia. A new Fire Danger Rating (FDR) system and forecasts was introduced, 
recommending appropriate protective responses based on the ratings. Householders were 
advised that on day of ‘catastrophic’ Fire Danger Rating it was not safe to defend their property 
and that it was always safer to evacuate well before a bushfire arrived in the area. The official 
bushfire warning system was substantially upgraded incorporating messages communicating 
escalating levels of danger primarily delivered in text on mobile telephones, automated 
recordings on landlines and on radio and television.  
 
Notwithstanding these changes to bushfire safety policy and programs, householders continue 
to confront a fundamental choice of evacuating or remaining. Householders living in bushfire 
prone areas react to more intense bushfire seasons involving greater ‘fire activity and more 
significant fire events’ (Gilbert, 2014, p. 5; Muir, Gilbert, O'Hara, Day, & Newstead, 2017) by 
increasing preparedness activities. Improvements tend to be short-lived however, as the 
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influence of the vicarious experience of these major bushfires diminishes and householders 
focus on their daily lives. Despite considerable research there is not a clear understanding of 
why householders respond as they do during a bushfire. This study aims at providing some 
insight into the factors that influence householders’ self-evacuation decisions. Establishing the 
key factors influencing bushfire self-evacuation focuses bushfire safety policy on changes that 
will make the greatest difference to householders’ safety. Having a clearer view of the 
characteristics of self-evacuators supports the design of well-targeted education and 
engagement initiatives that reflect the needs of residents of bushfire prone areas.  
 
The first section of this chapter describes key findings of this research including: factors that 
influence householders’ self-evacuation decisions and that predict self-evacuation; the 
importance of long-run hazard adjustment on decisions to evacuate or remain; the 
characteristics of self-evacuators; and the usefulness of the PADM as a framework for analysis 
of decision-making in bushfire. The research questions posed by this thesis are then explicitly 
addressed. Next, the contribution to knowledge of bushfire self-evacuation made by this 
research is explored and the implications for policy and practice are advanced. Finally, the 
chapter suggests areas of further research that may be productively pursued. 
 
8.2. Statement of Key Findings 
 
The examination of householders’ self-evacuation decision-making during bushfire, as the first 
major challenge of this study, has highlighted its complexity and diversity. Householders adjust 
their daily lives to respond to a potential bushfire threat. They do not disrupt their routines 
unless they perceive it as necessary. This applies to all sorts of households, from the family 
with children, the retirees, the empty nesters pursuing a tree-change, the horse fanciers, to the 
farmers growing crops or livestock. From the newcomers who have recently moved up from 
the city, to those who have lived on an acre for ten years with their two dogs and twenty hens, 
to those who have lived in the bush all their lives. They all react differently in a bushfire but 
all have a common starting point – they do not want to disrupt their lives by over-reacting. So, 
they look for the smoke and what it’s doing. They talk to their neighbours and consult with 
their adult children located away from the fire threat, to reassure them and ask for advice. They 
listen for information on the radio and go to the emergency services website to check the latest 
information. They keep their mobile telephones close for warning texts from the fire 
authorities. A few do none of this and some do a lot more. The point is that they are active 
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interpreters of the prevailing circumstances based on their knowledge, beliefs and values, 
assessing their specific situation from the perspectives of their life experience and unique 
psychological predispositions. This research has established that householders’ stasis, in 
continuing their daily routine, may be disturbed by three key factors that predict evacuation. If 
householders believe their personal safety is best protected by leaving they are more likely to 
self-evacuate, especially if they have not adequately prepared their property or themselves. The 
receipt of an official warning message also predicts that householders are more likely to 
evacuate. Third, the belief that the bushfire will damage or destroy their property and implicitly, 
is a threat to their personal safety, also predicts that householders are more likely to self-
evacuate. Remainers are not the focus of the study but they are more likely to stay because of 
their perception that staying and defending is the best way to protect their property, especially 
if they have prepared it and equipped themselves to fight the bushfire. Remainers’ motivations 
and perspectives must be understood and accounted for because at any stage during a bushfire 
they can become self-evacuators if their circumstances deteriorate.  
 
Understanding the enormous diversity of responses to these factors by self-evacuators was the 
third major challenge of this research. Householders do not uniformly respond to calls to self-
evacuate. Their response is determined by personal psychology driving individual beliefs and 
values mediated by a complexity of experience, threat awareness, perceptions of preparedness 
and capability, self-reliance and responsibility and of others involved in the emergency, to 
name a few. Some will self-evacuate in a way and at a time that the emergency services would 
see as rational and safe. Many more will intend to evacuate but wait and see how the fire 
develops. This study suggests that this is a rational response based on the rules of thumb 
householders apply to their decisions. Of the seven archetypes identified in this study five will 
delay their self-evacuation for various reasons from denying the threat, to denying 
responsibility for themselves, to assimilating advice and information from neighbours and the 
community. This doesn’t include remainers who may change their mind and evacuate because 
of changed circumstances. Even then it is not simply a matter of evacuating to an area of safety 
away from the threat and waiting for the fire services to allow their return once the bushfire is 
extinguished. Some self-evacuators are extremely reluctant to go. They leave home but stay in 
the fire area hoping to be able to return quickly after the fire front has passed. Some are not 
convinced they have made the right decision and covertly return and then leave again.  Others 
leave but set up camp at road blocks pestering authorities to let them back in. This study 
suggests that the design of community bushfire safety education and the strategies employed 
 
 
218 
 
by the emergency services to communicate with and encourage householders to self-evacuate 
are based on an incomplete understanding of self-evacuation decision-making. A more realistic 
understanding of self-evacuators is necessary if the emergency services are to provide effective 
bushfire education programs that enhance householders’ understanding and responsiveness, 
and have a far-reaching influence on their decision-making during a bushfire.  
 
This study’s use of the PADM as a conceptual and analytical framework suggests that the 
model is a useful tool for Australian bushfire research, especially if improvements to its design 
are incorporated as suggested here. 
   
Eleven key findings have emerged from this research.  
 
• Hazard adjustment perceptions were influential in predicting evacuation from bushfire.  
The most important were householders’ perceptions of the effectiveness of hazard 
related actions in protecting personal safety or property. These two factors were pivotal 
in influencing whether householders evacuated or remained at their property during the 
bushfire.  Perceiving evacuating as best for personal safety predicted evacuating while 
seeing remaining as best to protect property predicted not evacuating. Threat perceptions 
did not play as important a role in predicting evacuation as did hazard adjustment 
perceptions. 
 
• Undertaking long-run hazard adjustments influenced the decision to evacuate or remain 
by shaping householders’ perceptions of the effectiveness of those actions in protecting 
personal safety and property. The PADM should incorporate long-run hazard 
adjustments as a factor influencing the decision to evacuate or remain.  
 
• Official bushfire warnings, primarily through text messaging on mobile telephone and 
automated recorded message on landline telephones, were also a key input into 
householders’ protective action decisions, predicting self-evacuation and influencing its 
timing. 
 
• Perceptions of the likely impact of bushfire on property predicted evacuation while 
threat to or impact on personal safety did not. Impact on property deputised for threat to 
personal safety. 
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• The actions taken by householders in a bushfire event were extremely varied and 
dependent on a complexity of personal attitudes and perceptions influencing their 
interpretation of the specific circumstances that they confronted. The characterisation of 
householders’ decision-making implicit in the ‘evacuate’ or ‘stay and defend’ dichotomy 
does not adequately reflect this complexity. The self-evacuation archetypes identified in 
this research more realistically characterise the variety of householders involved in an 
Australian bushfire event. As discussed in Chapter 7 bushfire safety education and 
engagement programs should take account of identified householder differences by 
targeting and adapting these programs and providing support to address specific needs. 
 
• The Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) was a useful framework for analysing 
attitudes, behaviour, and decision-making in Australian bushfire because, as 
demonstrated in both the quantitative and qualitative findings, it both captured many of 
the factors involved in decision-making and suggested how they relate to one another. 
By incorporating environmental and social cues and warnings, the model more 
comprehensively reflects the range of factors influencing attitudes and behaviour in a 
bushfire event than do other social psychological models such as the Theory of Reasoned 
Action and the Theory of Planned Behaviour. Modifications to the PADM as suggested 
in this thesis would make it even more useful for the analysis of attitudes and behaviour 
of householders in an Australian bushfire event.  
 
• The traditional media played a crucial role in communicating bushfire information and 
advice to householders. The role of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) as 
the official emergency services broadcaster and its reputation for high quality journalism 
may explain why many householders saw the media as knowledgeable about bushfire, 
well informed about the situation, and as providing accurate and reliable information 
and advice. 
 
• Bushfire experience, including personal involvement in firefighting and indirect 
experience through training from people with bushfire experience or by seeing smoke, 
was significantly related to the decision to evacuate, or remain. 
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• The scope of householders’ long-run hazard adjustments increased with the extent of 
their bushfire experience. More experienced householders undertook more maintenance, 
preparation and equipping for property defence and personal safety than did those with 
less bushfire experience.  
 
• Volunteer fire fighters were respected by many for their community service; however, 
the fire-fighting authorities were perceived by some as bureaucratic and having values 
and priorities that diverged from those of the community. The goal of shared 
responsibility in bushfire safety is consequently in danger because householders 
perceive emergency authorities as imposing their values and priorities rather than 
consulting and accommodating the views of communities. 
 
• The continuing development of private firefighting units, especially within rural 
communities, in part, reflects dissatisfaction with the State emergency authorities 
consistent with dissatisfaction with unfulfilled firefighting support previously reported 
in the literature. 
 
8.3. Responses to Research Objectives and Questions 
 
This thesis addressed the following research questions: 
 
i. What are the factors that influence householders’ decisions to self-evacuate? 
ii. What factors predict self-evacuation? 
iii. What are the characteristics of self-evacuators? 
iv. What improvements can be made to the PADM to enable better analysis of 
householder self-evacuation decision-making?  
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8.3.1.  Factors influencing decision to self-evacuate. 
 
The major factors that influenced decisions to evacuate or remain are discussed below:  
 
8.3.1.1. Environmental and social cues. 
 
Environmental and social cues raised householders’ initial awareness of the bushfire and 
provided ongoing information on its nature, behaviour, and progress. Environmental cues were 
primarily seeing and smelling smoke, seeing flames and hearing the activities of firebombing 
aircraft and firefighting units. Family members and neighbours were the primary source of 
social cues. In many cases both environmental and social cues indicated the existence of an 
initial threat, provided accurate and timely intelligence on the progress of the fire and triggered 
final protective action decisions, especially to evacuate.  These cues were key inputs informing 
householders’ judgements and decisions but did not determine whether they would decide to 
evacuate or remain at their property.   
 
8.3.1.2. Official warnings. 
 
The receipt of official warnings, primarily SMS to mobile telephones and automated landline 
messages, was an important factor in influencing many householders to take a protective 
decision to evacuate and in the timing of the implementation of that decision.  For many 
householders, the receipt of an official warning that they should evacuate was the final 
inducement necessary to motivate them to leave immediately.  Warnings on radio and 
television by the ABC, the official emergency broadcaster, were also extremely important 
especially for those who were less technologically knowledgeable.  
 
8.3.1.3. Expectation of property impact. 
 
The expectation that the bushfire would have an impact on the householder’s property shaped 
self-evacuation decisions although it was less influential than hazard adjustment perceptions 
and the receipt of official warnings. Threat perception was of lesser importance because 
householders could undertake long-run hazard adjustments to address and reduce threat. 
Remainers took actions to protect their property and to prepare and protect themselves while 
defending their property against bushfire. Their long-run hazard adjustments were primarily 
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concerned with asset protection and less with the protection of personal safety although 
remaining in a known, prepared environment was seen by some as best for personal safety. 
Evacuators prioritised personal safety over asset protection by leaving, and recognised and 
accepted a consequent heightened vulnerability of their property.  
 
8.3.1.4. Hazard adjustment perceptions. 
 
Hazard adjustment perceptions were central to householders’ self-evacuation decisions. The 
decision to evacuate or not was influenced by the perceived effectiveness of actions in 
protecting personal safety or property and the resources required to implement these actions. 
The effectiveness of evacuating or remaining in protecting personal safety or protecting 
property was vitally important to householders’ decisions. Evacuators saw their action as 
protecting personal safety although the decision was implemented in different ways including 
leaving immediately, consulting and cooperating with neighbours, waiting for advice from the 
emergency services and seeking assistance from others to leave. Remainers prioritised property 
protection over personal safety. Undertaking long-run hazard adjustment was related to 
householders’ perceptions that evacuating or remaining was effective in protecting personal 
safety or property. Evacuating was seen as best for personal protection when adequate long-
run hazard adjustments had not been undertaken while remaining was perceived as best for 
property protection when they had. Remainers needed knowledge, skills and time and effort to 
establish an effective bushfire defence and to engage in the act of fighting the bushfire. 
Evacuators needed to expend time and effort on packing personal items, organising children, 
vulnerable neighbours/family and pets and preparing property to have some chance of survival. 
Cooperation with family, friends and neighbours was extremely important for remainers in 
providing the assistance required to both prepare and fight the bushfire. While cooperation was 
less critical for evacuators because of the fewer demands in taking that action some dependent 
and community guided evacuators relied on cooperation from others. 
 
8.3.1.5. Perceptions of stakeholders. 
 
All stakeholders including householders and household members, neighbours, the media and 
the emergency services played important roles advising, informing, influencing and taking 
responsibility for themselves and others during the bushfire. 
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8.3.1.5.1. Householders. 
 
While most householders formulated protective action decisions for themselves, many did so, 
based on information and advice provided by other stakeholders. These stakeholders were 
influential because many householders saw themselves as lacking adequate knowledge of 
bushfire behaviour and personal bushfire fighting experience.  
 
8.3.1.5.2. Emergency services. 
 
The emergency services were considered knowledgeable, informed, and reliable information 
and advice providers. Local volunteer firefighters were valued and respected for their 
community service but the emergency service organisations managing them were perceived 
more critically. Generally, householders expected the emergency services to perform 
effectively like any other provider of an essential public service and were not emotionally 
attached to them. Many in the bushfire risk communities perceived the emergency services as 
a vital public service operating within but at arms-length from local communities. 
 
8.3.1.5.3. Media. 
 
The media and especially the ABC, as the official emergency broadcaster, was widely 
perceived in the community as reliable and trustworthy.  The ABC’s role as a conduit for 
emergency services’ communications combined with its own well-known reputation for quality 
reporting positioned it as pivotal source of bushfire information and advice. Consistent with 
the high standards set by the ABC, some commercial radio and television appeared to treat the 
broadcasting of bushfire information and advice more as a community service than a 
commercial opportunity.  
 
8.3.1.5.4. Neighbours. 
 
Neighbours typically shared information and advice with one another during the bushfire. 
Sharing of media information, intelligence from people on the fire ground and personal 
insights, occurred through social networks. While this sharing provided essential information 
and resource inputs, it was not central to protective action decision-making except for 
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householders who were guided by the community or dependent on community advice and 
assistance.  Some remainers also teamed up with neighbours to monitor the bushfire and fight 
it together. The sharing of resources, and support for one another exemplified cooperative self-
interest, enabling a much more effective defensive effort than working alone. This pattern of 
neighbourly teamwork enhanced property defence but generally did not influence the decision 
to remain or evacuate.  
 
8.3.1.6. Information search. 
 
Information search was a key part of the decision-making process. Householders made 
substantial efforts to access accurate, up to date and relevant information to inform their 
decisions. They did not simply accept the emergency authority ‘line’. They sought out 
information to assess the situation, the threat level, the bushfire’s likely progress and their 
protective options. They sought information that allowed them to make reliable judgements 
about severity, proximity, direction, and likely bushfire scenarios. Sometimes they needed 
information that was hard to get or highly complex, driving even greater efforts to access 
reliable sources and networks for detailed content relevant to their location and circumstances.  
 
8.3.2.  Factors that predict self-evacuating. 
 
Three factors were of primary importance in predicting evacuation: perceptions of protective 
actions; receipt of official warnings; and the likelihood of impact on property. Hazard 
adjustment perceptions were by far the most important factors predicting the decision to 
evacuate or not to evacuate. The perception that evacuation was the best way to protect the 
personal safety of the householder and household members was the key predictor of 
evacuation.  The view that remaining was the best way to protect property was the key, and 
even stronger, predictor of not evacuating. Evacuation was a means of ensuring personal safety 
whereas remaining sought asset protection over personal safety. Some householders believed 
that remaining was the best way to protect both property and personal safety because their 
preparations had made their property safer than any other location threatened by the bushfire. 
Perceptions of the protective action as inexpensive predicted evacuating and that it required 
knowledge and skill to implement predicted not evacuating although these were less important 
to the decision. 
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Receipt of an official warning from the emergency authorities also predicted evacuation.  
Receiving a warning by text or landline made the warning immediate and urgent. The official 
source gave the warning credibility and communicated the seriousness of the situation. Where 
there was uncertainty or disagreement about the appropriate protective response, the receipt of 
an official warning was decisive or swayed the argument. Receipt of an official warning also 
triggered action. 
 
While expectation that the bushfire would have an impact on property was the least important 
factor predicting evacuation it was an important indicator of the immediacy of danger. The 
householder’s presence at their property, with the bushfire threatening, implied immediate 
threat that prompted evacuation. The perception of danger was intensified for those who had 
not undertaken long-run hazard adjustments to maintain or prepare their property. 
 
Perceptions of the media as knowledgeable and reliable, and both media and neighbours as 
responsible for protecting the householder were significant predictors of evacuation. The 
magnitude of these odds ratios were inadequate to reflect even a small effect and consequently 
they cannot be included as factors in the model predicting evacuation. 
 
8.3.3.  Characteristics of self-evacuators. 
 
In this study perceptions of threat and impact of the bushfire, hazard adjustment perceptions 
and perceptions of stakeholders; perceptions of self–reliance and self-responsibility; and the 
intrusiveness of bushfire threat, primarily characterised householders’ response to the bushfire. 
These PADM-inspired factors quantitatively defined the outline, and coloured in the 
characteristics of a range of quite different self-evacuation archetypes, while qualitative data 
suggested that the factors captured some of the attitudes, perceptions, motivations and 
behaviours of real people living in bushfire affected areas in the Perth and Adelaide Hills. 
 
This study revealed different combinations of factors that characterised individuals who 
perceived and responded to similar bushfire circumstances in quite different ways.  Some 
refused to accept that a bushfire threat existed or that they needed to take responsibility for 
themselves. Others accepted the existence of a threat and recognized the need to act but were 
unable to do so on their own or required support and advice to work through the process. Others 
who were committed to remain and defend their property recognised the risk to personal safety 
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and wanted to be able to evacuate safely if they felt threatened. The detailed depiction of these 
archetypes provides a deeper understanding of the drivers of behaviour, the variety of actions 
and the different cognitive routes traversed to arrive at a decision to evacuate or remain. The 
clear depiction of archetypes provides a new perspective for policy makers to consider the 
design of bushfire safety education and engagement programs that can better engage and meet 
the needs of a broader range of householders living in bushfire prone areas.  
 
Recognition and acceptance of the diversity of householders’ perceptions and responses to 
bushfire has the potential to encourage emergency authorities to adopt an approach to 
community bushfire safety based on greater cooperation and community empowerment. The 
meaning of sharing responsibility for bushfire safety would be broadened and implementation 
strengthened by the acceptance and support of the diversity of householders’ perceptions and 
response.  
 
8.3.4.  How PADM can be improved. 
 
The PADM has been a valuable theoretical framework for this thesis in conceptualising, 
portraying and analysing self-evacuation decision-making in two Australian bushfire events. It 
assisted in identifying relevant factors and exploring the relationships between them. 
 
However, the model requires modification for the Australian bushfire context for two reasons. 
In Australia, unlike all other jurisdictions (except the south of France and a few states in the 
USA), householders can choose their preferred short-run hazard adjustment, to remain or to 
evacuate from a bushfire. They are also able to choose to undertake a range of long-run hazard 
adjustments. This study has demonstrated that the extent and type of long-run hazard 
adjustments undertaken influences householders’ perceptions of protective actions. 
Consequently, for clarity of exposition, long and short-run hazard adjustments need to be 
separate behavioural outcomes within the model. PADM should be depicted as two separate 
models for analysing evacuating or remaining as short-term hazard adjustments, and in 
analysing long-run hazard adjustments such as maintaining, preparing, and equipping for 
bushfire.  In addition, long run hazard adjustments should be included as a factor in the model 
examining decisions to evacuate or remain.                                                                               
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PADM should also be improved generally by more extensively incorporating official warnings 
and representing the information search process as an instantaneous feedback mechanism 
directly influencing all ‘stages’ of the model.  
 
The definition of situational impediments should incorporate economic, social, and cultural 
influences that may not directly determine the preferred protective response but may influence, 
delay or even prevent the implementation of that preferred response. These broader factors are 
as pervasive, deep seated and important as the demographic variables such as gender, age and 
length of residence that are currently incorporated within the PADM. 
  
8.4. Contributions to the Knowledge 
 
This study confirmed research findings in several related areas. It found that threat perception 
was not strongly correlated with short or long-run hazard adjustment (Wachinger, Renn, Begg, 
& Kuhlicke, 2013). Remaining was perceived as an economic (Tibbits & Whittaker, 2007) or 
asset protection strategy more than a strategy directed at personal safety . A significant 
relationship between long-run hazard adjustment and the intrusiveness of bushfire threat 
identified in this study had also been established for earthquake and volcano (Lindell & Prater, 
2000; Lindell & Whitney, 2000; Perry & Lindell, 2008; Whittaker et al., 2013).  
 
This study has contributed new knowledge by identifying factors that predict evacuating or not 
evacuating from Australian bushfire based on actual behaviour following major bushfires 
rather than intended responses to a hypothetical bushfire scenario. This contribution needs to 
be examined and extended in further research as discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
 
The literature has explored in detail, across many hazards, the relationship between hazard 
adjustment perception and long-run hazard adjustments, however there is limited research on 
the influence of hazard adjustment perceptions on short-run hazard adjustment, evacuating or 
remaining, during a bushfire. One study has identified ‘attitude to leaving as a safe option’ as 
a significant and positive independent predictor of strength of intention to leave based on a 
theoretical bushfire scenario (McLennan, Cowlishaw, et al., 2014). The research reported here, 
based on actual behaviour, has investigated, and subsequently highlighted the importance of 
four separate hazard adjustment perception measures in predicting evacuation from bushfire. 
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It also established the importance of official warnings as a significant predictor of evacuation 
from bushfire. No similar finding is reported in the literature. 
 
The findings of this research have elevated the importance of long-run hazard adjustments in 
their influence on householders’ perceptions of protective actions and in understanding of 
householder behaviour in Australian bushfire. Undertaking or failing to undertake long-run 
hazard adjustments influences householders’ perceptions of the effectiveness of evacuating or 
remaining in protecting personal safety or property and influences the decision to evacuate or 
remain.   
 
Through a multifaceted characterisation of bushfire self-evacuators, this study has extended 
the understanding of the reasons for householders’ attitudes and responses in a bushfire. It has 
challenged the simplistic understanding based on the dichotomy of householders as either 
evacuating or staying to defend. This provides a more authentic basis for the emergency 
services to design appropriate community bushfire safety education and engagement policies. 
 
Finally, as previously discussed, this study has identified the need to modify PADM to 
incorporate long-run hazard adjustments as a factor influencing hazard adjustment perceptions 
and short-run protective response as a behavioural outcome. It also suggests two separate 
models for short-run and long-run protective behavioural responses for PADM’s effective use 
in an Australian bushfire context.  
 
8.5. Implications for Policy and Practice 
 
Factors identified in this study as predicting evacuation can assist in designing and targeting 
bushfire education and engagement policy.  The three key factors that can contribute to the 
improvement of public policy are the perception that evacuating is best for personal safety, that 
remaining is best for protecting property and the influence of the receipt of official warnings 
on evacuating. Bushfire education programs have consistently emphasised the potential risks 
to personal safety of remaining or of late evacuation. This study reinforces the need for 
education programs to emphasise the risk to personal safety arising from decisions that delay 
evacuation and result in dangerous, late evacuation and suggests that further efforts are required 
to clarify the extent of the risk from bushfire to personal safety and the extreme danger posed 
by late evacuation. 
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There is currently a unique opportunity to build on the extensive use, acceptance and credibility 
of official bushfire warnings that prevails within the Australian community. These warnings, 
especially those delivered by text messages on mobile telephones and audio recordings on 
landline currently have the ear and eye of the public.  However, this study suggests that these 
official warnings suffer from shortcomings that can undermine their effectiveness and 
acceptance into the future. Official warning messages are more likely to be accessed, accepted, 
and acted upon if they provide access to up-to-date, accurate, and detailed information that is 
relevant to the receiver. The communication of incorrect, out of date or location inappropriate 
warnings undermined their credibility. Use and acceptance of official warning messages could 
be improved by expanding and regularly updating geographically targeted content and advice. 
With such improvement, official warnings can be even more persuasive in influencing 
decisions to evacuate and to leave well in advance of the bushfire. 
 
This study highlighted the importance of the media, especially the ABC, as a communicator of 
bushfire information and advice. The extent of the media’s role and influence may be a 
uniquely Australian phenomenon based on the ABC’s reputation as a high quality public 
broadcaster built over many decades, its status as the official emergency broadcaster and the 
perception in the community that the emergency services provide much of the emergency 
information broadcast by the ABC. For whatever reason, much of the bushfire information and 
advice provided by the media is influential. Increasing content and location relevance and 
timeliness of bushfire information and advice through the ABC could further strengthen the 
effectiveness of its emergency communications. Perhaps influenced by the success of the ABC, 
some commercial radio broadcasters have recently instigated community service broadcasts on 
bushfire. This development should be encouraged. Efforts by public and commercial media to 
improve their expertise and credibility in communicating emergency information and advice 
increases the likelihood that at-risk householders will access, accept, and implement it. 
. 
There is also a challenge for government to improve community access to quality bushfire 
information through a range of other public and private sources. It is a challenge requiring 
consideration by government because much of the at-risk community expect much better 
bushfire information and believe that government should make it a priority. Householders, 
especially those who chose to remain or did not evacuate immediately, wanted live, detailed, 
accurate, location-specific information about bushfire. Community access to restricted 
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emergency services information and Government initiatives improving Internet based 
emergency information are needed. Social media is an increasingly important information 
source requiring the development of improved web and mobile based platforms that can be 
used by the emergency services, to communicate more detailed and extensive official 
information. Information access issues also require consideration. Radio and internet based 
scanners are increasingly used by householders as an important source of live information 
during a bushfire event. The costs and benefits of proposed actions by the emergency 
authorities to prevent access to this information source should be carefully considered. A small 
number of householders used aerial drones near their property to collect live information on 
the bushfire. While this poses a safety issue for aircraft operating in the area, the considerable 
potential and likely future popularity of this information gathering technology requires 
government to balance community demands for quality information and the safety of 
firefighting aircraft.  
 
A potential future conflict between the emergency authorities and the at-risk community is 
emerging. Although couched in the language of shared responsibility, the attitudes of the 
emergency authorities toward the community may be perceived as protective authoritarianism 
rather than collaborative engagement and cooperation. Government policy of shared 
responsibility needs to recognise the diversity of people’s circumstances, characteristics and 
needs as reflected in the diverse characteristics of self-evacuators identified in this study. The 
emergency services could then communicate and interact with the community in ways that 
reflect the reality of their circumstances and for the community to see the authorities attempting 
to meet their specific needs. 
 
There is a mismatch between contemporary bushfire fighting strategies employed by the 
emergency services and expectations of many in the community who prefer the traditional 
approach to firefighting - ‘just going and putting out the fire’. This has resulted in some 
confusion and dissatisfaction with the performance of the emergency authorities within the 
community and greater visibility of the activities of private fire-fighting groups responding to 
and rejecting emergency services’ fire-fighting strategies. This poses a multi-faceted challenge 
to public policy. Community concerns about the appropriateness and effectiveness of current 
bushfire fighting strategies need to be transparently assessed and the community advised of the 
rationale for the approach that has been adopted in recent years (Paveglio et al., 2015). Dialogue 
and reconciliation with experienced individuals including those involved in private fire-
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fighting groups needs to be pursued to establish more constructive relations and to harness their 
expertise and resources (Stasiewicz & Paveglio, 2016).  
 
Bushfire safety education and engagement policies and programs should be designed and 
targeted to specifically address the diversity of the perceptions, attitudes, needs and 
circumstances of residents of bushfire prone areas. 
 
 
8.6. Implications for Research 
 
A growing body of evidence suggests that climate change will increase the frequency and 
severity of bushfire in many locations within Australia including rural and urban interface areas 
(Bradstock et al., 2009; IPCC Fifth Assessment Report Working Group II, 2014; Liu et al., 
2010). Emergency authorities promote evacuation as the safest protective response to bushfire 
and assert, based on extensive research, that late evacuation is dangerous and a key contributor 
to bushfire fatalities. Although there has been significant Australian research on protective 
responses to bushfire, including self-evacuation, the pressures from climate change and the 
growing human populations in bushfire prone areas requires the continuing research efforts be 
applied. This study has taken some initial steps toward a better understanding of the factors 
that predict evacuating or not evacuating, and the characteristics of individuals that influence 
their responses to a bushfire threat, but these exploratory insights need consolidation. The 
conclusions are limited by both an inadequate sample size and incomplete conceptualisation of 
factors affecting evacuation. Few Australian studies address actual or intended evacuation 
decision-making (McLennan et al., 2012). Two important studies that consider decision-
making and intentions are limited by small or self-selected samples and adopt an expectancy-
valence framework that excludes environmental and social factors (McLennan, Cowlishaw, et 
al., 2014; McLennan et al., 2012)  Further research is needed to strengthen the conceptual 
framework of self-evacuation decision-making through the rigorous integration of the 
psychological insights of expectancy-valence models and environmental and social factors that 
are demonstrably important in bushfire behaviour. Further research to collect sufficient data is 
needed to enable sound conclusions on more factors predicting evacuation, including those 
identified in this research as significant but tentative due to sample size.  
 
This study established that the receipt of official warnings was a predictor of evacuation. There 
has been considerable research on warnings reported in the grey literature that should be used 
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as a basis for definitive synthesizing research on how to improve official bushfire warnings to 
enhance their usefulness in decision-making and the likelihood that they will be accepted and 
acted upon by the receiver (Cube Group., 2014; Ipsos Social Research Institute., 2014).  
 
The potential opportunities for improved emergency communication presented by the unique 
relationship between the emergency services and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
should be investigated. The high level of community trust in and reliance on both the 
emergency services and the ABC demands a rigorous investigation of how this can be 
harnessed to better encourage people to listen to and act on media information and advice.  
 
The information landscape is changing rapidly and there is clear evidence of greater use of 
social media in the dissemination and collection of emergency information (Alexander, 2014; 
Bird et al., 2012; Reuter et al., 2013; Simon et al., 2015). Research is required for a better 
understanding of the forms of social media used, the factors that encourage social media use 
over other more traditional emergency information sources and how the Australian emergency 
authorities can more effectively connect with and use this emerging trend in a bushfire event. 
 
Australian studies have reported on the significant proportion of individuals who ‘wait and see’ 
how a bushfire develops and whether it becomes a threat, before making a decision to evacuate 
(McLennan, Paton, & Wright, 2015). This has been linked to late evacuation and fatalities 
(McLennan et al., 2012; Tibbits & Whittaker, 2007). This research confirmed that a 
considerable minority of householders ‘wait and see’ how a bushfire develops before they take 
protective action and suggested that this behaviour may be a product of the application of rules 
of thumb that guide their decision-making. Further research is required to explore how rules of 
thumb influence householders’ decisions to wait and see during a bushfire. 
 
Reporting actual behaviour, his study has emphasised the influence of undertaking long-run 
hazard adjustment on the perception of short-run hazard adjustments. Other studies based on 
intended behaviour also identified significant relationships between hazard mitigation 
activities and intentions to remain and defend or to evacuate (McNeill et al., 2013; Paton et al., 
2006; Whittaker et al., 2013). More research, based on actual, rather than intended behaviour, 
is required to more clearly establish which preparatory actions most significantly influence 
short-run hazard adjustments. 
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There is a need for an improved understanding of the characteristics of householders who 
evacuate from, and those who stay and defend against a bushfire. One Australian study 
examined the psychological differences between intended evacuees and remainers  
(McLennan, Paton, & Beatson, 2015) and a report commissioned by the Victorian Fire Services 
Commissioner (nous Group., 2013) using a qualitative methodology, devised seven archetypes 
reflecting typical patterns of attitudes and behaviours of people responding to the threat of a 
bushfire. This thesis, using a mixed methodology and extensive quantitative data that enabled 
the development of a statistically significant model, identified self-evacuation archetypes 
characterised by typical patterns in the way they understood and responded to bushfire. 
Understanding the attitudes and perceptions of householders facing a bushfire threat is 
fundamental to the creation of more effective public policy. Further research to extend the 
range, and improving the measurement of behavioural factors that are used in characterising 
self-evacuators, is needed. 
 
Community attitudes toward, and expectations of, the fire services, including professional and 
volunteer fire-fighters, is increasingly complex and appear to be changing. Research is required 
to establish community attitudes toward the fire services and their implications for how the fire 
authorities engage and communicate with bushfire prone communities. 
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Appendix A: Telephone Survey 
Hello my name is [NAME OF INTERVIEWER] and I am doing PhD research on what 
influences people's self-evacuation from bushfire. Would you agree to be interviewed about 
your experiences with the recent bushfire in your area? The questions will take about 30 
minutes. Your answers will be confidential. I would like you to answer all the questions but 
you don’t have to. If any questions cause, you distress please let me know and I will stop. 
 
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED IN LETTER SENT TO 
RESPONDENT 
[Following consent] 
 
After this interview, I would like to discuss the possibility of meeting you and any other adult 
household members to further discuss important issues that arise from this interview. Only 
myself and my two University supervisors will have access to your responses and all the 
information you provide will be de-identified and stored securely for up to 5 years and then 
destroyed.  
 
The results of this research will be reported in my thesis and may also be published in 
journals, conference papers and other publications. 
You can: 
 
• Withdraw as a participant at any time 
 
• Have unprocessed answers withdrawn and destroyed 
 
• Have any questions you ask answered at any time 
 
Do you have any questions about any of that? 
Now let’s get started…. 
 
1. What is the approximate distance between your house and the nearest bushland area? (An 
area of forest or trees or bush etc) 
  Less than 100 metres 
  Between 100 and less than 500 metres 
  Between 500 metres and 1 kilometre 
  Greater than 1 kilometre 
 
2. Which of the following best describes the property you live on? 
  House on residential block 
  Hobby farm or small acreage (over ½ acre) 
  House on large farm 
  Other[specify] ___________________________________ 
 
 
3. Has there been a bushfire in your local area in the last 3 months? 
  Yes 
  No [Terminate] 
  Don’t Know [Terminate] 
 
4. How close did the bushfire come to your house? 
  Fire burnt house/sheds/garden 
  Less than 100 metres 
  Between 100 and less than 500 metres 
  Between 500 metres and 1 kilometre 
  Between 1 and 2 kilometres 
  Greater than 2 kilometres 
 
5. Which one of the following best describes what you did during the bushfire?  
  Left before the fire arrived in my town or suburb 
  Left when the fire arrived in my town or suburb 
  Stayed and actively defended the house and property 
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  Began defending the house and property from the fire but left when I felt the danger 
was too great  
  Stayed to actively defend the house and property but the fire never arrived 
  Did not actively defend the house or property but stayed throughout the fire and 
sheltered inside the house  
  Did not actively defend the house or property but stayed throughout the fire and 
sheltered in a structure (other than the house) or vehicle 
  Did not actively defend the house or property but stayed throughout the fire and took 
refuge somewhere else 
  Intended to leave but stayed because the fire never arrived 
  Other (specify) ___________________________________ 
 
 
5a. At the beginning of last summer, which one of the following did you think you were most 
likely to do if a bushfire occurred in your town or suburb? 
  Stay and try and protect your property throughout the fire 
  Do as much as possible to protect your property but leave if threatened by the fire 
  Wait to see what the fire is like before deciding whether to stay and defend or leave 
  Wait for police, fire or emergency services to tell you what to do on the day 
  Leave as soon as you know there is a fire threatening your town or suburb 
  You would not be at home because you intend to leave on days of high fire danger 
  Hadn't thought about it 
  Other (specify) ___________________________________ 
 
 
6. During this current bushfire season but before the recent fire in your area, how frequently 
would you say you had: 
Thought about the threat of bushfires 
Talked to your friends/ neighbours about 
the threat of bushfires 
Heard about the threat of bushfires through 
the media 
Read information on bushfire in brochures, 
newspapers, the Internet etc 
 Not at all 
 Very little 
 Some of the time 
 Often 
 Very often 
 Don't Know 
 
7. In the past, before this most recent bushfire, had you had any personal experience of 
bushfire (not necessarily fighting a fire)? 
  Yes 
  No 
  Don’t Know 
 
8. Before this recent bushfire how long ago did you last have personal experience of a 
bushfire? 
  Less than 12 months ago 
  1 - 5 years 
  6-10 years 
  11-20 Years 
  More than 20 years 
 
 
9. Before this recent bushfire, in the past, have you or any people in your household 
experienced any of the following: 
Seen or smelt smoke 
Experienced property damage due to 
bushfire 
Evacuated from a bushfire 
Been injured by a bushfire 
Experienced death as a result of bushfire 
[REFER TO NOTES] 
 Yes 
 No 
 DK 
 
 
10. Have you had any of the following training or experience: 
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Currently or previously a member of a fire 
brigade 
Formal or informal training from people 
with bushfire experience 
Personal experience fighting bushfires 
Other bushfire experience or training 
 Yes 
 No 
 DK 
 
 
11. In the future, how likely do you feel it is that a bushfire will: 
Threaten your property 
Injure you or family members 
Disrupt your work or job 
Disrupt your normal day to day activities 
such as shopping or recreation  
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Neither likely or unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very likely 
 Not applicable 
 
 
12. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
The emergency services will tell me if I 
need to leave my home during a bushfire 
I know that I need to be self-reliant in the 
event of a bushfire 
The emergency services are responsible 
for protecting me if there is a bushfire 
I accept responsibility for my home and 
property during the bushfire season. 
The emergency services are responsible 
for protecting my home if a bushfire 
threatens it 
 Strongly disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither agree or disagree 
 Agree 
 Strongly agree 
 
Now I'd like you to think about the recent bushfire and your feelings and experiences during it. 
I'd like you to tell me about your thoughts and feelings that lead you to do what you did during 
the bushfire. 
 
13. How did you first become aware that there was a bushfire in your area? 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
14. Which of the following were the main sources of information that you used when you were 
at home during the bushfire? [PROBE: Were there any other sources?] 
  Environmental cues-flames, embers and smoke, wind, heat 
  Radio  
  Television. 
  Fire agency (CFA/DSE/DFES) website 
  Twitter on my computer 
  Facebook on my computer 
  Family and /or friends. 
  Neighbours 
  Twitter on my mobile 
  Facebook on my mobile 
  Other (please describe) ___________________________________ 
  Did not get any information. 
 
15. What type of information did you mainly try to get from these sources? [DO NOT READ] 
  Confirmation that there was a bushfire 
  Severity of the bushfire 
  Location of bushfire 
  Proximity of brushfire to my home 
  Where the bushfire was heading 
  How fast the bushfire was travelling 
  Safe escape routes that I could use 
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  Location of community refuge  
  Other ___________________________________ 
 
 
16. Did you receive any of the following bushfire warnings from the fire authorities? 
  Alert- informed there was a non-threatening fire  
  Watch and Act-informed there was a threatening fire 
  Emergency Warning-that you are in danger and should leave or prepare to fight 
  Emergency Warning-that it is too late to leave 
  No warning received 
  Don't Know 
 
 
17. Which of the following ways did you receive the warning message from the fire authorities: 
  A recorded warning message on my landline telephone 
  An SMS message on my mobile phone 
  A message on my App on my mobile telephone 
  Fire agency (CFA/DSE) website 
  Siren 
  Door knocking by emergency services 
  On the radio 
  TV 
  Other ___________________________________ 
 
 
18. During the course of the bushfire, while you were at home, how many major sources of 
information did you use in total? 
 Number ______ 
 
19. During the course of the bushfire approximately how much did you check your bushfire 
information sources? [READ SCALE] 
  Did not check information sources 
  A very small number of times 
  A small number of times 
  A moderate number of times 
  A large number of times 
  A very large number of times 
 
20. How carefully did you consider the information you got about the bushfire? [READ 
SCALE] 
  Did not consider the information at all 
  Not carefully considered 
  Reasonably carefully considered 
  Very carefully considered 
  Gave it extremely careful consideration 
 
21. Thinking about the main sources of information you used, how easy or difficult was it for 
you to understand the information that you got about the bushfire?  
  Very difficult 
  Difficult 
  Neither difficult or easy 
  Easy 
  Very easy 
 
22. Why did you find it difficult to understand the bushfire information you received? 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
23. At the height of the bushfire, when you were still at home, how much of a threat did you 
feel the bushfire was to: [AT THE WORST TIME DURING THE BUSHFIRE] 
 Level of threat 
You (and your family)  No threat 
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Your property  Very small threat 
 Small threat 
 Medium threat 
 Large threat 
 Very large threat 
24. What was the main thing that made you feel that the bushfire was a medium/ large/ very 
large threat to you/ your family / your property? 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
25. What was the main thing that made you feel that the bushfire was a small/ no threat to 
you/ your family / your property? 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
26. At its height, when you were still at home, how large an impact did you think the bushfire 
would have on: [AT THE WORST TIME DURING THE BUSHFIRE] 
  
 Level of Impact 
You and your family 
Your property 
 No impact 
 Very small impact 
 Small impact 
 Moderate impact 
 Large impact 
 Very large impact 
 
  
27. At the height of the bushfire when you were still at home, how likely did you think that it 
would have the following impacts: [AT THE WORST TIME DURING THE BUSHFIRE] 
  
Cause death to you or close family 
members 
Cause injury to you or close family 
members 
Damage or destroy your house 
Damage or destroy other property of 
yours 
Cause death or injury to pets 
Cause death or injury to livestock 
 
 
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Neither likely or unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very likely 
 Not applicable 
 
 
28. At the time that you first became aware of the bushfire how quickly did you expect it to 
become a threat to you (your family) and your property? 
  Immediately or within minutes 
  Within 30 minutes 
  Within 1 hour 
  1-2 hours 
  3-5 hours 
  6-12 hours 
  13-24 hours 
  More than 24 hours 
  Didn't expect it to become a threat 
 
29. Before or during the bushfire did you do any of the following things? [I WANT TO 
UNDERSTAND YOUR THINKING PROCESS] 
Thought of different ways to respond to the 
bushfire 
Weighed up the best ways of responding, 
including doing nothing  
 Before the bushfire started 
 During the bushfire 
 No- neither before nor during the 
bushfire 
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Decided on the way you would respond to 
the bushfire 
Developed a clear plan of what you and 
your family would do to respond to the 
bushfire? 
 
30. Before or during the bushfire did you do any of the following things?  
Cleared gutters of leaves  
Cleared leaves, twigs and long grass 20-
30 metres around the house 
Moved combustible materials like firewood 
or garden furniture away from the house 
Removed bushes close to the house and 
cut back overhanging tree branches 
Covered all gaps and vents to reduce the 
risk of embers entering the house or 
cavities 
Obtained and prepared firefighting 
equipment like a pump and hoses 
Turned on sprinklers or sprayed your 
house and surrounding area with water  
Obtained and prepared equipment such as 
ladder, bucket and mop to put out spot 
fires 
Filled gutters with water 
Prepared personal items and memorabilia 
for evacuation 
Prepared a kit of personal protective 
clothing for each household member 
Moved your car into a position for quick 
evacuation 
 Before the bushfire started 
 During the bushfire 
 No- neither before nor during the 
bushfire 
 
31. Did you at any stage during the bushfire, evacuate yourself (and your family) from your 
home or did you remain at your home throughout the bushfire? 
  Evacuate yourself (and your household) 
  Remain at your home throughout 
  Other (specify) ___________________________________ 
 
32. What were the most important factors that influenced your decision to evacuate from your 
home? [PROBE: ANY OTHERS] 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
33. What were the most important factors that influenced your decision to remain at your 
home throughout the bushfire?[PROBE: ANY OTHERS] 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
34. Before or during the bushfire, did you work out an evacuation plan that included where 
you would evacuate to, the transportation you would use and the route you would take 
(depending on the location and path of the fire)? 
  Before the bushfire 
  During the bushfire 
  No- did not have evacuation plan 
  Don't Know 
 
35. I would like you to think about the following statements and tell me if you strongly agree, 
agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree or strongly disagree with them: 
Evacuating is the best way to protect 
myself (and my family) 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Neither Agree or Disagree 
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Evacuating is the best way to protect my 
property 
It is not expensive to evacuate 
I need knowledge and skill to evacuate 
There is time and effort required to 
organise to evacuate 
I need co-operation from family/ friends to 
evacuate 
Remaining and defending is the best way 
to protect myself (and my family) 
Remaining and defending is the best way 
to protect my property 
It is not expensive to remain and defend 
I need knowledge and skill to remain and 
defend 
There is time and effort required to 
organise to remain and defend 
I need co-operation from family/ friends to 
remain and defend 
 
 
 Agree 
 Strongly Agree 
IF RESPONDENT DID NOT EVACUATE DO NOT ASK Q36 
36. To what extent did the following factors make it difficult, delayed or prevented you from 
evacuating?  
Availability of a safe escape route  
Availability of transportation 
Time of day/night 
Traffic conditions on your escape route 
Expected cost of accommodation when 
evacuated 
Emotional reaction of myself and/or 
household member to bushfire threat 
Not having a thought-out evacuation plan 
Disability of myself and/or household 
member 
Separation of household members during 
the bushfire 
Need to take care of domestic pets (cats, 
dogs) 
Need to take care of non-domestic pets 
(hens, pigs, sheep) 
Need to take care of livestock 
Concern that roadblocks might prevent you 
returning home  
 
 
 Not at all 
 Small extent 
 Moderate extent 
 Large extent 
 Very large extent 
 Not applicable 
37. Now thinking about your experience with bushfire generally and with the following 
indiviuals and organisations, on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is not all and 10 is a great 
extent, to what extent do/are [CITE GROUP]..: [READ RESPONSES EXACTLY AS 
WRITTEN] 
 You/family Neighbours  TV 
and/or 
radio 
Emergency 
services - 
fire fighters 
and police 
Influence your 
thinking and 
what you did 
during the 
bushfire. 
Have 
specialist 
knowledge 
and 
You/family 
______ 
Neighbours 
______ 
TV 
and/or 
Radio 
______ 
ES ______ 
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understanding 
of how a 
bushfire is 
likely to 
behave.  
Well informed 
about what 
was actually 
happening 
during the 
bushfire.  
Give accurate, 
complete and 
impartial 
information 
and advice 
about the 
bushfire.  
Responsible 
for protecting 
you (your 
family) and 
your property 
against the 
bushfire. 
 
38. You said that [INSERT ONLY THOSE RATED 7 AND ABOVE FROM THE FIRST LINE IN 
Q37] influenced your thinking and actions during the bushfire. Did they influence you mainly 
because their information and advice highlights the RISK that the bushfire posed to you (your 
family) OR do they influence you mainly because you saw them as reliable, trustworthy and 
they know what they are talking about? 
  Reason for Influence 
Your family 
Neighbours  
TV and/or Radio 
Emergency services - fire fighters and 
police 
 Made me aware of the RISK posed 
by the bushfire 
 Because they are reliable, 
trustworthy, know what talking about 
 Not applicable 
 
39. Did the fire authorities fight the bushfire within about 1 or 2 kilometres of your property? 
  Yes  
  No 
  Don't Know 
 
40. How much of an influence on your decision to %Q31LBL% was the presence/ absence of 
fire authorities to fight the bushfire within 1 or 2 kilometres of your property? 
  No influence at all 
  Very small influence 
  Some influence 
  Large influence 
  Totally influenced my decision 
 
 
41. Why do you say that? 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
And now for the last few questions... 
 
42. Which of the following best describes your household composition? 
  Couple with one or more children or dependents living at home 
  Couple without children or dependents living at home 
  Single person with children or dependents living at home 
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  Single person without children or dependents living at home 
  Group of adults living together 
  Other ___________________________________ 
 
43. What is the total number of non-dependent adults (18 years and over) living in your 
household? 
 Number of non-dependent adults ________ 
 
44. What is the total number of dependent adults (18 years and over) living in your 
household? 
 Number of dependent adults ________ 
 
45. What is the total number of children and dependents (including elderly and disabled) of 
the following ages living in your household? 
 Dependents 0-5 years ________ 
 Dependents 6-12 years ________ 
 Dependents 13-17 years ________ 
 Elderly/disabled adult dependents _______ 
 
46. To which one of the following age groups do you belong? 
  18 to 24 
  25 to 34 
  35 to 44 
  45 to 54 
  55 to 64 
  65 -74 
  75 and over 
 
47. How long have you lived in the locality you live in now?[LOCALITY GENERALLY NOT 
SPECIFIC HOME] 
  Less than 1 year 
  1 to 3 years 
  4 to 10 years 
  More than 10 years 
 
48. What is the main language that you speak at home? 
  English 
  Another language. What language ___________________________________ 
 
49. Are you a volunteer in a local bushfire brigade? 
  Yes 
  No 
 
50. Do you or any member of your household have a disability or condition that requires 
assistance or care? 
  Yes 
  No 
 
51. Do you or any member of your household have special needs or a vulnerability in an 
emergency situation? 
  Yes 
  No 
 
52. What is the postcode of the area you live in? 
 Postcode ________ 
  
53. Do you own your house, in the process of buying it, rent it or do you have some other 
arrangement? 
  Own home 
  In process of buying (mortgage) 
  Renting 
  Other arrangement 
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54. Prior to the bushfire what kind of insurance did you have? 
  House and contents 
  House only 
  Contents only 
  Outbuildings only (sheds) 
  Farm insurance (livestock/machinery) 
  No insurance 
 
55. Are you a member of: 
  a neighbourhood bushfire group  
  Community Fireguard? 
  Not a member of any bushfire group 
 
56. Do you have domestic pets such as cats or dogs? 
  Yes 
  No 
 
57. Do you have any non-domestic animals that you treat as pets like hens, pigs, goats or 
sheep? 
  Yes 
  No 
 
58. Do you have animals such as horses, cows or other livestock? 
  Yes 
  No 
 
59. Could I have your first name only please? 
 Name ___________________________________ 
 
I HAVE A SHORT PARTICIPANT INFORMATION LETTER ABOUT THIS RESEARCH. CAN 
I EMAIL OR POST IT TO YOU PLEASE? 
59a. Can I have an email or street address I can send you information on this research that I 
am doing? 
 Address ___________________________________ 
 
That is the end of the interview. Thank you for your time. Just to remind you that I am [NAME 
OF INTERVIEWER] and If you have any questions, concerns or feedback please contact Ken 
on 0418 532 472. 
 
60. RECORD GENDER 
  Male 
  Female 
 
61. RECORD TELEPHONE NUMBER 
 Telephone _________ 
 
 
62. RECORD STREET ADDRESS 
 Street Address ___________________________________ 
 
63. RECORD NAME OF INTERVIEWER 
 Interviewer ___________________________________ 
 
64. RECORD COMMENTS 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix B: Face-to-face interview 
Field Format for Perth and Adelaide Hills Bushfire Interviews 
 
Introduction 
 
Introduce myself 
Introduce and background the PhD research 
Provide ethics statement 
Confidentiality 
Obtain consent – provide form and have it signed 
Explain the use of recording equipment 
Proceed with interview 
 
Commencement questions 
 
(Name of survey respondents) told us in the telephone survey, a lot about what happened in your 
household during the fires. I am very interested in your decisions in response to the fire.  
 
Please tell me about what happened during the fire, starting from when you became aware of the fire. 
 
Prompt in the following areas 
 
Risk identification 
 
How did you decide that there was a real threat you needed to pay attention to? 
 
Did you talk about how much threat the fire seemed to be, what sort of impact it might have?  
 
Risk assessment 
 
How did you decide that you needed to take some sort of protective action against the fire? 
 
What influenced your view that you needed to/did not need to take action? 
 
Was there general agreement that you needed to do something? 
 
Protective action search 
 
Did you consider the different options you had to protect yourself from the fire?  
 
What did you do to identify the different options? 
 
Protective action assessment 
 
How did you decide on the best option for protecting yourself and your family? 
 
How did you come to the conclusion that this was your best option to protect you and your family?  
 
How did you come to an agreement on the best thing to do? 
 
Protective action implementation 
 
Once you had decided what you are going to do, how did you decide when you would do it? 
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How did you decide when you would do things? Was it a matter of your agreeing that things should 
be done immediately? Or was this a time when things slowed down because you weren’t sure about 
the decision you made? 
 
Could you have changed your mind about what to do? 
 
What would have changed your mind? 
 
Information needs, assessment and implementation 
 
In the process of deciding what you would do and how to do it you also would have needed to get 
information. How did you decide: 
 
What information you needed to answer your questions about the bushfire? 
Where and how you could get this information? 
Whether you needed to get the information immediately or whether could wait? 
 
Future 
 
Is there anything that you think I should be considering to help people to evacuate safely from 
bushfire? 
 
Thank participant 
  
261 
 
Appendix C: Interview consent form 
 
CONSENT FOR PERTH AND ADELAIDE HILLS BUSHFIRE RESEARCH 
1. I have had the project explained to me, and I have read the information sheet  
2. I agree to participate in the research project as described 
3. I agree: 
to be interviewed  
that my voice will be audio recorded 
4. I acknowledge that: 
(a) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from 
the project at any time and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied 
(unless follow-up is needed for safety). 
(b) The project is for the purpose of research.  It may not be of direct benefit to me. 
(c) The privacy of the personal information I provide will be safeguarded and only disclosed where I 
have consented to the disclosure or as required by law.  
(d) The security of the research data will be protected during and after completion of the study.  The 
data collected during the study may be published, and a report of the project outcomes will be 
provided to RMIT.   Any information which will identify me will not be used. 
Participant’s Consent 
 
Participant:  Date:  
(Signature) 
 
Where participant is under 18 years of age: delete if not required 
 
I consent to the participation of ____________________________________ in the above project. 
 
Signature: (1)                                             (2) 
 
Date:  
(Signatures of parents or guardians) 
 
 
Participants should be given a photocopy of this PICF after it has been signed. 
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Appendix D: Ethics approval letter 
 
 
 
13
th  
January 2014 
 
John Handmer 
Building 96 Level 2, room 2 
School of Mathematical & Geospatial Sciences RMIT 
University 
 
Dear John 
 
ASEHAPP 65 – 13 HANDMER-STRAHAN Household Decision Making in Bushfire 
Self-Evacuation 
 
Thank you for submitting your amended application for review. 
 
I am pleased to inform you that the CHEAN has approved your application for a period of 3 Years 
from the date of this letter to 13
th 
January 2017 and your research may now proceed. 
 
The CHEAN would like to remind you that: 
 
All data should be stored on University Network systems. These systems provide high levels of 
manageable security and data integrity, can provide secure remote access, are backed up on a regular 
basis and can provide Disaster Recover processes should a large scale incident occur. The use of 
portable devices such as CDs and memory sticks is valid for archiving; data transport where 
necessary and for some works in progress. 
The authoritative copy of all current data should reside on appropriate network systems; and the 
Principal Investigator is responsible for the retention and storage of the original data pertaining to the 
project for a minimum period of five years. 
 
Annual reports are due during December for all research projects that have been 
approved by the College Human Ethics Advisory Network (CHEAN). 
 
The necessary form can be found at: www.rmit.edu.au/staff/research/human-research-
ethics 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
 
Linda Jones 
Chair, Science Engineering & 
Health College Human Ethics 
Advisory Network 
 
Cc Student Investigator/s: Ken Strahan s3460512 School of Mathematics and Geospatial Sciences 
Other Investigator/s: Joshua Wittaker Research Fellow School of Mathematics and Geospatial Sciences 
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Appendix E: Participant information form 
  
 
 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION  
Project Title: Household Decision Making in Bushfire Self-Evacuation 
Investigators:  
Professor John Handmer. BA (Hons) MA PhD 
john.handmer@rmit.edu.au 9925 2307 
 
Dr Joshua Whittaker. B SocSci (Hons) PhD 
joshua.whittaker@rmit.edu.au 9925 2418 
 
Mr Ken Strahan. B Com (Hons) M Com 
s3460512@student.rmit.edu.au  
 
Dear …………., 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT University. Please read 
this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before deciding whether to 
participate. If you have any questions about the project, please ask one of the investigators.  
 
Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted? 
  
This Project is being conducted by Ken Strahan who is an RMIT University PhD student in the School 
of Mathematical and Geospatial Sciences. He is being jointly supervised in this project by Professor 
John Handmer, who is the Chief Investigator and by Dr Joshua Whittaker as the Co-investigator. 
The project is examining households’ self-evacuation decision making in the event of a bushfire. 
The project has been approved by the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Why have you been approached? 
  
You have been approached to participate in this research project because you live in a locality where 
there has been a bushfire in the last 3 months. 
 
What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed?  
 
The research project is investigating the issues that influence individuals (in households) in their 
decision to self-evacuate (or not) when confronted with a bushfire in their area. The primary 
research question is: “What are the factors that influence household self-evacuation from bushfire?” 
 
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do?  
 
Should you agree to participate in the research project you will be involved in a 30 minute telephone 
survey and a one hour face-to-face interview with Ken Strahan. The face-to-face interview will be 
conducted with other adult members of your household, in your home or in a location convenient to 
you. 
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What are the possible risks or disadvantages?  
It is not anticipated that there will be any risks to you in being involved is this project outside those 
that you experience on a normal day to day basis. 
 
However, should the survey or interview cause you distress they will be immediately stopped.  
 
If you are in distress or request assistance, we will refer you to an appropriate service, or if there is 
doubt about an appropriate point of reference we will refer you to the Bushfire and Natural Hazards 
CRC contact point for these issues. 
 
What are the benefits associated with participation?  
 
There are no particular benefits to you as a result of your participation in the project although 
participation may prompt your thinking or actions relating to your bushfire self-evacuation decision 
making.  
 
What will happen to the information I provide?  
 
All information that you provide will be treated confidentially and only the three researchers listed 
above will have access to that information.  Information you provide in your telephone and/or face 
to face interviews will be coded and stored separately from identifying information such as names 
and addresses. You will not be identifiable within our research records. 
 
Any information that you provide can be disclosed only if (1) it is to protect you or others from harm, 
(2) if specifically required or allowed by law, or (3) you provide the researchers with written 
permission.  
 
The results of this research project will be published in Ken Strahan’s PhD thesis and are likely to 
published or disseminated through peer-reviewed journals, conference papers and other 
publications. The results will be published as an Appropriate Durable Record (ADR) in the RMIT 
Online Repository which is a publicly accessible online library of research papers. 
 
No individual records will be identifiable as all data will be treated at an aggregate level and any 
possible identifiers removed from the data file.  
 
All research data, including telephone interviews and face-to-face audio recordings, will be kept 
securely at RMIT for 5 years after publication, before being destroyed. The final research paper will 
remain online as an ADR. 
 
Because of the nature of our initial data collection, we are not obtaining written informed consent 
from you immediately. Instead, we will seek verbal consent at the time that you are first contacted 
by telephone and written consent when we interview you face-to-face. . 
 
What are my rights as a participant?  
• The right to withdraw from participation at any time  
• The right to request that any recording cease  
• The right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can be 
reliably identified, and provided that so doing does not increase the risk for the participant.  
• The right to be de-identified in any photographs intended for public publication, before the 
point of publication  
• The right to have any questions answered at any time.  
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Who should I contact if I have any questions?  
If you have any questions about the research project you can contact Professor John Handmer or Dr 
Joshua Whittaker at the School of Mathematical and Geospatial Sciences on (03) 9925 2283. 
 
What other issues should I be aware of before deciding whether to participate?  
We are not aware of any other ethical issues that we believe you as a potential participant should be 
aware of before deciding whether you wish to participate.  
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Professor John Handmer.  Dr Joshua Whittaker.  Mr Ken Strahan 
BA (Hons) MA PhD   BSocSci (Hons) PhD  B Com (Hons) M Com 
 
 
If you have any complaints about your participation in this project, please see the complaints 
procedure at http://www.rmit.edu.au/research/human-research-ethics   
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Appendix H: Face-to face interviews: thematic categories 
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